

FRONTIER LAND SYSTEMS IN SOUTHERNMOST CHINA

A comparative study of agrarian
problems and social organization
among the Pai Yi people of Yunnan
and the Kamba people of Sikang.

By

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FOREWORD

This study is a product of what was originally planned to be a more comprehensive investigation of non-Chinese communities in southern and southwestern China. The project was begun in 1940 but wartime difficulties and the pressure of other duties made it impossible to carry out the whole program. The two field studies which are described in the present report were, however, completed and the results were written up in Chinese. It was not possible until recently to complete the translation of these reports into English. Fortunately this delay has not appreciably diminished the value of the reports since, according to more recent evidence, the basic pattern of social relationships described herein have not been materially altered during the past few years.

The Institute of Pacific Relations is now issuing the study in the hope that not only will it be of interest to anthropologists and students of Chinese frontier problems but it will also throw light on the larger problem of Chinese administration of the numerous non-Chinese peoples that inhabit the whole southwestern and northwestern area of the country. Few Westerners realize the extent and the importance of these non-Chinese areas although in such places as Sinkiang they have obvious political and international significance. The problem, however, is one which is likely to increase in importance with the development of transport and education in China. This is likely to remain true no matter what regime assumes control of the central government of the country.

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December 1948

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND
Secretary General

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

Although this study is limited to the agrarian systems of the Pai Yi in Yunnan and the Kamba in Sikang, it is intended to illustrate how the agrarian problem is interwoven with national and colonial questions, or how agrarian changes are at once complicated by an alien administration and by problems pertaining to nationality. The Pai Yi are of Thai or Siamese nationality, and the Kamba, of Tibetan nationality; both live in China's southwestern borderland and are dominated by an external feudal regime.

Until recently most Western scholars have hesitated to consider white ("civilized") and colored ("uncivilized") races on the same level. To them the question of nationalities and land tenure was often confined to Europe, to the Balkan peoples, the Poles, the Finns, and the Irish. Hundreds of millions of peasants in Africa and Asia who still live under alien domination have been beyond the mental horizon of these writers. Mr. V. Liversage in his Land Tenure in the Colonies (1945), Sir Alan Pim in his Colonial Agricultural Production (1946), and Dr. C. K. Meek in his Land Law and Custom in the Colonies (1946) have effectively brought together the agrarian and the colonial questions, but have neglected their national aspects. It is hoped that the present study may help to elevate what appears to be an internal agrarian question to what is in reality a problem of general international significance.

Imperialistic penetration tends to preserve temporarily the traditional feudal relations. An example of this may be found in my previous study, Industrial Capital and Chinese Peasants (1939). Similarly, feudalistic penetration hinders the transformation of tribal land tenure as well as any pre-feudal social structure. In both cases alien domination retards rather than liberates forces that are necessary for the progress of society and its national culture. Indeed, agrarian problems today are intricately bound to international relations.

Lord Hailey in An African Survey (1938) said, "The forms of land tenure must bear a close relation to the kind of society it is proposed to establish." As a matter of fact, it is social structure that creates its own pattern of land tenure; agrarian systems and agricultural economies merely reflect the particular social structure in which they are found. Inasmuch as the Chinese feudalistic administration has superimposed itself upon the Pai Yi society and the Kamba society and hinders free development and progress there, the pre-feudal or primitive forms of land tenure of these two societies have been preserved for an abnormally long time.

Consequently, the parts of Yunnan and Sikang, where detailed surveys were conducted in 1940, the results of which are presented in this report, may be considered as living museums of agrarian history. In point of

evolution, however, the form of the Pai Yi society in southernmost Yunnan is older than that of the Kamba society in eastern Sikang, which in turn is older than that of the Uighur society in the cases of the southern Sinkiang. Modern communication, influenced by international relations, has, more than any other factor, decisively brought about such a differentiation.

To the Institute of Pacific Relations, which I had the honor to serve as research associate for a number of years, and to its Secretary General, Mr. William L. Holland, I owe a debt that I can hardly hope to do more than acknowledge with a profound feeling of gratitude. Without the support of the Institute this study could not have been undertaken; without the continued friendly interest and encouragement of my colleagues at the Institute, it would not have been completed. I am also indebted to Mr. Chen Hung-tsin for his able assistance in field work, his laborious task of statistical operation, and his many valuable comments and criticisms. I am solely responsible, however, for the views expressed in the study.

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PART I

THE PAI YI IN YUNNAN

CHAPTER I.

THE PAI YI IN YUNNAN

Though eroded and corrupted by commerce and capitalism, feudalism in China has never been eliminated. It still holds its own ground against the inevitable development of modern industry. Such nationalities as the Muslims, Mongols, Miao, Yi, etc., long forced into the background by the highly organized Chinese or Han bureaucracy, have never been able to integrate themselves economically and politically into nations. Like Austria-Hungary under the Hapsburgs and Russia under the Romanovs, China is a multi-national state. Whereas in Austria the politically more developed Germans amalgamated the Czechs, Poles and others into a state, and in Hungary the Magyars dominated the Croats and others, and in Russia the Great-Russians welded the Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Letts, etc. into one imperial state, in China the Chinese, or the Han people, from the very remote past have conquered minor nationalities and formed an empire.

In the several southwestern provinces of China the Yi form the most important minor nationality. According to a somewhat conservative estimate, there are at least 6,750,000 people in the four provinces of Kwangsi, Kweichow, Kwangtung and Yunnan who speak one or another dialect of the Yi language. Their distribution may be seen from the following:

Distribution of Yi Peoples

<u>Location</u>	<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Number</u>
Kwangsi	T'o, Nung, and Chawng	2,000,000
Kweichow	Yoi, Chung, and Chung-chia	2,000,000
Kwangtung (mainland)	Chawng	500,000
Kwangtung (Hainan island)	Lei	250,000
North and Northeastern Yunnan	Tai Nam, Tai Lai, Tai Lung, Tai Yoi, Chin Tai, etc.	1,000,000
Western Yunnan	Tai Nua	600,000
Southern Yunnan	Lú, Shui Pai Yi and Pai Yi	400,000
Total		6,750,000 ⁽¹⁾

So far no philological, ethnological or archaeological studies establish definitely the geographical region which may be regarded as the birthplace of the Yi, though in 1885 Professor Terrien de Lacouperie concluded that they had come from the mountains north of Szechuan and south of Shensi. (2) Major H. R. Davies of the 52nd Oxfordshire Light Infantry traveled through Yunnan in 1895 and expressed the opinion that the Yi at one time had probably inhabited a great part of China south of the Yangtze but were subsequently absorbed by the Chinese. (3) Just as the Miao and the Yao had been pressed into Indo-China, the Yi were pushed out of the more eastern provinces of China by the slow advance of the Chinese. In Yunnan the Yi have moved generally toward the south. Up to

the time of Mongol conquest in western Yunnan, the Yi had concentrated their population in Tali and Yungchang (now Pao-shan), (4) but today there are very few Yi living in these two districts. The most concentrated Yi population is to be found in southernmost parts of Yunnan, the region inhabited by the Pai Yi.

According to the opinion of Major Davies, later confirmed by the field study of a Chinese philological student, Tao Yun-kwei, the Miao and the Yao were the first aborigines of Yunnan, later came the Yi, still later the Fan from Tibet, and finally the Han or the Chinese. (5) For centuries the Yi have been pushed south toward the seacoast. In Siam they are known as the Yun or the Tai, and number about 10,000,000. In Indo-China they are known as the Lao, the Nung, Tai-Dam and Tai Kao, totaling 2,000,000. In Burma, known as the Shans, Ngio and Kun in the Federated Shan States, and as the Ahom and Khamti on the Indian border, they number about 1,250,000. (6) In other words, the total population of the Yi is about 20,000,000 of which 13,250,000 are to be found south of China's boundary.

Dr. William C. Dodd, thirty-three years an American Presbyterian missionary to the Yi, made a tour of investigation in Yunnan during 1913. According to his estimate, as seen from the above table, there are about 2,000,000 Yi in Yunnan. Half of these, mostly in northern parts of the province, are illiterate, i.e. without a written language of their own. The other half, being literate, have two branches; the Tai Nua and the Tai Lu. (7) Tai Nua is known to the British as "Chinese Shans," while Tai Lu is also called Lu, and known to the Chinese as Pai Yi.

When Mr. Tao Yun-kwei of Academia Sinica made an anthropological survey in Yunnan during 1934-1936, he estimated that there were about 550,000 Pai Yi in the southern parts of Yunnan, forming nearly five percent of the total population of the province. (8) The Pai Yi in Yunnan are now distributed in four regions. First of these is the Red River valley among the several districts of Yuan Kiang, Mu Kiang and Pu Ehr, where the Pai Yi claim 30 to 35 percent of the total local population. This region was completely conquered by the Chinese about four hundred years ago, and the Pai Yi here have been most influenced by Chinese customs and manners. The second region lies along the present Yunnan-Burma Highway from Paoshan to Woanting, where the Pai Yi make up 30 to 40 percent of the local population, still maintaining their own customs and manners. Third is a region between 23° and 24° N and between the Salween and the Mekong, where the Pai Yi are much less influenced by Chinese culture. Fourth and last is the region south of 23°, on both sides of the Mekong, the southernmost part of Yunnan. Here the Pai Yi are often called Shui Pai Yi by the Chinese. Historically this territory is known as the Shih Shong Baan Naa, meaning in the Yi language "twelve lands." The Pai Yi in these "twelve lands" are the least influenced by Chinese customs and manners. (9)

The Pai Yi in Shih Shong Baan Naa comprise 50 to 85 percent of the total local population. (10) They are a short, well built people, with very distinct Mongoloid features, and a yellow complexion as fair as, or sometimes fairer than that of the Chinese. When Major Davies saw them in 1895 he described their dress as considerably different from that of the Chinese Shans (Tai Nua). The men wear blue clothes, but the bottom of

their trouser-legs and the sleeves of their jackets are ornamented with stripes of some lighter colour, and on their heads they usually wear yellow silk turbans. The women wear light blue or dark blue jackets, and skirts striped horizontally with various colours, generally green or light blue at the bottom. Their turbans are dark blue with a gold fringe, and a silver ornament is often worn in the hair-knot." (11) Forty-five years later, in 1940, when the present writer visited that region, he found the Pai Yi usually bare-headed but sometimes wearing cloth turbans. Fancy and ornamented dress had disappeared and even the silver ornament in the hair-knot was a rare sight. Apparently poverty had increased.

The origin of the name "Pai Yi" is not certain. Professor Terrien de Lacouperie, in his study of the aboriginal and non-Chinese races of China, concluded that "Pai-Yi" was synonymous to "Pai Yi", which meant "the barbarians from eastern Szechuan and western Hupeh." (12) While it is true that "Yi" in Chinese does mean barbarian and "Pa" was the old name for the Szechuan-Hupeh border region, the meaning of "Pa" has never been ascertained, nor can it be stated reliably that "Pa" has been corrupted or modified to "Pai".

In his description of the Pai Yi in 1882, Archibald R. Colquhoun thought that the literati had "cunningly fostered" the superstition "that foreigners come to their country to spy on the nakedness of the land, and that, by chipping stones or taking an angle here or there, they steal away the 'Po', or 'good fortune' from the place." (13) Thus "Pai Yi" is the same as "Po Yi," and it should mean the people of good fortune. While Yi is a Chinese term, "Po" must be a word in the Yi language, and the combination is taken to mean "lucky barbarians." (14)

Recent field investigations have revealed that "Pai" is a religious and social term among the Yi people in western and southern Yunnan. It is the term given to the entire process of installing a Buddha and the hilarious celebration connected with it. (15) Usually the Buddha is purchased near the Burmese border and carried to the village for worship and celebration. A small stone or wood Buddha is transported by two men and a large one by four in a journey of many days. After its arrival one to three days of religious ceremony takes place and in the night, under full moonlight, the youth of the village and neighboring places make love during the long celebration. Those who put up this "Pai" are henceforth called "good people." Only "good people" can expect a seat in heaven after death, and consequently command considerable social prestige while living. It is the personal ambition of everyone to have a "Pai," and probably because of this the entire people is called "Pai Yi," meaning those "barbarians" who always want to and do put up the "Pai."

CHAPTER II.

SHIH SHONG BAAN NAA

The Pai Yi population is concentrated in the southernmost region of Yunnan, which was undoubtedly a part of the Indo-Chinese territory known as Suvarnabhumi in Sanskrit, meaning "golden land." (16) In Chinese history this region has always been called Shih Shong Baan Naa. Shih Shong, in the Yi language, means ten and two; Baan Naa, land and field. Historically, this regional name signified a union of some twelve main tribes, each with its definite boundaries and cultivated lands. Later, in relation to the feudal suzerainty above them, each applied to a valley or a group of small valleys where the Pai Yi and the aboriginal people lived.

These valleys and localities had the following names:

1st Baan Naa:	Ting Cheng, Meng Hai, Meng Er, Meng Yan, Meng Kwan, Meng Sing, Meng Yuan
2nd Baan Naa:	Meng Lung
3rd Baan Naa:	Meng Chua
4th Baan Naa:	Meng Wen, Meng Pan, Meng La
5th Baan Naa:	Loh Shun, Cheng Tung, Lung Teh
6th Baan Naa:	Che Li, Kan Lan Pa, Meng Lun, Meng Soon, Lung Hu, Meng Kwon
7th Baan Naa:	Meng Man, Meng Kong, Ta Loh
8th Baan Naa:	Meng Pon, Meng Shun, Meng Moan
9th Baan Naa:	Pu Teng, Meng Ban
10th Baan Naa:	Meng O, O Teh
11th Baan Naa:	Yi Pang, Yeh Wu
12th Baan Naa:	Meng Hung

The 10th Baan Naa was incorporated in French Indo-China and the 12th Baan Naa in British Burma, while the rest of Shih Shong Baan Naa is organized as six Chinese administrative districts. The leading and politically most important district is Cheli, comprising the towns of Che Li, Kan Lan Pa, Meng Lun, and Meng Kwon. Bordering the Shan States of Burma and commercially the most important is the district of Fuhai, embracing the towns of Meng Hai, Meng Wen, and Ta Loh. The other four mountainous districts are Nanchiao, Ningkiang, Chengyueh, and Loshun. Cheli is geographically located in the center of these six districts which have a total area of about 15,000 square miles and a total population of 160,000. (17)

This area is much larger than Belgium or San Salvador, and it is a veritable Switzerland for mountains, without the good roads or public conveyances of that country.

Shih Shong Baan Naa is largely mountainous but towns with a population of 5,000 or 10,000 people are situated in the valleys wide enough to allow irrigation and rice cultivation. Almost everywhere village wells are found, walled and curbed with brick or stone, and usually roofed with tile or thatch. A few of them are arched over with stone masonry. Agriculture is well advanced. (18) There is a succession of crops; rice is followed by tobacco, pepper, peas, onions, peanuts, etc. Most of these are planted by the acre, instead of in little garden patches as in Siam. A few of the towns are less than a day's journey apart when traveling on foot over the mountains; many of them are more. The people are excellent field cultivators, and, generally speaking, a stay-at-home folk.

The valleys and towns are inhabited by the Pai Yi peasants, who make up at least 70 percent of the total population. Their ancestors came from the north and east and established a union of the twelve tribes during the Tang Dynasty (between the eighth and ninth centuries.) They drove the aboriginals, chiefly the Lo Kher and the Akar, to the slopes of the hills and the high mountains. (19) The Akar, who still make up about 15 percent of the total population, are among the earliest aboriginal people here. They now cultivate tea, cotton, and a very hardy variety of rice high up in the mountains. With these products they come down to the markets to trade with the Pai Yi for cloth, implements, ornaments and vegetables.

The few hundred Chinese (or Han people) who temporarily reside among the Pai Yi do not make up even half a percent of the total population. Most of the Chinese in Shih Shong Baan Naa are either merchant-usurers, or magistrates and other officials with their retinue and bodyguards. During their sojourn, which may be anywhere from six months to several years, they make as much money as possible. As overlords and exploiters of the local people, they have bred deceit, corruption, bribery and brutality, and have invited the intense hatred of the Pai Yi.

The Yi in general, and the Pai Yi in particular, have a common language. Major Davies observed that of all the Indo-Chinese groups the Yi is the only one whose language has not been split up into mutually unintelligible dialects. "From the sources of the Irrawaddy down to the Siamese border, and from Assam to Tongking, a region measuring 600 miles each way and including the whole of the former Nan-Chao empire (from the seventh to thirteenth centuries) the language is practically the same. Dialects of course exist as they do in every country in the world, but a Shan (or a Yi) born anywhere within these bounds will find himself able to carry on a conversation in parts of the country he has never heard of, hundreds of miles from his own home. And this it must be remembered is more than six hundred years after the fall of the Nan-Chao dynasty, and among Shans who have had no recent political or commercial relations with each other." (20)

In Yunnan the 25th parallel of latitude marks also a linguistic dividing line. North of this the Tibeto-Burman languages dominate among the aboriginals, while the Yi and Mon-khmer (or the Miao and the Yao)

languages are spoken in the south. As mentioned before, there are two branches of the Yi in the south: the Tai Nua, or "Chinese Shans", to the west, and the Tai Lü, or Lü, or the Pai Yi, to the east. Evidently the Pai Yi of Shih Shong Baan Naa have developed a written language of their own. According to Major Davies, "The Lü writing differs from that of the Chinese Shans and is very like that of the Laos of north Siam." (21) There is also a marked difference in the spoken language. In the Salween valley to the west many harsh gutturals are heard. In the Mekong valley, in the heart of Shih Shong Baan Naa, these sounds disappear but there is a general tendency to turn the sound ai into oi, thus kai, fai, becomes koi, foi. East of the Shih Shong Baan Naa another change of dialect takes place.

Language is always a very important factor in the formation of a nation. "No nation is possible", said Otto Bauer, "without a common language." (22) This is true because a "nation is a sociological and not a biological term." (23) The Pai Yi of Shih Shon Baan Naa are not only a group of tribes, of an ethnographical category, but they themselves constitute a nation, occupying a common territory and speaking a common language. Moreover, they maintain their own economic system, and their culture reveals national psychological characteristics.

The Yi of southwestern Yunnan, the so-called Chinese Shans, seem to have lost whatever distinct national character they may once have had. Intrigue, opium and Chinese civilization generally, have conspired to render them more or less like Chinese. This is especially true along the Yunnan-Burma Highway. But the "Shans" in the southernmost part of the province, in Shih Shong Baan Naa, are quite different. Of the Pai Yi in this region Major Davies said, "They live almost exclusively in river valleys, and on the whole, I think that they have probably mixed less with other tribes than may have been the case with the Lo-los. Living as they do in the valleys, with an established Buddhist religion, a more or less settled government, and a comparatively high civilization, they are somewhat sharply distinguished from their neighbours." (24)

Undoubtedly, the Pai Yi of Shih Shong Baan Naa are a historically evolved nation, because they constitute a stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up different from the Chinese, the Miao, the Lo Kher and the Akar. That this nation has been preserved for many centuries must be explained chiefly in terms of the isolated position of this particular portion of Yunnan.

The first Westerner who visited Shih Shong Baan Naa was a Briton employed by the Government of India, Captain W. C. McLeod. "The great importance of reaching China through Zimme (in Siam) and the Shan State (in Burma) has been acknowledged by the Government of India ever since McLeod's visit to Zimme, Kiang Tung and Kiang Hung in 1836-1837." (25) At that time streams and rivers had no bridges. Round trips between Yunnan and Burma took a little over four months. The State of Kiang Hung was another name for Shih Shong Baan Naa. According to Colquhoun's information in 1882, it could not be entered until both the permission of the Chinese government, to which it had once been tributary, and of the Chieftain of the State had to be obtained. (26) In that year Colquhoun discovered that the Chinese name for Kiang Hung was Cheli, the name earlier known to the Jesuits. (27)

Kiang Hung was sometimes written as Kenghung by the British, was known to the French as Xieng-hong, and to the Chinese as Cheli, or simply Kiu-lung-kiang. Kiulungkiang (nine dragon river) is the Chinese name for Mekong or Cambodia. To the Pai Yi of the Shih Shong Baan Naa, the city of Cheli is known as Chienghung. In the Siamese language it is called Chiengrung. The city is located on the Mekong, three caravan stages from the Burmese border. It is situated on a steep western slope overlooking the river, so hidden by trees that only the temples and the long sloping roof of the Chieftain's palace can be seen from the river.

Colquhoun did not visit Cheli in 1882. The second Westerner actually to arrive there was Rev. Daniel McGilvary of the American Presbyterian Mission in 1893, fifty-six years after Capt. McLeod. Rev. William C. Dodd of the same Mission, thirty-three years a missionary to the Tai people in Siam, was the third Western visitor to Cheli in 1913. He described the Pai Yi territory as a pocket in the southern border of China, and the city of Chiengrung as in the middle of this pocket.

"We are in a pocket, sure enough," said Dr. Dodd, "shut off from everyone and everything belonging to the world we have lived in heretofore. We have neither post nor telegraph, though we have the promise of both. The nearest are six days away at Szemao, the official center of the southwest quarter of Yunnan. They hold our mail there till they get a man's load before they send it on by official runners! Letters come more frequently. Often our papers are four months old when we get them, and Christmas cards arrive on the Fourth of July. It is 26 days from Chiengrung by caravan stage via Szemao, to the French railway at Mengtze; it is 24 or 25 days down to the Siam railway at Lakawn; and it is about the same distance to the Burma railway, via Kengtung." (28) It seems either prophetic or satiric that when the whole country is "dark as a pocket," the name of the capital, Chienghung, or Chiengrung, should mean in the Pai Yi language, the Metropolis of the Dawn.

CHAPTER 3.
IN SPLENDID ISOLATION

The Pai Yi of Shih Shong Baan Naa did not come into contact with the Han, or Chinese, until the 14th century. Closer relations between the two began only during the Ming Dynasty, (fourteenth to seventeenth centuries), followed by a long period of Chinese conquest from the middle of the eighteenth century to the early years of the Chinese Republic. Because of historical and geographical isolation this region, of which Cheli is the center, remains today the racial minority in China that is least sinofied, showing the minimum evidence of Chinese political and social influence.

From the beginning of the seventeenth to the middle of the thirteenth centuries, i.e. during the Tang and Sung Dynasties, there was a powerful kingdom named Nan-Chao in the northern and western parts of Yunnan. Tali and Paoshan, both situated on the present Yunnan-Burma Highway, were the flourishing centers of this kingdom, whose population was largely Tibetan and Yi. To the southeast of the present Kunming, largely in the Red River valley, there were 37 tribes who sooner or later became tributaries to Nan-Chao. A very small number of those in this valley were the Pai Yi. At that time, most of the Pai Yi were living in the Salween and Mekong valleys to the southwest of Kunming, and were quite independent of Nan-Chao. (29)

Contemporary writings by Chinese authors in the Tang Dynasty give some idea of the political economy of Nan-Chao, which was more backward than that existing in Central China. (30) Agriculture was conducted under a latifundia system, with farms as large as ten miles each way. Harvests were supervised by officials, who distributed the necessary amount of unhusked rice each peasant family would need for subsistence, and took the rest of the harvest for the State. All peasants had to fight at the order of the State or the Chieftain, and such soldiers were not paid. For every hundred families there was a police officer to maintain peace and order. (31)

Threatened by barbarian invasions from north of the Great Wall, the Chinese emperors of Tang and Sung never came into conflict with the Nan-Chao rulers. On the contrary, friendly relations were maintained between them. Nan-Chao itself, however, was not advanced enough in political economy to subdue the tribes in the Red River valley, much less to bring the Pai Yi of the Mekong valley to a tributary status. In fact, as late as 1205-1238 A.D. the Nan Chao rulers had to send military expeditions to quell the tribal rebellions in the southeast. (32) The Pai Yi in Shih Shong Baan Naa did not become a tribute-paying nation until the middle of the thirteenth century, and then not to the Nan-Chao rulers, nor to the Chinese emperors, but to the Mongol conquerors.

Under the Mongol dynasty of Yuan, Yunnan was incorporated as a part of China. However, the tributary status of Shih Shong Baan Naa during the Yuan Dynasty was temporary, and more or less nominal. The fact was that some forty years after Kublai Khan had reached Tali and conquered Nan-Chao in 1253, another Mongol general in Yunnan, known as Uriangkadai, made an expedition to "Annam", or the present territory of Tonkin, in

in order to defeat the Chinese army of the Sung Dynasty in Kwangsi and Kwangtung. Later the troops of Uriangkadai entered Hunan and captured the city of Changsha. The Mongol expedition to Tonkin followed the Red River valley and never entered Shih Shong Baan Naa. (33)

After 1296 there was continuous internecine warfare in this region, which came to an end in 1325 when the Yuan Court appointed a Pai Yi Chieftain as commander-in-chief at Cheli. (34) Never once throughout the Mongol rule in China did the Emperor send a military expedition to Shih Shong Baan Naa. This had been attempted twice, in 1302 and again in 1312, but the plan was not actually carried out. Towards the end of the thirteenth century the Yuan aristocracy had become so weak that it had to avoid using military power as a means of quelling rebellions. (35) It furthermore adopted a policy of non-intervention and remained neutral in any case of disputed succession. For this reason, there was very little record of this region in Yuan history, even less than of northern Siam, a territory contiguous to it. The Mongols sent a military expedition to northern Siam in 1312, but it collapsed because of pestilence and other hardships. (36) Throughout the Mongol rule in China, Shih Shong Baan Naa was nominally under the suzerainty of Peking. Neither Mongol nor Chinese culture, however, exercised any influence over this region.

The Ming Dynasty, which succeeded the Mongols, also sent no military expedition to Shih Shong Baan Naa. When the Ming rulers dispatched their troops to Kunming and Tali in 1381, they ordered General Fu Yu-teh not to extend the expeditionary forces but to receive tributary messengers from the border regions. (37) Thus the Cheli region became a tributary of the Ming Emperors for about 150 years, from 1381 to 1532, though the Ming rule in China lasted 276 years. Some regions to the northeast of Cheli became Ming tributaries as late as 1432. Consequent on the rise of Taungoo Dynasty in Burma (1531-1758) a large portion of Shih Shong Baan Naa recognized the suzerainty of the Burmese king. The Ming Emperor sent a punitive expedition to Burma in 1583 which did not pass through Cheli but marched along the present Yunnan-Burma Highway line. By 1596 a large number of Chinese soldiers started colonization work on the border around Woanting. (38)

Despite this punitive expedition the Yi tribes north of Cheli revolted no less than six times between 1570 and 1600. (39) Shortly afterwards Burmese troops went to Cheli and captured the chieftain of Shih Shong Baan Naa in 1626. The Yi ruler from the Red River Valley to the east, who entered and succeeded him, was later murdered by Chinese troops dispatched by the Ching Dynasty, or the Manchu Dynasty. For thirty-three years, therefore, from 1626 to 1659, Shih Shong Baan Naa was a tributary to the Taungoo kings in Burma.

It can safely be said that the relationship between Shih Shong Baan Naa and the Peking court was closer during the Ming than during the previous Yuan Dynasty. For in the period of Ming rulers two marked changes took place which clearly affected this relationship. First, hereditary succession of Chieftains among the Pai Yi was replaced by approved succession granted by the Imperial Court in Peking. As a rule the Court just sanctioned whosoever was qualified by the tradition of hereditary succession. There were also occasions when the Court, pursuing a policy of "divide and rule," deliberately approved an untraditional succession. In these cases internecine wars often ensued. (40) Second,

in addition to the same voluntary tributes as were paid during the Mongol rule (Yuan Dynasty), the Pai Yi chieftains had to pay the Ming Emperors a certain amount of silver every year, and had to contribute labor requisitions as they required from time to time. However, neither Yuan nor Ming rulers exacted tax, in agricultural produce, from Shih Shong Bean Naa.

CHAPTER IV

INCOMPLETE CHINESE CONQUEST

After Manchu Dynasty troops had entered into Shih Shong Baan Naa and had installed a Pai Yi chieftain of their choice at Cheli in 1659, the Imperial Court in Peking, where political power was distributed between the Manchu military commanders and Chinese bureaucrats, launched a definite policy of conquering this minor nationality in Yunnan. The conquest was largely undertaken by Chinese officials, soldiers and merchants. Its evolution marked three distinct stages: first, the peaceful administrative conquest of the northern part of this Pai Yi region; second, the bloody and brutal conquest of its southeastern parts, east of the Mekong; third, the equally bloody conquest of its southwestern parts, including Cheli. In the southwest, however, the conquest is still incomplete. Here, the old tribal land system has not been altered by the Chinese administration, whereas in other parts of the region it has already been wiped out. It is because of this incomplete conquest that Cheli and its neighboring districts to the West and to the south have never paid agricultural produce as tribute to the Chinese administration.

During the reign of the first Manchu Emperor in China no less than thirteen Yi towns were organized under the Chinese administration. They were Meng Yan and Meng Yuan of the 1st Baan Naa, Cheng Tung of the 5th Baan Naa, Meng Pon of the 8th, Pu Teng and Sze Mao of the 9th, Meng O of the 10th and others nearby, located in the northern portion of Shih Shong Baan Naa. In 1661 these Pai Yi communities were brought under the supervision and control of a new prefecture of Yuan Kiang. In 1664 a sub-prefecture with headquarters in Pu Ehr, situated immediately on the northern boundary of Shih Shong Baan Naa, was installed. The chieftains of the thirteen Pai Yi towns were not allowed to collect tribute, which now went directly to the Chinese officer in Pu Ehr. Other Pai Yi towns, such as Cheli in the south, sent tribute to Pu Ehr by special messengers. (41) During this peaceful stage of 65 years, from 1661 to March 1726, when the acting Viceroy of Yunnan and Kweichow, Oer Tai, arrived in Kunming, the Pai Yi land system in those thirteen towns was not disturbed. Consequently there was no revolt, nor was there any need for military expeditions.

The second stage which established the Chinese rule over the southeastern parts of Shih Shong Baan Naa, east of the Mekong, was, in contrast to the first stage, marked by many revolts and military expeditions. These revolts were often caused by the Chinese attempt to change the Pai Yi land system (to transform land ownership from a village collective possession to a private family property). The revolts were more or less linked to the earlier Sino-Burmese War and to the later Pai Yi internecine wars of succession. Still later, these local disturbances supported the big Muslim rebellion, begun in West Yunnan, which lasted for more than thirty years, spread throughout the province and reduced more than half of its population. From 1726 to 1909 this was a period of intrigue, atrocity, devastation and conquest, a long period of 183 years.

Indeed, the maximum number of Chinese garrison troops in this region was to be found during this period. According to the records in Pu Ehr

Prefecture Chronicle, the following statistics are available:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Garrison at Pu Ehr and Sze Mao</u>
Before 1723	2,400 regular troops
About 1729	3,200 regular troops
About 1851	2,450 winter militia
1888	1,451 regular troops
1890	1,284 regular troops
1895	921 militia

The primary attraction to the Chinese merchants and officials who were followed by these soldiers was the abundant harvests of cotton and tea in this southeastern portion of Shih Shong Baan Naa. Sze Mao was then the collection center for cotton, whence this valuable commodity was not only distributed to the northern and eastern parts of the province but also to Kwangsi and Kweichow and Szechuan. The Pu Ehr tea, so well known throughout China, was actually produced in the high mountains of Chenghuh (northern part) and Cheli (eastern part). Pu Ehr was the central market to which more than a thousand tea merchants came every year from western Yunnan to do business. These Chinese tea dealers practiced usury and exploited the Pai Yi, the producers. Loans were extended to them in the autumn and were returned in spring at the time of tea harvest. The fixed low collection price plus high rates of interest left little income to the producers. (42)

At the same time Chinese officials, both military and civil, carried out their extortions. During the harvest season they sent their soldiers or guardsmen into the mountains to collect tea and paid whatever price they chose. The tea transport in such cases was done by requisitioned labor. Besides, civil bureaucrats demanded tea tribute from the Pai Yi, and army bureaucrats held up the tea transport for tolls. By 1733 tea was declared to be a government monopoly. The tea merchants were forbidden to enter the region and no free trading of tea was permitted. What the Chinese administration paid for tea collection was not more than 50 percent of the market price.

There were four salt wells yielding natural salt in Shih Shong Baan Naa. At first Chinese magistrates stationed revenue officers at each of these places. Later, when the salt revenue collectors stayed away from these valleys of low altitude-climatically unfavorable to them- they demanded a lump sum payment from the Pai Yi of some 2,000 ounces of silver annually. This heavy tax burden considerably reduced the chances of good livelihood for the salt producers. The revolt near Cheli in 1732 was caused by both the tea monopoly and salt tribute. When the Chinese launched a punitive expedition against these helpless Pai Yi, the latter had to flee into the mountains, but not until after they had cut down numerous tea "trees" to fill up the salt wells. (43)

So far as the local chronicles can show, the biggest revolt in Shih Shong Baan Naa took place in 1728, participated in by the Pai Yi, the Lo Kher and other aboriginals. It was a revolt against Oér Tai's agrarian policy. In November 1726, shortly after his arrival in Yunnan, Oér Tai became the Viceroy. Two years later he was made the Viceroy not only of Yunnan and Kweichow but of Kwangsi as well. His policy was known as kai-tu kuei-liu, meaning the abolishment of hereditary chieftains. The

tribes of the Pai Yi and the aboriginals were to be governed directly by Chinese magistrates appointed by the Provincial Governor and the Viceroy jointly. By confiscating, whenever possible, the land of the chieftains and by surveying the village land of the Pai Yi for the purpose of collecting direct land tax, Oér Tai succeeded, during his term of more than six years of office, in reducing the power of the Pai Yi chiefs east of the Mekong and in greatly extending the taxable lands of the Peking Imperial Court.

The newly appointed Chinese magistrates gave the order that within three months after the completion of land survey there should be a full payment of the land tax in cash. In case of the failure of such payment, the land surveyed would be confiscated. Corruption and bribery in connection with land surveying and tax payment, as well as the additional miscellaneous requisitions, further infuriated the local population. The initial act of the popular revolt was a sudden massacre of Magistrate Liu Hung-tu and his entire family. (44) Liu was caught in the official stable where he had fled and hidden himself. The rebels searched him out and took away from his official seal with which they knocked him down and killed him. His heart and liver were removed, cooked and eaten. His corpse was boxed up in between two tables and burned. Outside the office building scores of bodies were burned; they were the guardsmen who had extorted and oppressed the Pai Yi and aboriginals. Only a Chinese cook, who had always treated tribute messengers well, was spared.

Oér Tai quelled this 1728 revolt by dispatching several thousand armed troops, who massacred the people and looted village after village. Those Pai Yi chieftains who offered resistance were executed or banished and the rest were either allowed to remain with an annual stipend or were shifted to other provinces. By 1807 the entire region was pacified. While the chieftains west of the Mekong remained to rule in their own traditional way, those east of the river had all been replaced by Chinese magistrates appointed by the Imperial Court. (45) The rank of Viceroy Oér Tai was raised to an hereditary baron. Still later he was summoned to Peking and was made a Grand Secretary and concurrently president of the Board of War and Grand Councillor. For his policy of eradicating the hereditary Pai Yi chieftains, he was finally rewarded by the Manchu Emperor with the title of an Earl of the first class with rights of perpetual inheritance. After his death in 1745 his name was celebrated in the Imperial Ancestral Temple and in the Temple of Eminent Statesmen.

The joint Manchu-Chinese rule of Shih Shong Baan Naa went from bad to worse and reached its nadir in about the middle of the nineteenth century. Synchronizing with the Taiping Rebellion, which spread far and wide in the central and eastern provinces, was the Muslim Rebellion in Yunnan, which lasted much longer. Though Tu Wen-hsiu led the Muslim movement in Yunnan from 1855 to 1872, the movement itself had begun as early as 1838 in southwestern parts of the province and did not end until 1874 in Meng Shih and Kai Hwa in the southeast. This 36-year war devastation and the subsequent plague reduced the provincial population from 15 to 4 million. (46)

Throughout the Yunnan Muslim Rebellion, the western part of Shih Shong Baan Naa remained relatively quiet. Here there were as yet no Chinese officers, no Chinese magistrates, to be dealt with. Tiao Tsun-cheng, the Pai Yi chieftain in Cheli, raised an army of 6,000 men to help

the Chinese administration east of the Mekong. Evidently he was grateful to the Chinese administration which had always favored his ancestors in their wars of succession during the previous period. The Pai Yi were, however, so sympathetic to the Muslim movement and so much against the Chinese oppressors that they organized a plot and assassinated him in 1864. Tiao Tsun-cheng as a puppet of the Chinese had not considered the national interests of the Pai Yi and had himself practiced extortion on his own people. From 1864 to about 1909 Cheli and other Pai Yi communities west of the Mekong were independent but still more or less isolated. (47)

The Pai Yi who lived east of the Mekong found it necessary to revolt against their Chinese overlords, and consequently they joined the Muslim Rebellion en bloc. They and all Muslims in the province were subdued by the armed forces commanded by Viceroy Tsen Yu-yin, the best known bureaucrat in Yunnan since the days of Viceroy Oer Tai. Tsen Yu-yin came from a Yi family in northwestern Kwangsi, and he proved to be as loyal to the Manchu Court in Peking as was Marquis Tseng Kuo-fan, who was chiefly responsible in putting down the Taiping Rebellion.

Tsen Yu-yin found many difficulties in both financial and military administration. He mustered enough strength to restore the civil bureaucratic administration in northern and eastern Yunnan. By 1909 many areas between the Red River and the Mekong were still without a Chinese magistrate. The major portion of Shih Shong Baan Naa west of the Mekong was entirely outside of the Chinese administration. In the map drawn by R. A. Colquhoun in 1881 Cheli was outside the boundary of China. Cheli, or the Shih Shong Baan Naa west of the Mekong, did not become Chinese territory until after the Sino-British negotiation in 1893 and the resultant treaty of the next year. According to this boundary agreement of 1894, article 5, Cheli is not to be alienated to any third Power without the previous mutual consent of China and Great Britain.

By the time of this treaty, the proposed railway project from Rangoon through Mandalay and Zimmé to Cheli had already been dropped. The Suez Canal had opened for trade. Ships had been taking cotton textiles and other goods to Canton from Rangoon. Cotton textiles were sent to Yunnan in a quicker and cheaper way through the indirect route of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. The average time it took for a caravan from Kunming to reach Rangoon through Szemao and Cheli was about four and a half months, whereas cotton goods could be brought from Rangoon to Canton and then sent by boat to Peh Seh, and from there by horse to Kunming, in two months. (48)

When the Chinese conquest finally reached Cheli, therefore, this area west of the Mekong was still out of the international or even national trading route. It was still wrapt in splendid isolation.

The Chinese conquest of this special region began to take shape by 1909 when three administrative districts were carved out of this territory west of the Mekong and three separate magistrates were there appointed. This third but incomplete stage of conquest was ushered in by the Pai Yi war of succession in Meng Hai, the center of the first Baan Naa. Tiao Chu-kuo and his nephew Shao Ya-tai came to a serious armed dispute as both claimed to be the chieftain of the first Baan Naa. The Chinese garrison commander Hsieh Yu-kung sided with Tiao Chu-kuo

against Shao Ya-tai and consequently stirred up a local revolt of several thousand Pai Yi militia. Market places were destroyed and important Chinese merchants from Szechuan murdered by these rebels. This caused a large military expedition to be sent by the Chinese government. An entire regiment commanded by Ko Shu-hsun laid siege to the rebels' very mountainous fortress in Ting Cheng, which lasted more than half a year, accompanied by atrocities and bloody battles. (49)

After this Pai Yi revolt had been savagely repressed, the policy of the Imperial Court in Peking was to extend kai-tu kuei-liu (abolishing hereditary chieftains and appointing Chinese magistrates) to the west of the Mekong, comprising the five Pai Yi of Meng Chua, Ting Cheng, Meng Wen, Meng Hai, and Meng Er. This, however, created obvious difficulties. As the policy carried out by Oer Tai in the territory east of the Mekong was at best only partially successful, now, nearly two centuries later, with an increasingly corrupt Chinese administration in Peking as well as in Kuming and a seriously weakened military strength, the same policy could hardly be applied to this special region. Here, private ownership of land had not yet been introduced. There were no small landowners, nor owner-cultivators, and the entire land ownership was still vested in the village as a community and in the Pai Yi aristocracy as a ruling class. Short of either the devastation of a long war or a powerful military dictatorship, this land system could not be done away with quickly so as to give way to a new administration based on taxing the land unit of private ownership.

In the circumstances it was almost impossible to survey the land effectively without arousing another and certainly larger rebellion. Advised by Chinese merchants and the Pai Yi chieftain at Cheli, the Manchu-Chinese government finally adopted a new policy for this area; i.e. shei-liu pou kai-tu, meaning "to appoint Chinese magistrates without abolishing the hereditary Pai Yi chieftains." (50) The original land system was to be preserved and land tax was to be collected by the chieftains from each family instead of from any land unit. Thus, the original tribal administration became necessary if only for the sake of collecting tribute which the Chinese magistrates were to pass on to the Imperial Government. This policy was supplemented by that of encouraging colonization by Chinese peasants and garrison troops. As the Chinese have found this region too unhealthy to live in, however, colonization so far has never been a success. (51) The original Pai Yi land system is still intact here; Chinese conquest, as far as the west of the Mekong is concerned, is as yet incomplete.

CHAPTER V

TWO-STRATA ADMINISTRATION

The co-existence of the original Pai Yi administration under the hereditary chieftains and the super-imposed Chinese administration represented by the appointed magistrates in this area west of the Mekong, differentiates it from other parts of the Shih Shong Baan Naa. Centers of these two strata of administration in Cheli District are located about three and a half miles apart. The Pai Yi chieftain is in Chiengrung and the Chinese magistrate resides at a place locally known as Chiengmai.

Chiengmai is really the site of an old city, which was decimated so many years ago that at present there is scarcely a trace of it left except for portions of the wall and moat. The Chinese bureau, or court, is built of burned brick and is quite imposing for this wild place. Not more than forty years old, this is the regular Chinese establishment, somewhat in the nature of a fort, having holes in the walls for guns. Chiengmai remains a Pai Yi city, as few Chinese have settled in it. The Chinese are limited to officials, soldiers, and a small group of merchants. The Chinese soldiers are guardsmen, but the local police force is entirely composed of the Pai Yi. While brigandage is rife and all caravan routes unsafe even up to Sze Mao, it is safe to go anywhere in the Shih Shong Baan Naa without protection. The magistrate in Cheli has appellate jurisdiction through all the territories of Shih Shong. There is as yet no post nor telegraph in Cheli; mails and telegrams have to go through Fuhai, a neighboring and more commercial district seat.

The palace of the Pai Yi chieftain in Chiengrung is a big barn-like structure, solidly built of beautiful woods of different kinds, once the pride of the country, now rather weather-beaten and blackened by exposure. Under the house a few horses are stabled. There is apparently no attempt to beautify the grounds, or even to control the growth of weeds in the rainy season.

Amidst this dilapidation stands the harem, literally swarming with women and children. The chieftain is an opium-smoker, but his sons are healthy looking young men. One of them has been to Bangkok, which is very far for a Pai Yi man to journey.

Being the principal ruler of the Pai Yi in Shih Shong Baan Naa, the Cheli chieftain is locally called Zao-pilin. In the Yi language, Zao is a term of respect; pilin means domain or territory. Zao-pilin is therefore synonymous with king. In Burma and in Siam alike he is called khsie. All Pai Yi address him as Sumlibabinzao similar in meaning to "His Majesty." His royal court comprises 205 officials divided into five ranks. Apparently this is a close imitation of a feudalistic organization, probably of the Chinese Ming Dynasty.

Of the first rank there are only four officials, similar to ministers. The first is Zao Chingha, in prestige and power the equal of

a premier. But Zao Chingha is a hereditary premier, and his salary is paid with the tribute of the Pai Yi peasants in Chingha, a place not far from Chiengrung across the river. The people in Chingha pay tribute exclusively to Zao Chingha and do not have to pay tribute or work for Zao-pilin. The post of the former was created several hundreds years ago to represent Zao-pilin in dealing with Chinese officials. At first Zao Chingha was appointed after on recommendation of the influential people in Shih Shong Baan Naa, seven generations ago it became a hereditary post. Next to him in rank are three other ministers: "Tulung Kao (Chief Executive); Tulung Fahao (Chief Superintendent), and Tulung Weilangchuanwan (Assistant Superintendent). Tulung is a Pai Yi term of respect towards officials. Weilangchuanwan is a place some twenty miles from Chiengrung, where the people pay tribute exclusively to the Tulung bearing its name.

There are eight officials of second rank. The Tulung Naakang deals with external affairs, i.e. with the Chinese; kang, in the Yi language means a bow, and undoubtedly the original duty of this official was to keep bows and arrows. The second is Tulung Pasi who attends to financial matters; pasi in the Yi language means treasury. Tulung Naahwa is the right flank general; Tulung Naasai the left flank general. Tulung Zaoka controls the markets of Chiengrung and Tulung Haiyan supervises the household affairs of Zao-pilin. Tulung Naahua is a captain who commands the spear squad or the guardsmen of Zao-pilin. Finally, the eighth official is Tulung Naama, who is at once a doctor and a veterinary surgeon; na in the Yi language is medicine.

Sixteen officials compose the third rank. Tulung Naakuo attends to the traveling affairs of Zao-pilin. Tulung Naahuan clears the road for Zao-pilin to travel, and a squad of rod-bearers are under his command. Tulung Naahailang takes care of all affairs pertaining to the hunting of Zao-pilin. Tulung Naachang is the official who looks after the state elephants. Two generations ago he used to keep more than sixty elephants, one generation ago he still had twelve, but now he keeps only one small elephant thirty-five years old. Tulung Naachinghan is the military adviser. Tulung Naahewang is the prison superintendent. Tulung Naawo is the bridge superintendent. Tulung Naayi is the execution superintendent. Tulung Naanei is the official soothsayer. Tulung Naalo the officer attending the royal cart drawn by twenty-eight men, Tulung Naapien the officer in charge of peacock feathers, Tulung Naachuanpien the officer attending affairs of ancestral worship, Tulung Naawa the boat superintendent, Panaa Wenfa the assistant boat superintendent, Panaa Nao the officer commanding the big knife squad, and Panaa Fei the officer attending to the worship of the rain god.

In the fourth rank there are eighteen officials. First, there is the chief literary officer who is concurrently the official historian, called Tulung Naakai. His assistant is called Panaa Monkung. These two have six junior assistants: Panaa Piechahun, Panaa Tameng, Panaa Yintahun, Panaa Yahun, Panaa Ahliyahun, and Panaa Tsaihun. Then, there is Pamon Kalahun Naapan who is in charge of the three fish ponds of Zao-pilin. Fishing is done collectively by the Pai Yi for their chieftain, and often more than a thousand people at once fish in these royal ponds. Panaa Kinhun is the chief superintendent of the Pai Yi legal court. He is assisted by three officials called Panaa Chen, Panaa Chentehhun, and Panaa Kaiérmanlei. Panaa Lungérkwai is the officer who

controls one hundred pages, waiters or messengers generally known as the Zaomaonaikunhwa. The word kwai in Pai Yi means one hundred. Panaa Erhahsi is a junior officer controlling fifty Zaomaonaikunhwa, and the word hahsi means fifty. Panaa Changkam is the officer who attends the manufacture of Zao-pilin's gold and silver utensils. Panaa Hsinhei superintends festival entertainments. Finally, there is a special official called Panaa Kem who keeps all utensils of Zao-pilin that are exclusively for the use of royal entertainment.

The fifth and last rank of Zao-pilin's officials consists of nine men. Panaa Kango is the master of court ceremonies, Panaa Tiuchum the superintendent of the royal kitchen, and Panaa Tingtsai the keeper of slave-servants. At present there are still about twenty slave families comprising more than sixty hereditary servants who attend the household affairs of Zao-pilin. Women servants wait on the ladies in the harem. Then come Panaa Mo who controls the guns both for fighting and for celebration, and Panaa Lampao who hunts down criminals and tries prisoners. There is a special official looking after the spoons and chopsticks of Zao-pilin, whose title is Pahan Tahunnaa Maotsai. Another, who keeps other table utensils of gold and silver for Zao-pilin, is called Papeng Manaa Maotsai. Two officials act as ushers of the royal court: Panaa Pomengman meets and guides all guests in general, while Panaa Pomengo looks after guests of the royal tribe exclusively.

In addition to the above fifty-five court officials there are, as already mentioned, 150 pages known as the Zaomaonaikunhwa. On every market day, i.e. once every five days, six of these pages go to Zao-pilin's court ready for any errand. They are supposed to remain there for this interval of five days until the next batch arrives. The Zaomaonaikunhwa are regarded as candidates for official posts of the lowest, or fifth, rank. From among these 150 people officials are chosen to fill any vacancies in that rank. When the present writer visited Zao-pilin's palace in 1940, he saw a group of squalid, idle beggars nearby, still called by the villagers Zaomaonaikunhwa.

All fifty-five court officials, but not the Zaomaonaikunhwa, have received land holdings as a form of permanent salary payment. Theoretically, officials of the first rank should have twice as much as officials of the second rank, those of the second twice as much as those of the third, etc. In practice, however, land distribution among the officials was never as regular as it might have been. It is said that several decades ago the Premier (Zao Chingha) held twice as much land as any of the other three officers of the first rank. By 1940 the Chief Executive actually received more than twice more rent in kind than the Premier himself. According to Tiao Tung-yu, chieftain of Meng Wen and probably one of the best informed persons in Shih Shong Bean Naa, the annual unhusked rice taken by Zao Chingha is 1,200 tiao (equal to 142,859 pounds); the annual rent received by Tulung Fahao (Chief Superintendent) is 1,500 tiao (equal to 178,574 pounds); but the annual income, in the form of unhusked rice, of Tulung Kao (Chief Executive) is as much as 3,000 tiao (or 357,148 pounds).

The general notion entertained among the Pai Yi is that all officials of all ranks were in the beginning elected by the people at large. A long time ago some of the high-rank officials became hereditary holders and at

about the same time the low-rank officials became mere servants of Zao-pilin. Still later, through corruption and usurpation, the more aggressive officials have succeeded in amassing more wealth than they are entitled to enjoy. Even from this political superstructure it can be judged that Cheli District yields a queer combination of pre-feudalistic ideas and decadent feudalistic practices.

Throughout, the Shih Shong Bean Naa administrative sphere has adopted itself to its topographic situation. In the valleys between the mountain ranges there extend large plains dotted by villages and fertile agricultural fields. In the plains, scattered among hilly locations, are small plains whose administration is attached to that of the bigger plain nearby. The administration of the large plain is called by the Pai Yi themselves a Meng, and that of a small plain or a village, a Man. Thus one Meng always includes several Man.

The Meng itself varies in size. In accordance with size, the Chieftains of Meng are classified into five ranks. The first is called Zao Meng, the second Zao Tungpa, the third Zao Ya, the fourth Zao Palung, and the fifth Palung. However, these five categories of Meng chieftains are not subordinate one to another, but are all directly under Zao-pilin, the chieftain of the entire Shih Shong Bean Naa. At present, Bean Naa is no longer the administrative territory; Meng is the important administrative unit. In each of the old Bean Naa there is one, two, or sometimes three Zao-Meng. The real leader of a Bean Naa are the Meng Chieftain or chieftains.

Twenty-four Meng still maintain some kind of political relationship with Zao-pilin in Cheli. Of these Meng chiefs, nine are called Zao Meng, six Zao Tungpa, two Zao Ya, four Zao Palung, and three Palung. Their relationship with Zao-pilin varies from time to time, nor is it of the same degree of intimacy. Generally speaking, however, because of the encroachment of Chinese influences, Zao-pilin's suzerainty over these Meng chiefs is rapidly on the decline.

Evidently the liaison between the Meng and the court of Zao-pilin is a sort of political council, known in Pai Yi language as Hoslam. The general Hoslam is in Chiengrung (in Chinese it is called Chin-Teh-Cheng), where Zao-pilin resides. It is housed in a structure of two parts. The inner one is of fifty square meters, separated from the outer by low palisades of wood. The outer structure of about 137 square meters is for visitors. The 32 members of the general Hoslam are selected from among the 55 court officials of all ranks. Sixteen members constitute a quorum. On every market day, or once in five days, the Council holds a session with Zao Chingha (the Premier) as the chairman. On the annual religious festival day it holds an extraordinary session, participated in by representatives of all Meng. Often the attendance is more than 100.

This extraordinary session exercises the power of appointment and dismissal of village officers in the Meng. Officers so appointed must pay a fee to the Hoslam, which appropriates it for Zao-pilin and other officers and also for the expenditure of the Hoslam itself. A Hsien pays two yuan (yuan is a Chinese dollar), a Cha pays three yuan and a Pa six yuan. Higher officials like Palung, Zao Kao and Zao Kuan pay as high as several hundred yuan. It is clear that Hoslam is by no means a legislative body. As its session is open to the public, however, people in the

street often have the opportunity to visit it and listen to a sort of "cabinet meeting."

In the Meng there is an organ similar to Hoslam, called Guan. The Guan of a large Meng has a membership of 20 to 25 officials, that of a small Meng between 10 and 15. A Meng is comprised of several villages, large and small, whose officials are known by nine titles. Zao Kuan and Zao Kao control more than one village each. Then, under them, are four grades of village chiefs. That of a large village is called Palung, that of a medium-size village Pa, that of a small village Cha, and that of a very small village Hsien. Besides, there is the Pomeng or the Popan who acts as postman or messenger; there is the Anchan who attends all affairs of religious worship; there is the Hunhan who acts as a policeman of the village. A large village usually maintains more than ten Hunhan, whose tenure of office is from one to three years. Each Hunhan is paid one-fifth of a yuan per day, and in times of war one yuan per day. The six officers of Zao Kuan, Zao Kao, Palung, Pa, Cha and Hsien have received land holdings as a form of permanent salary payment, as have such of their superiors as Zao Chingha, Talung Fahao and Tulung Kao. As the size and wealth of villages vary greatly, this "land salary" also shows a wide variation. The minimum for Palung, for instance, is a piece of land under cultivation which requires five tiao of seeds (one tiao is about 95 pounds); but often he receives ten times more. Today, the land allotted to Pa (Pa-tien) and the land allotted to Cha (Cha-tien) are to be found in every Pai Yi village.

In the course of time the chieftains of Meng and a few top officials in Zao-pilin's court have become hereditary. Some of the Meng have also attained to more or less autonomous power. Indeed, the present relationship between the court and the Meng, as well as among the Meng, is being maintained not so much by feudalistic bonds as by ties of blood. The Zao-pilin in Cheli has four sisters and eight brothers. Of the brothers, one is his own high official in the court, three are chiefs of sub-districts under the Chinese magistrate in Cheli, and two are Zao Meng or Meng Chieftains. Of the sisters, two are wives of Zao Meng and two wives of Zao Palung. Two of the three daughters of Zao-pilin have also married Zao Palung. Thus, Shih Shong Baan Naa appears to be a union of the Meng with Zao-pilin as its official head, more nominal than real. This first stratum of Pai Yi administration actually rests on the Meng and its component villages.

The comparatively new stratum of Chinese administration in this area west of the Mekong had its origin, as already explained above, in the policy of shei-liu pou kai-tu (appointment of Chinese magistrates without abolishing Pai Yi rulers). It began in 1909 at the end of the Ting Cheng revolt in Fuhai. At first three magistrates were appointed to control three districts respectively: Cheli, Fuhai and Nanchiao. Then in 1913 the area of Chinese administration was considerably extended. Under the name of Border Region of Pu Ehr and Sze Mao, eight administrative bureaus were established therein, with the main regional office in Cheli. By 1927, some of these bureaus were turned into magistrates' offices. Finally, in 1932, the entire territory of Shih Shong Baan Naa was organized into six districts, each with an appointed magistrate. These districts are Cheli, Nanchiao, Fuhai, Chengyueh, Lohshun and Ningkiang.

Just as in the Kuming region or the Tali region of Yunnan, the organization of the magistrate's office and of sub-district administration is of the same pattern as prevails in all Chinese provinces. While elsewhere this forms the only stratum for taxation, police, defense and justice, it is a second stratum in the six Pai Yi districts, arbitrarily and abruptly superimposed on the Meng and village administration already in operation for many centuries.

THE BURDEN OF DOUBLE GOVERNMENT

It is clear that in setting up a double government in Pai Yi region the Chinese administration intended to utilize the existing administration at the time of conquest. A considerable number of Pai Yi functionaries have been gradually absorbed into the offices of the district and the sub-district. This at once strengthens the magistrate and weakens Zao-pilin. As long as there is a double government, however, neither the old nor the new administrative system can entirely neglect the relationship between them. The old one is not able to resist the new; at the same time the new can hardly replace the old administration. Such a political structure not only lacks unity but also tends to be corrupt and impotent. The most obvious result is an ever increasing tax burden on the shoulders of the Pai Yi population.

To illustrate this point the sub-district organization may be described. The office of a sub-district performs the important liaison function between the magistrate's office above it and the pao-chia system below it. This system, which involves making ten-family units responsible as a group to the police, has been China's chief method of maintaining state authority. If anyone commits a crime, the responsibility is distributed not only among his or her family but throughout the ten families organized under that system. This sort of police rule applies in the villages as well as in the cities. Each Pao consists of ten Chia and each Chia consists of ten families. Naturally in this case, the heads of Pao and the heads of Chia must be Pai Yi themselves. Of necessity reports from the sub-district (Chu) office are addressed both to the Magistrate and to Zao-pilin. Most of the sub-district offices in Cheli are headed by Pai Yi chieftains, who have not the slightest idea of the Chinese written language. Again this necessitates appointing an assistant exclusively to handle Chinese reports. Three-fourths of his salary is paid out of the tax which goes to the magistrate's office, but one-fourth must come from an additional surtax in the sub-district. (52)

As a matter of fact, the Chinese assistant in a sub-district office is the supervisor of that office and almost shares equal power with its Pai Yi head. The second sub-district of Cheli, locally known as Tai Meng Lung, may be taken as an example. Seven officials constitute the sub-district council: the head, the assistant, Palung Kao, Palung Ta, Meng Ehrshan, Pashiangau, and Yohsinhsueh. With the exception of the Assistant, all are Pai Yi. Palung Kao is responsible for tax collection, granary administration, and public finance in general. In all of these duties he is assisted by the Chinese Assistant. The latter shares with the sub-district head the responsibility of handling all external affairs, and both directly command the six servants employed by the office. Matters pertaining to the organization of the militia are left to Palung Ta; labor conscription and other forms of requisition to Meng Ehrshan; temples and education to Pashiangau; and criminal cases, such as arresting bandits and transporting prisoners, to Yohsinhsueh. But these officers have to obey orders from the head and the Chinese Assistant. All officers who have already received some land holdings do not receive extra salaries, but those who have not, like the Chinese Assistant, are given a monthly

cash salary. (53) Conflict between the Chinese Assistant and Pai Yi officials is a frequently recurring affair, because very often he imposes extra requisitions of labor and of cash in the sub-district. (54)

In the Pai Yi community, religion and education are inseparable and are joined in one and the same institution. Even in the smallest and poorest village there is a Buddhist temple, where boys learn to read and write Pai Yi language and pursue the study of Buddhist canons. These boys participate in the daily work of the temple, such as sweeping the ground, cleaning dwellings, washing clothes and preparing food. When they reach the age of twenty they may leave the temple and marry. A field survey of four villages in Cheli during 1940 shows that no less than 63 percent of all males have entered Buddhist temples for a shorter or longer duration, and that even among those who are no longer in the temple 12 percent are still able to read and write Pai Yi. This accounts for the fact that in August 1937 the Chinese magistrate in Cheli sent a written request to the Yunnan provincial government bank (the New Fu Tien Bank) for the superinscription of a few Pai Yi words upon the Chinese bank notes. This was accordingly done. In the words of the magistrate, "some 80 percent of the Pai Yi males" can read their own language but not one in a thousand can read Chinese characters.

Prior to the arrival of Chinese magistrates there were no educational institutions other than the Buddhist temples. With the organization of districts and sub-districts, however, schools for studying Chinese were established. The magistrate ordered the Pai Yi administration to collect funds for the school and provide students to enter it. (55) There were nine such Chinese schools in Cheli by 1940. The system of enrollment went through a significant change during the year 1936, when the Pai Yi population revolted against the absolute requisition of students.

Since the revolt of 1936 the Pai Yi administration has been allowed to send a certain number of students to the Chinese school, not necessarily from among the Pai Yi but also from among the aboriginal tribes. So long as the school attendance is up to the quota the magistrate does not find fault with the Pai Yi administration. Thus, all villages now make assessments in cash or in grain for hiring a definite number of boys to attend the Chinese school. Chinese, Pai Yi, the Akar and the Lo Kher are all eligible to be, and have been, employed for this purpose. Some Pai families are so poverty-stricken that they are willing to hire out their boys to go to school, for the sake of receiving fifty Chinese dollars and twenty-five tiao (or about 2,380 pounds) of unhusked rice for one school boy per year. This sort of involuntary scholarship, or stipend, for hired attendance, is actually a special form of tribute burden upon the shoulders of all Pai Yi villagers. The Pai Yi call this special tribute Lian-nui, meaning small soldier. In their minds it is as if these boys are sent away as requisitioned soldiers.

In the 1940 field survey which covered 66 villages in Cheli, the majority of 51 villages was reported as having made assessments for school attendance and only a minority of 15 villages sent boys without resorting to hiring. The total of Lian-nui assessments in the 51 villages amounted in 1939 to some 3,032 Chinese dollars and 571 tiao of

unhusked rice. The total value of both items in that year reached 3,317 Chinese dollars, equal to 23 percent of the total tax burden of all 66 villages. Lian-nui is easily the second largest tax item in the Pai Yi territory, next only to the poll tax or, as it is known to the Chinese and the Pai Yi, household tax.

From a large village three or four students or pupils are sent. A tiny village often joins another neighboring village to send one pupil. Thus what is supposed to be compulsory education has become "educational" compulsion. Boys have to walk to their school, sometimes as far as fifteen kilometers one way (about 30 li). In the village of Man Luan Tien there were in 1940 a total of fifty pupils from as many as eighteen villages. The various distances between the school and pupils' homes may be seen in the following table:

Distances between Man Luan Tien School and Home Villages of Its Pupils

<u>Name of Village</u>	<u>Distance</u>	<u>Number of Students</u>
Man Luan Tien	Less than $\frac{1}{2}$ Li	3
Tung Lao	About $\frac{1}{2}$ Li	2
Wei Suo	2 "	2
Man Tung	3 "	3
Man Ching Yu	4 "	4
Man Nan	6 "	2
Man Luan Lung	6 "	2
Man Nei	6 "	4
Man Kwang Lung	7 "	4
Man Ling	8 "	4
Man Ching Ham	8 "	1
Ching Tung Mai	9 "	1
Man Kwang Mai	10 "	2
Man Nong	10 "	2
Man Sha	12 "	4
Man Liu	13 "	4
Man Li	28 "	2
Man Ah Liu	30 "	4

On the average, therefore, a pupil has to walk to and from his school for about ten kilometers (about 20 li) on every school day.

It is clear that such compulsory school attendance could not have been possible without relying on the strength of the Pai Yi village administration. This system has given all the village heads an extra duty, often an extra opportunity of squeezing (graft-taking) and other forms of corruption. The utilization of one stratum of administration by another, and the sinecures and venality almost inevitable within such a double structure of government, have considerably increased the tribute paid by the Pai Yi. As it is there is a double system of education. Just as the magistrate is superimposed upon Zao-pilin so is the Chinese school upon the Buddhist temple.

The policemen in a Pai Yi village are called the Hunhan, whose tenure of office is from one to three years. In addition to this a separate police system was organized by the Chinese administration in 1936. The magistrate's office started to requisition police service in that year, and the Pai Yi villages had to send 32 Lian-long for this

purpose. In Pai Yi language Lian-long means big soldier. To the Chinese it is known as Hsueh-pin, or a soldier in training. His term of service is half a year. With headquarters at the magistrate's office, he is supposed to do various odd jobs such as policing and guarding the office, hunting down criminals, watching prisons, and running errands in connection with revenues.

In order to meet this sort of labor requisition, the Pai Yi administration organized the karma as a territorial unit from which one Lian-long must be provided. A karma comprises four small or two large villages. Of the 66 villages in Cheli surveyed, only three sent Lian-long directly, the rest making a total assessment of 2,917 Chinese dollars in 1939 for securing the specified number of hirelings. The Lian-long burden is second only to that of Lian nui, commanding 20 percent of the total tax burden of all 66 villages.

Other tributes, or "taxes", exacted by the Chinese administration are collected on the basis of dividing spoils between the magistrate and Zao-pilin and even among the petty officials in the Pai Yi village. Besides the 32 Lian-long, the magistrate's office maintains 60 Chinese armed guards with funds collected from the Pai Yi. At a meeting of the district council, attended both by the magistrate and Zao Chingha, on June 26, 1938, it was decided that for each picul (135 pounds) of tea produced in Cheli one Chinese dollar should be levied for the purpose of maintaining these armed guards. It was also stipulated that the magistrate's office was to receive 80 percent of this tax, 10 percent to go to the Hoslam, and the remaining 10 percent to the collecting officer in the village.

The collection of the largest tribute, the household tax, illustrates even better the system of division of spoils. Between 1936 and 1940 every house in Cheli paid a household tax of one dollar and sixty cents Chinese per year. In Chiengmai, where the magistrate resides, the household tax is collected by his own office. Elsewhere in Cheli it is done by the Pai Yi administration. These two collections are pooled and their accounts settled between the magistrate and Zao-pilin. Of the total collected, half is devoted to the maintenance of the magistrate's administration and the other half given to Zao-pilin for him to settle with his subordinates.

In general the division of household tribute under Zao-pilin is carried out according to the following percentage:

<u>Recipients</u>	<u>Percentages</u>
Zao-pilin	10
The Hoslam in Cheli	10
The Guan of all Meng	10
High ranking officials of the Meng	30
High ranking officials of other Meng	20
The village chiefs in all Meng	20

Karl Marx once said, "There have been in Asia, from time immemorial, but three departments of government: that of finance, or the plunder of the interior; that of war, or the plunder of the exterior; and finally the department of Public Works." (56) The double government in Shih Shong Baan Naa, however, has virtually only one function, i.e. that of exacting tribute under various items of "taxes." Public Works such as

irrigation and maintenance of market places are undertaken by villagers themselves, and due to isolation there is no defense work to speak of. Bureaucratic finance alone has been aggravated to form common basis of the two-strata administration.

CHAPTER 7.

LAND OWNERSHIP

Long before the Chinese conquest and the subsequent introduction of a feudalistic bureaucracy in the land of Pai Yi, there was incipient feudal development evidenced by payment of government salary in permanent land holding and hereditary tenure of office. In the court of Zao-pilin, as described above, all fifty-five officials had been given land, and some of the top-ranking officials had become hereditary, prior to the Manchu Dynasty. Before the initiation of the feudal administration from Peking, there had already been a feeble and mimic feudalism in Shih Shong Baan Naa, just as there is in China an imitative capitalistic development when the real basis for such a development is still to be achieved. Of more significance was the fact that the Chinese bureaucracy utilized, and hence tended to preserve, the remnants of a pre-feudal system of agrarian relations. This was indeed a forerunner of the present situation in China, the Western capitalistic influences making use of, and hence moving in to retain, or at least retard the complete overthrow of, the feudalistic remnants.

Just as China in general, and eastern and central China in particular, is characterized by a combination of feudalistic and capitalist forces, so the land of Pai Yi, being an isolated "pocket" in southernmost Yunnan, has a mixed social and political structure of feudalism and village communes. Whereas the structural unit of feudalism is territory, a definitive and unalterable area of land, that of the pre-feudal commune is the tribe and its component clans. Whereas land holding is the dominant feature of a feudalistic society, blood relationship remains the controlling factor in a village commune, where land ownership is common and collective.

Apart from an occasional few places where a handful of Chinese colonizers claim a new piece of land for their own farming, there is throughout Shih Shong Baan Naa no private ownership of land in its strict sense. An extensive field investigation during 1940 in Cheli has revealed that there are only four categories of cultivated land. None of them can be ascertained to be privately owned, and one category remains common land of the village both in form and in substance.

In the Pai Yi language, na means cultivated land, which term is also used by them as a land unit. The Chinese translation of na is tien. One tien or na is about 0.04 hectare, equivalent in size to one-third of a mu in Szechuan Province. The four categories of na are Nawoan, the village commune land; Nazao, the land held by officials as their salary payment; Nawa, the temple land; and Naboi, newly opened land on permanent leasehold basis. It is not only the presence of Nawoan that indicates a definite remnant of the early village commune, but there are three main observations in this connection which all point to the existing communal nature of the Pai Yi society. The first is the common and collective ownership of land, both cultivated and uncultivated, of fish ponds and of woods and forests. Second, collective labor is directed to cultivation, hunting, fishing and lumbering. Finally, the corporate nature of the village, in such matters as tribute payment and land tenancy, is strikingly impressive.

As to the common property of the village the most important, of course, is the Nawoan. The Pai Yi word for village is Woan. Nawoan, therefore, means the cultivated land belonging to the entire village community. In most cases there is no rent paid from Nawoan. To illustrate, the 490 na of Nawoan in Man Yang, the 500 na in Ching Yu, and the 1,200 na in Man Ta all pay no rent. In some villages where Nawoan has been given to newcomers to cultivate, there is a very small nominal rent collected by the village. Such is the case in Man Teh, where for one na of Nawoan only one-tenth of a tiao of unhusked rice is paid as rent. (One tiao is approximately 95 pounds). Rent from Nawoan so far has never exceeded three-tenths of a tiao from one na, which may be half of the total crop. But this occurs only in a few villages. As may be seen from the following table nearly three-fourths of Nawoan yields no rent income to the village.

Nawoan Investigated in Cheli
(1940)

<u>Number of Villages</u>		<u>Number of Na</u>	<u>%</u>
Rent paying	6	3,360	25.8
No rent paying	17	9,690	74.2
Total	23	13,050	100.0

In most villages Nawoan is each year redistributed by the village officers for cultivation, either towards the end of April or in the middle of June. Usually the distribution is carried out according to households and not with regard to the number of people in this or that household. Two or three families, or two or three households, jointly cultivate 100 na of Nawoan. Often it is more or less equally distributed among the old households for cultivation, and the new households in the village receive the remainder. In some villages like Man Ling, Wei Suo, Man Liu, Man Sha, Man Tung and Man Li, where population has been static for a long period, no annual redistribution is made. Instead, there is an annual review of the situation for optional adjustments by the village officers, which has become more or less nominal. Again, in some villages such as Man Luan Tien, Ching Yu, Lung Hun, Tung, Lao, Man Ting and Man Mei, no redistribution nor review has been made for more than half a century. In these villages there are a preponderance of Nazao, the official's land holdings; thus the practice of redistribution has long disappeared.

Of the 66 villages already investigated in Cheli, 37 cultivate rice on dry land. This rice is grown not in the irrigated valley where Nawoan and Nazao are to be found, but on slopes and hilly places in the vicinity of the village. It appears that anybody who has the means to do so can start dry farming in such places, and there is no rent exacted from this land. It is still regarded as the common property of the village as a whole. Woods and forest-land are also recognized as belonging to the village. All residents are free to take timber and bamboo for their own use. No one sells such things as timber or bamboo, because no one needs to buy it. Since the hills and mountains are considered to be commonly owned, all results of individual or group hunting are divided among the villagers, with a larger portion going to the officials. Fish ponds also belong to the village. A definite date is set for fishing;

and the fish are either divided among the villagers, or presented from the village to Zao-pilin, or sold to replenish the common treasury, usually all three in combination.

The present system of collective labor is certainly a social atavism traceable only to a primitive commune. In fact, William C. Dodd's observation in 1913 regarding the general culture of Cheli is still true today. This American missionary said, "Buddhism is nominally strong in this region, but in reality it has a far weaker hold than in Kengtung [in northern Burma]Fetish has a far stronger hold here than Buddhism. The people are very superstitious. As an instance, they feared to tell me their own names, or the names of their rulers, lest writing them down should bring sickness or trouble of some kind." (57) A current and effective fetish, for instance, is that one should not catch fish alone but should do the catching with other villagers. Those who have violated this rule are supposed to be punished by a diabolical spirit. There is an oft-repeated story from Fuhai that once a villager hunted a deer but neglected to give a portion of it to a widow, who, however, was later saved by an angel when the whole village was wiped out by a plague.

According to Pai Yi tradition, hunting and fishing as well as many other activities are carried out collectively by the entire community. When a new house is to be built all working adults of the village do it collectively. If anyone shows delinquency and proves to be lazy at this work, his or her household will receive the same treatment when the occasion arises. In Meng Wen in 1940 the writer saw one family fined three dollars Chinese and the loss of its chickens because its members did not join other villagers to assist in the funeral of a particular family.

On April 22, 1940, the Pomeng in Man Chang Tsai blew the horn late in the afternoon. It was understood by all villagers to be a warning that on the next morning they were to march into the forest to obtain lumber and bamboo for constructing a new house. An ordinary house is built entirely of bamboo, but that of the village headman has lumber in its construction. The next morning thirty-two men and women took their knives and food into the woods some ten miles away. When they marched back to the village, each carried four big pieces of bamboo. On the subsequent day the villagers worked together to put up a house, the construction of which is so simple it is usually finished on the same day.

There are two kinds of Nazao (land holdings of the official) in Cheli and its neighboring districts. One exacts labor rent, i.e. the land requires cultivation by the villagers and all the harvest is taken by the entitled official. The other collects rent in kind, i.e. rent is paid in produce, being a portion of the whole harvest, but cultivation is distributed among a number of households. In the former case the village itself is a tenant while in the latter not all villagers are tenants. Thus the Nazao with labor rent is not distributed for cultivation but is cultivated by the entire village's labor power. It is virtually a small-scale plantation, the collective labor on which is never paid and is requisitioned as a labor tribute. This clearly illustrates how a feudal tribute has been made possible by utilizing the earlier form of collective communal labor.

As of old, the corporate nature of the village commune still persists. A village in the Pai Yi land pays tribute or "tax" as a unit, and it leases in and leases out its land. In the 66 villages of Cheli already surveyed, a total of 65,146 na were cultivated in 1940 by the people in these villages. Of this 41,121 na were Nazao with rent in kind, 1,300 na were Nazao with labor rent, 13,050 na were Nawoan, 6,875 na were Naboi (newly cultivated land) and as much as 2,800 na were land leased in by 8 of the 66 villages. The 66 villages possessed altogether in 1940 a total of 67,851 na of irrigated land, of which 1,400 na had been abandoned in five villages and 1,305 na were leased out by six villages. The rent collected or the rent paid, as the case may be, is handled by the village headman, who is really a feudalistic representative for, but not of, the old village commune.

In the Pai Yi language, village treasury is called Hautunlai. The 1939 accounts of Hautunlai of the village Man Chang Tsai would easily illustrate the external relations of a village commune now under the management of a more or less feudalistic chief. Around this village of 37 households there are pastures, swamps, and abandoned land. Pastures are used by the whole village, swamps only breed mosquitoes, and land has been abandoned because of its exhausted fertility. The total irrigated land of this village amounts to 2,260 na, of which 1,040 na are Nazao with rent in kind, 840 na are Nawoan leased out by the village because of the lack of labor power, and 380 na are Nawoan distributed to the villagers for cultivation. As Nazao in this case were distributed also to the households for cultivation from which an annual rent of 30 tiao per 100 na is exacted, the accounts of Hautunlai only include the transactions regarding Nawoan and the tributes or "taxes" exacted by Zao-pilin and the Chinese magistrate jointly.

For the 840 na of Nawoan leased out, a rent in kind as heavy as that on Nazao is collected by the village chief, i.e. 30 tiao of unhusked rice per 100 na of land. The total rent income of Man Chang Tsai is therefore 252 tiao. For the 380 na of Nawoan cultivated by the villagers themselves, a lower rent is collected by the village chief at the rate of 20 tiao per 100 na. When the rent in kind is collected from outside the village, furthermore, it is immediately distributed to all the 37 households in Man Chang Tsai, including five officials on the top and five households who do not pay household taxes. The distribution of the village's rent income is as follows:

Papan (the village chief in this case)	80 <u>tiao</u>
Popan	20 "
Cha	20 "
Small Cha	15 "
Hsien	10 "
27 households (3 <u>tiao</u> each)	81 "
5 households (1.5 <u>tiao</u> each)	7.5 "
<hr/>	
Total 37 households	233.5 <u>tiao</u>

The balance of 18.5 tiao and the total of 76 tiao collected from the 380 na of Nawoan both enter into the accounts of Hautunlai.

Thus the income and expenditure items may be listed below:

<u>Income</u>			<u>Expenditure</u>		
1. Value of 76 <u>tiao</u> rent, at 4 Chinese dollars per 10 <u>tiao</u> , total	30.40	Chinese dollars	1. Household tax paid by 31 houses, at 4.25 each	total 131.75	Chinese dollars
2. Value of 18.5 <u>tiao</u> rent balance from outside the village	7.40	"	2. Fees for Lian-mui (25 <u>tiao</u> and 50 Ch. Dollars)	total 62.50	Chinese dollars
3. Back payment of tax from 31 households at 1.2 each, total	37.20	"	3. Fees for Lian-long (3 Chinese dollars per month), total	36.00	Chinese dollars
4. Back payment of tax from 5 households at 0.6 each, total	3.00	"	4. Fees to hire laborers to meet part of requisitions (7 <u>tiao</u> and 11.25 Ch. dollars)	total 7.37	Chinese dollars
5. Value of fish sale (about 1/3 fish distributed to all households and 2/3 fish sold)	200.00	"			
Total	278.00	"	Total	237.62	Chinese dollars

The balance of 40.38 Chinese dollars no doubt is to defray emergency requisitions by the Chinese administration and miscellaneous and incidental expenses of the village. It should be pointed out here that this favorable balance is entirely due to the high rent collected from outside the village on a considerable amount of Nawoan. With most villages, where there is no Nawoan to be leased out to other villages for a high rent income, tax burden has invariably created a Hautunlai deficit.

Geographical isolation, restricted development of commercial crops, and thin population have been the chief factors in preserving the remnants of a primitive commune. Wherever these factors are not present, such as in the case of India, and in other parts of China, a village land-ownership as embodied in the Nawoan cannot be found. The desert region of India, Rajputana, is comparatively isolated from the rest of northern India. Because of its railway development, irrigation improvements and an increasingly denser population, however, there is no more village-owned land subject to redistribution, or to annual or periodical review. Long before the railway construction the Jats in Rajputana had cultivated the land of many little feudal states, similar to the Nazao, in Shih Shong Baan Naa. This Nazao in Rajputana originated from the land reward given to top-ranking army officers in the course of military conquests. (58) Long feudalistic rule has destroyed the village commune, and the feudal Chieftains now send their own tax collectors (Kamdar) directly to the villages. The only feeble remnant of a village commune is the Panchayat, or village council of five elders, which functions more nominally than actually.

Due to the redistribution of Nawoan in Cheli for cultivation, the second category of land-Nazao-is mostly distributed only to the villagers. Of the total of 42,421 na of Nazao surveyed, only 3.5 percent exacted labor rent and 96.5 percent took in rent in kind, as explained above. Nazao, under the present feudalistic influences, naturally tends to increase. Its origin and classification should be appreciated all the more. Probably during the Ming Dynasty Zao-pilin, in imitation of Chinese feudalism, claimed a considerable amount of land in Chiengrung and relied upon its rent income to maintain his court expenses as well as those of his royal household. Similarly, the top-ranking officials of the court were also given land as reward for their services. In every Meng the chieftain and his subordinates followed the example of Zao-pilin, bringing another set of Nazao into existence.

The cultivated land from which Zao-pilin receives his rent income is called Nanai in Pai Yi and Nashichwan in Chinese. Shi means private and chwan means estate. It is private in Chinese theory while the Pai Yi still regard it as state land. Similarly, the uncultivated land claimed by Zao-pilin is called Tunghai in Pai Yi and Tungshichwan in Chinese. Most of his Nanai and all of his Tunghai are to be found in Chiengrung and its vicinity. From time to time Zao-pilin financed the clearing of new fields, and occasionally land was given to him by the village as a fine for some criminal offense. The above have happened in remote places, but nevertheless this land is also called Nazao, or specifically Nanai. In early periods Nanai in the several Meng was looked after by Zao-pilin's special agent. Later the Meng chieftains were supposed to take care of the rent for him. In recent years, however, the encroachment by the Meng chieftains has been so rapid that Zao-pilin has lost most of the rent from the Meng, and now only receives a total of 2,500 tiao of unhusked rice from about 1,700 na of Nanai.

Tulung Kao (Chief Executive) receives an annual rent in kind of about 3,000 tiao from 2,000 na. When Zao-pilin acts concurrently as Tulung Kao, as he did in 1940, he also takes this rent in addition to his own. Tulung Fahao (Chief Superintendent) receives annually 1,500 tiao from 1,000 na. These Nazao are known to the Pai Yi as Natulung, meaning the field which yields rent to the Tulung. Zao Chingha, the Premier, receives 1,200 tiao every year from some 800 na of Nachingha. Chingha is the name of a place just across the river from Chiengrung. Like a fief, it is granted to Zao Chingha as a hereditary holding. In fact, all the Nazao, under various names, are feudalistic lands.

The land from which the Meng chieftains derive their rent income is known as Nalungzao, of the size anywhere from 50 to 300 na. Their subordinates have their land holdings: Nacha for the Cha, Napa for the Pa, and Naanchan for the Anchan. It should be pointed out here that, while most of the Nazao of Zao-pilin and his court officials are collectively cultivated by the communal system of household distribution, almost all the Nazao of the Meng officials, including the Nalungzao, are cultivated by tenants chosen by the rent recipients. Evidently, the former is a transitional type whereas the latter is a full-fledged feudal land.

Nawa, the temple land, is a third category. This was not contributed by any devout Buddhist, as no inhabitant in the village had

private land to give. Nawa was granted by Zao-pilin exclusively. Once it was granted the village cultivators have had to pay rent to the specific Buddhist temple. Though about 80 percent or more of the Pai Yi villages have temples, only few of the latter enjoy the income from Nawa. In recent years, particularly, there has been no increase in the amount of this land grant.

Naboi, meaning in Pai Yi a new field, is the fourth and last category of land in Cheli. In Chinese it is known as *Nashing*, or a rising field which is newly cultivated. It is also called *Nashi*, because in the Chinese notion this land is regarded as becoming private land sooner or later, and *shi* means private. Of the total of 65,146 *na* cultivated by the 66 villages investigated, as much as 6,875 *na* are of the Naboi category. It means a little over 10 percent of the total cultivated area is managed by the villagers themselves. This has been the origin of Naboi. Any one or more households can move on to some cultivable land of the village and start farming. Within the first five years Zao-pilin and the Chinese administration do not exact tribute from it. After that, the cultivator is supposed to pay rent to the village chief but in practice this payment has been ignored. Outsiders are not permitted to take Naboi, except in cases when the population of the village is very scanty. Sometimes a piece of abandoned land is restored to cultivation and is also regarded as Naboi. At all events, the Naboi, once established, are not subject to distribution for cultivation among village households. It is true that the cultivating family has no legal ownership of this land, but it enjoys the right of permanent leasehold. In this way the Naboi may be regarded as an incipient approach towards a private land ownership by the family as is now prevalent in many parts, especially in eastern and central China.

There are over 70 villages in Chiengrung, the first sub-district of Cheli. During the first half of 1940, a total of 66 villages was carefully surveyed. (59) The result shows that the villagers themselves cultivate altogether 64,146 *na* of irrigated land, including 2,800 *na* leased from outside. The villages own corporately a total of 65,051 *na*, including 1,305 *na* leased out to outsiders. The ownership may be thus classified:

Land Ownership in Cheli
(66 villages in 1940)

<u>Items of land</u>	<u>Number of Na</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
1. Nazao, including a small fraction of Nawa	42,421	65.3 (60)
2. Nawoan, including 1,305 <i>na</i> leased out	14,355	22.1
3. Naboi	6,875	10.5
4. Land abandoned due to soil exhaustion, including both Nazao and Nawoan	1,400	2.1
Total	<u>65,051 na</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Here, as in any other society, land ownership serves as an index to the nature of social and political structure. The preponderant percentage of land held by officials of all sorts, from Zao-pilin in Cheli down to the petty functionaries in the Meng and in the village, not only shows the concentration of rent income in the hands of a relatively few people, but proves an irresistible process of feudalization. Formerly Nazao were mostly located at the end of a canal, or in places where water supply could not claim priority; but now, as Nazao have become more and more prevalent, they are to be found in the best irrigated areas. The increase of Nazao at once crowds out Nawoan and molests their water supply.

As explained above, the increase of Nazao also influences the distribution of Nawoan for cultivation. As time goes by, tenancy on Nazao becomes more and more fixed. Under this condition redistribution of both Nawoan and Nazao has entirely ceased in many villages. Furthermore, instead of being paid by the village as a whole the tenants now deliver rent directly to the land holders. Whereas Nawoan often takes no rent at all, and any rent collected therefrom is comparatively low, the rent on Nazao is invariably higher. The spread of Nazao therefore impoverishes the village, thus helping further to break the communal life. It would not be incorrect to say that the percentage of Nazao is the percentage of feudalism which has evolved from a primitive communal society. On the other hand, the fact that in Cheli 22 percent of the cultivated land remains as genuine commune land, conclusively demonstrates a type of pre-feudal society.

Proto-feudal socio-political structures, as suggested by Professor S. V. Yushkov, may be divided into two groups: first, the "barbarian kingdoms" in which feudal relations began to be established by an interaction between slaveowning elements and patriarchal elements; second, those proto-feudal states which arose as a result of the dissolution of the structure of primitive society. (61) The study of the second group has been taken up only comparatively recently. The society of Early Chou Dynasty or the West Chou Dynasty (1000 to 600 B.C.) in China can be classified in the first group, while that of Cheli in the present time must be regarded as a simple type of the second group.

As has already been mentioned in an earlier chapter, the Pai Yi in Cheli did not pay tribute to the slave-owning kingdom of Nan-chao, and there is today no trace of slavery in this area. Just as slave owning has not been the only criterion of a slave society, so it is not a desideratum of a proto-feudal society. In the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms described by Professor Yushkov as a proto-feudal structure prior to the ninth century, slaves could buy their freedom. The real essence of a proto-feudal society is to be found in the following five characteristics.

First, a proto-feudal society is one in which a group of clan-tribal elders or leaders is being transformed into a land-holding nobility. All recipients of the rent income from Nazao, which now claim 65 percent of the total cultivated area, have become the nobility in Cheli.

Second, tax, sometimes also military, administration has its basis shifted gradually from the household to the domain. In other words, a tribute is changing into a feudal rent, and vassality is being united

with a fief. This is precisely the relation between the two strata of administration in Cheli.

Third, leaders are not necessarily elders, as they are no longer elected and some of them have attained a hereditary position such as now held by Zao-pilin, Zao-Chingha and the Meng chieftains. Local administration is assisted by a system of decimal organization of police, linked with a definite territory. Thus, the system of Pao Chia, as described in an earlier chapter, has been introduced into Cheli. (62)

Fourth, a tribal assembly is being transformed into a state council, similar to the modern Cabinet meeting. Here, the Hoelam and the Guan of Shih Shong Baan Naa are essentially of the same nature and function as that of the Witangemot of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms prior to the ninth century and the Veche of Kiev State before the eleventh century.

Fifth and finally, the rural population or the immediate producers are not yet stratified into several classes. Such is the present situation in Cheli. There is, generally speaking, no differentiation among the peasant cultivators of Nazao and Nawoan, of Nawa and Naboi.

CHAPTER VIII

LAND UTILIZATION

The one general, outstanding, obvious and remarkable phenomenon about this proto-feudal society in Cheli is its very low productivity and sparse population. Unlike the healthy highland of Kunning, which is about 6,400 feet above the sea level, Cheli is located in a valley as low as 1,850 feet above that level, with a minimum temperature of F. 44° and a maximum of F. 102°. There is a long rainy season but no snow. In 1939 there were 8,775 households with a total population of 32,915. Of this total, 16,477 were females and 16,438 were males; and of the males "only 1,152" were supposed to be able-bodied youth. (63) Only a little over 70 villages are to be found in the first sub-district of Cheli, and most of them have no more than 10 to 40 households each.

Number of Households in 66 Villages
(1940, Cheli)

<u>Households in the Village</u>	<u>% of Total of 66 Villages</u>
10-20	25.8
21-30	31.8
31-40	22.7
Total	80.3%

Taking the more populated four villages as an illustration, it is found that the average number of people in each household is only 3.94 and the average number of farm hands per household is not more than 2.08 persons. This last figure is far below what can be found in central and eastern China, even in the several north-eastern provinces known as Manchuria, where the population is also sparse.

Number of Working People in 168 Households
(Cheli, 1940)

<u>Name of Village</u>	<u>Households</u>	<u>Village Population</u>	<u>Working People</u>		
			<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Total</u>
Man Chang Tsai	35	195	45	40	85
Man Tung	35	106	34	28	62
Man Luan Tien	46	174	46	45	91
Man Ting	52	187	59	53	112
Total	168	662	184	166	350
	%	100	27.8	25.1	52.9

From the above table it is clear that only about 53 percent of the total population is engaged in farm labor.

It must be noted that in the Pai Yi villages there are two kinds of households: one is the registered and household-tax paying, the second is

the non-registered who do not pay such a tax. In Chinese, the former is known as Cheng Hu and the latter Fei Cheng Hu. Of the 1,900 households in 66 villages investigated, 82.7 percent are Cheng Hu and 17.3 percent Fei Cheng Hu. In the periodical distribution of irrigated land for cultivation Cheng Hu have a priority over Fei Cheng Hu. In 1940 about 90 percent of Cheng Hu and 4 percent of Fei Cheng Hu cultivated the irrigated rice land. Those households that do not wish to do farming work, such as merchant families, those that do not need to farm, such as priest families, and those that cannot farm, such as families without able-bodied men, are not given land to cultivate. Households of court officials also do not receive land for cultivation. Generally speaking, only 75 percent of all the households are supposed to do field work on the irrigated land. Moreover, some of these have leased out a portion of the land because of inadequate man and animal power.

From the statistics of 44 villages as given below, about 73 percent of those households given land to cultivate actually receive 68 percent of the available irrigated land. This shows a fairly equal distribution, and among these 73 percent of village households each has been given 25 to 50 na. The average size of farms distributed among all the households is 42 na, equivalent to 26.5 mu in central and eastern China or about 9 mu in Szechuan. This household farm is comparatively larger than the average in any other rice-producing area in China. Since about 75 percent of the village households are given land for cultivation, the average cultivated land per household amounts to 31.6 na, equivalent to about 20 mu in central and eastern China. (64)

Distribution of Irrigated Land Among 1,008 Households
(44 villages, Cheli, 1940)

<u>Land Received</u> <u>per Household</u> (Na)	<u>Number of</u> <u>Households</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Land</u> <u>Received</u> (Na)	<u>Percent</u>
Below 20	80	7.94	1,300	3.06
20-25	80	7.94	1,600	3.76
26-50	732	72.61	29,038	68.38
51-100	115	11.41	10,293	24.24
Above 100	1	0.10	240	0.56
Total	1,008	100.00	42,471	100.00

Despite the fairly equal distribution, nearly one-fourth of the land is cultivated by nearly 11.5 percent of the families who receive land. These households have a farm as large as 50 to 100 na each to take care of, and they must be regarded as the better-to-do elements in the Pai Yi region.

There are five kinds of rice grown in Cheli. First, and most important, is the glutinous rice, white and lustrous, being 80 percent of the total rice production and the staple daily food of the Pai Yi. Then there is the so-called sweet rice, white and soft but not glutinous, claiming 15 percent of the total rice production. It is also used as daily food, though regarded as being inferior. Third, there is a small quantity of hard rice, white but not glutinous, which is used for making rice curd (Hulongbaa) and rice noodle (Hulong). Fourth, the so-called

soft rice, white and nutritious, is taken by the Chinese in Cheli as their staple daily food. The fifth kind is the reddish glutinous rice. It is produced in a very small quantity, invariably used for making thick rice cakes (Hubon) and thin rice cakes (Laubon).

The "soft rice" is cultivated both in the irrigated field and on mountain slopes. In the latter case it is also known as "dry rice." Of the 66 villages investigated, 37 of them cultivate "dry rice", and in these 37 villages nearly 36 percent of the households carry out such cultivation. The soft rice, the hard rice, and the sweet rice are all planted in May and harvested in October. The reddish glutinous rice grows between June to November. In parts of Cheli, where the climate is warmer, two crops are grown per year. Besides rice, another inferior crop is raised. In most of the places, however, there is only one crop. Fertilizer is not applied in any case, and even hoeing and weeding are rarely done.

The annual agricultural production, as reported by the magistrate on November 12, 1939, to the Yunnan provincial government, may be listed as follows:

<u>Products</u>	<u>Annual Production</u>	<u>Available for Export</u>
(1) Glutinous rice	184,000 <u>piculs</u> *	1,000 <u>piculs</u>
(2) Soft rice	107,000 "	600 "
(3) Kaoliang	1,400 "	none
(4) Corn (or maize)	400 "	none
(5) Soy bean	630 "	100 "
(6) Cotton	1,000 "	500 "
(7) Tea	3,200 "	2,000 "
(8) Tobacco	1,000 "	none
(9) Camphor	3,200 <u>catties</u> *	2,800 <u>catties</u>

* (one catty equals 1.33 pounds and one picul equals 133 pounds)

As a rule the cultivating household devotes ten days of the year to plowing with an iron plow. The usual weight of an iron plow is about three kilograms. The small plow, some 40 cm. long, weighs about six kilograms. Very rarely can an iron plow last twenty years; most of the households have used the same plow for two to five years. It was found in four representative villages that 18 percent of the cultivating households possess no plow.

Plow Distribution among Cultivating Households
(4 villages in Cheli, 1940)

<u>Village name</u>	<u>Cultivating Households</u>	<u>Those Who Have Plows</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Man Chang Tsai	31	31	100
Man Tung	30	24	80
Man Luan Tien	40	24	60
Man Ting	21	21	100
Total	122	100	82

Furthermore there are many households that possess a plow but have no plowing animal, either cow or buffalo. In the Pai Yi language, a cow is called Hoo, a buffalo is called Whai. The latter is more valuable as it is a better field-working animal than the former. In the 44 villages investigated, there were in 1940 a total of 1,343 households. Of these, 1,008 received land for cultivation; but as many as 37 percent of the 1,008 households had to lease in a buffalo and cow, because they did not have any or did not have an adequate number for their field work. From the following table it is clear that in one-fourth of the villages 40 to 60 percent of the cultivating households lease in plowing animals.

Percentage of Buffalo and Cow Leasing
(44 villages in Cheli, 1940)

<u>% of Households that Cultivate and Lease in Animals</u>	<u>Number of Villages Covered by Such %</u>
0	7
1-10	1
11-20	4
21-30	4
31-40	3
41-50	7
51-60	4
61-70	7
71-80	3
81-90	2
91-100	2
Total	44

It is very significant that out of these 44 villages investigated, in no less than 18 villages more than half of the cultivating households lease in working animals. In other words, in 40 percent of the villages at least 50 percent of the farming families possess no cow or buffalo. Furthermore, the total number of field animals in Cheli is on the decline. Of the 66 villages surveyed in 1940, two had no field animal at all, and on the average, the decrease of cows and buffaloes within five years (1935-40) in 64 villages was about 37 percent. This obviously has greatly undermined the productivity of the Pai Yi region.

While within this period of five years the prices of pigs and salt have not changed very much, those of cotton piece goods have gone up 50 percent in the same period; and those of cow, buffalo and plow have risen

similarly. No doubt this has added a further burden to the cultivators and has tended to disrupt their economy.

Price Increase of Cow, Buffalo, and Plow
(66 villages in Cheli)

	<u>Cow per Head</u>	<u>Buffalo per Head</u>	<u>Plow per Piece</u>
1935 price	20.8 Ch. dollars	39.2 Ch. dollars	1.5 Ch. dollars
1940 "	25.3 " "	57.7 " "	2.5 " "
Percentage of increase	21.6	47.2	66.7

There was animal pestilence in Cheli and the neighboring districts, during 1938, and the subsequent import of cows and buffaloes from Sze Mao in the north has not fully replenished the supply and need. Generally estimated, Cheli has now only 4,360 buffaloes and 17,540 cows.

There were in 1940 a total of 168 households in the four villages of Man Chang Tsai, Man Tung, Man Luan Tien and Man Ting. Of these 61.9 percent had no cows and 63.1 percent had no buffaloes. While the buffalo is primarily used for field cultivation, the cow is kept also for transport purposes. Twenty-two households had one cow each; thirty, two cows each; fourteen, three cows each; two, four cows each; five, five cows each; and one household had seven cows. As many as 54 households had one buffalo each; 6 households had two each; and two households three each. The distribution of these working animals may be seen from the following table.

Distribution of Cows and Buffaloes

<u>Name of Village</u>	<u>Cultivating Households</u>	<u>Households having cows</u>	<u>% of Households having cows</u>	<u>No. of cows</u>	<u>Households having Buffaloes</u>	<u>% of Households having Buffaloes</u>	<u>No. of Buffaloes</u>
Man Chang Tsai	31	24	77.4	73	12	38.7	13
Man Tung	30	18	60.0	31	14	46.7	15
Man Luan Tien	40	22	55.0	38	17	42.5	17
Man Ting	21	10	47.6	22	19	90.5	27
Total	122	64	50.8	164	62	50.8	72

It is significant that of the 122 cultivating households, only 50.8 percent had cows and buffaloes while 49.2 percent had none of either. That is why 24.2 percent of all those households with working animals lease out some of them, and at the same time as many as 62.3 percent of all households not possessing a buffalo have had to lease them in, in order to do their field work.

Land and Lease of Field Animals
(4 villages in Cheli, 1940)

<u>Name of Village</u>	<u>Households Having Cows & Buffaloes</u>	<u>Households leasing out Animals</u>	<u>Households Having No Buffalo</u>	<u>Households leasing in Field Animals</u>
Man Chang Tsai	24	1	23	14
Man Tung	21	9	21	19
Man Luan Tien	26	2	29	24
Man Ting	24	11	33	9
Households	95	23	106	66
Total				
%	100	24.2	100	62.3

The institution of hired labor in agriculture is not yet developed in the Pai Yi society. Out of the total of 1,572 registered households, or Cheng Hu, in the 66 villages surveyed, only 82 households, or about 5 percent, hire seasonal field laborers. Some of the Nazao, of course, are cultivated by the collective labor of the village. The rest of Nazao, the Nawa and the Nawoan are distributed among the households for cultivating 100 na together. Labor shortage rarely occurs on this basis. Seasonal labor is often hired in connection with Naboi cultivation. Whereas in the case of collectively cultivated Nazao each household in the village contributes one man's work for three days, the seasonal laborer hired on the Naboi and the Nawoan is paid from one to two Chinese dollars per day. If he is paid by the month, he receives at most 15 Chinese dollars plus food and lodging. When the Akar or the Lo Kher from the mountains are employed as seasonal field workers, they usually bring their children with them. Thus the entire family is fed and besides 0.60 Chinese dollars is paid, sometimes as low as 0.25 Chinese dollar per day. These aboriginals do not remain in the valleys during the rainy season, since there is then no field work to be done.

Apart from a few wells, the irrigation in Cheli is almost entirely dependent upon canals, which receive their water from the nearby mountains and hills. Canals have been built by requisitioned labor. Any repair work is similarly done. The latest work recorded was the repairing of a Chiengrung canal of about seven miles long, from February 10 to 25, 1939, involving 500 people. Earlier, in the spring of 1937, the repair work on the same canal had required a little over 1,000 people. This canal serves nine villages, in which a considerable amount of Nazao is to be found.

There are at least three ways of canal control. One is a system by which each village elects an officer to take care of its own irrigation; such is the case for instance, with the village of Wei Ching in Chiengrung. The second is a rotation system among two or more villages. To illustrate, the three villages of Man Tung, Man Liu and Man Ling share one canal for their field irrigation, and the canal officer is elected by rotation by all three villages out of the cultivating households, for the tenure of only one year. In 1940 Man Tung furnished the Pan Meng, the Pai Yi name for canal officer. The third system is also a Pan Meng by rotation among the villages, but limited to those villages at the end of the canal. There is a group of eleven villages sharing the use of

one canal: Man Ting, Man Kung, Man Ching Meng, Man Nofong, Man Ying, Man Chuanse, Man Cheng, Man Meng, Ching Pong, Man Tao, and Man Mien. As Man Nofong and Man Kung are located at the very end of the canal, one household from each takes up the office of Pan Meng by rotation from year to year.

In many places Pan Meng has become hereditary. In some places a new one is elected when his descendant is found to be unsatisfactory. Annual elections still prevail in some villages. All appointments of Pan Meng are confirmed by the Guan, the assembly of Meng. In the midst of the rice-planting season Pan Meng begins to perform his duties by holding a meeting at the head of the canal, when a pig is killed as a sacrifice to those who have lost their lives in connection with canal work. All water boundaries are fortified by wooden boards, and all water passages are directed in bamboo cylinders, which are fixed in the board on the boundary line. For a 50-na farm the diameter of the bamboo cylinder is two inches and for a 100-na field the diameter is four inches.

Pan Meng holds a certain amount of land, usually from 70 to 80 na, for the maintenance of his family. It is called Na Pan Meng. In some villages there is also a specific portion of land set aside, out of the Nawoan, to feed those villagers who participate in the canal repair work. Pan Meng commands a high prestige in the villages. When he makes the inspection trip in planting season, he often discovers damages done to the water system and assesses fines. He constantly supervises the canal. Anyone who steals the use of water during the day is fined six Chinese dollars. If the theft is at night, when the use of water is not so urgent, the fine is half that amount. This elementary economic administration is carried out almost exclusively by Pan Meng. In the Shih Shong Baan Naa there is no long canal, no extensive irrigation, nor a centralized bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the land of the Pai Yi is a proto-feudal society.

The poor organization of labor power and the backwardness in agricultural technique, which are outstanding economic features of any proto-feudal society, naturally result in low productivity in general and on the farm in particular. The investigation of the four villages of Man Chang Teai, Man Tung, Man Luan Tien and Man Ting shows that the yield of unhusked glutinous rice per 100 na is, on the average, not more than 152 tiao. Out of each tiao 20 to 30 catties of rice can be polished. There are obvious variations consequent on the different degrees of land fertility. The harvest of rice from superior soil is very often twice as large or more than that from inferior soil. The yield from moderately fertile soil is about seventy percent of the harvest from superior land. Statistics of 56 villages reveal that the average yield of all medium fields is 74.5 tiao per 100 na; those of 59 villages reveal that the average yield of all inferior fields is 46.2 tiao per 100 na; while the records of 62 villages show the average yield per 100 na for all superior fields is as much as 108.7 tiao.

In the four above-mentioned villages there was in 1939 a total of 168 households. More than a quarter of these households did not receive any land for cultivation. Some 26 households harvested 60 tiao of unhusked rice each; 14 households 50 tiao each; 13 households 30 tiao each; 14 households 80 tiao each; and 15 households 70 tiao each. There was one that harvested the lowest, only 15 tiao, as against four others

that harvested the highest, 100 tiao each. In this case, as may be seen from the following table, the average per household harvest was only 55.5 tiao.

Harvests of Irrigated Land
(4 villages in Cheli, 1939)

<u>Village Name</u>	<u>Rice Cultivating Households</u>	<u>Total Rice Harvests (tiao)</u>	<u>Average per Household Harvest (tiao)</u>
Man Chang Tsai	31	2,402	77.5
Man Tung	30	1,430	47.7
Man Luan Tien	40	2,228	55.7
Man Ting	21	710	33.8
Total	122	6,770	55.5

Rice harvest amounts to only about 60 percent of the village consumption. In other words, in these four villages at least, what is harvested in a normal year (1939) is far from being adequate to feed all the village people.

Harvests and Consumption
(4 villages in Cheli, 1939)

<u>Name of Village</u>	<u>Total Households</u>	<u>Households with Land for Rice</u>	<u>Total Harvest (tiao)</u>	<u>Total Village Consumption</u>	<u>% of Harvest to Consumption</u>
Man Chang Tsai	35	31	2,402	2,836	84.69
Man Tung	35	30	1,430	1,841	77.69
Man Luan Tien	46	40	2,228	3,109	71.66
Man Ting	52	21	710	3,259	21.75
Total	168	122	6,770	11,045	61.29

It is to be noted that only 72 percent of the village households are engaged in rice cultivation, and that many of the people in these villages are engaged in other agricultural activities, particularly horticulture, and various kinds of auxiliary works. In Man Ting horticulture is especially flourishing. More than half of the households is connected with fruit growing, such as bananas, lichee, coconut, pineapple, and serea. The last, known in the Pai Yi language as ba or bu, is a kind of tender green leaf taken from a special type of tree called go she nei. This leaf is for wrapping lime which the Pai Yi, like the Muslims, are fond of chewing. All these horticultural products are exported from the village.

The fact that villagers can now grow fruit trees on the communal land and thereby gain private profit, indicates a fast-crumbling primitive society. Because of the commercial development of this horticulture, Man Ting is already full of peddlars and petty merchants, even usurers. Out of 52 households, 31 have had to rely on horticulture and trade to maintain their livelihood. The remaining 21, though cultivating rice, have also had to earn other income in order to pay rent and to keep them

selves alive. In Man Luan Tien 41.3 percent of the households have income other than from rice cultivation, in Man Chang Tsai 94.2 percent, in Man Ting 96.1 percent, and in Man Tung as many as 97.1 percent. Taking the four villages together, of the total of 168 households, 32 derive their income solely from rice cultivation; 136 households, or 81 percent, have other income.

As may be seen from the following table, less than 20 percent of the total households of the four villages can both pay rent and maintain themselves by rice cultivation alone.

Position of Rice Harvest in Household Budget
(4 villages in Cheli, 1939)

<u>Village Name</u>	<u>% Households Not Cultivating Rice</u>	<u>% Households Cultivating Rice But Failing to Meet Budget</u>	<u>% Households cultivating Rice and Paying Rent and Meeting Budget</u>
Man Chang Tsai	11.4	57.1	31.5
Man Tung	14.3	54.3	31.4
Man Luan Tien	13.0	65.2	21.8
Man Ting	59.6	40.4	-
Total	27.4	53.6	19.0

In these four villages the harvest of "dry rice" from non-irrigated land is almost negligible, being only 63 tiao per year. Comparing the cash income (largely from sale of fruits) with the grain income from rice cultivation, however, the statistics show that the former is as much as 65.7 percent of the latter. Apparently horticulture occupies an important position in Cheli, particularly in these four villages.

Cash Income Largely from Horticulture
(4 villages in Cheli, 1939)

<u>Village Name</u>	<u>Households invested</u>	<u>Rice Harvests in Tiao</u>	<u>In Dollars Chinese</u>	<u>Cash Income Equivalent in rice, tiao*</u>	<u>% to Rice Income</u>
Man Chang Tsai	11	1,157	215	430	36.2
Man Tung	22	902	123	246	27.3
Man Luan Tien	13	355	36	71	20.0
Man Ting	47	3,437	1,524	3,048	88.7
Total	93	5,851	1,898	3,795	65.7

*The price in 1939 for glutinous rice was half a dollar Chinese per tiao.

Because of the low productivity and the accompanying inadequate means of production, a considerable portion of the cultivable land in Cheli has not yet been worked. It is said that Cheli, the entire administration district, has an area of 16,700 square li, with culti-

vated land amounting to 286,200 mu and cultivable but not yet cultivated land amounting to about 101,100 mu. (65) In other words, roughly 74 percent of the cultivable land is or has been cultivated, but 26 percent of it has never yet been cultivated.

Unlike central and eastern China, or Kunning and Chungking, public cemeteries and grave yards do not constitute a problem in the Pai Yi land. According to Pai Yi tradition there are three kinds of burials. All aged Buddhist monks who died of sickness and other old people who have enjoyed high moral prestige during their life time are given burial by cremation. Those who die of murder, of fatal accident, or of plague and pestilence, are usually given a water burial; the corpse is wrapped in bamboo matting and thrown into the river. A third way requires a burial ground, but only a very small one; there is no mound built for the grave, but instead an oil paper umbrella with a paper lantern attached to it is placed at the burial place. Among the Pai Yi there is no such custom as cemetery visiting. Thus, two or three years later, when the umbrella and lantern will long ago have been destroyed by natural forces, new burial will take place almost on the same spot. Whereas in most populated regions in China graveyards occupy as much as 3 or 4 percent of the cultivable land, here in Cheli and neighboring districts burial grounds do not present a land problem at all.

The problem of utilization of the Pai Yi land is that of the abandoned land, the increasing acreage of once cultivated, but now abandoned, land. It is said that in Chiengrung, the first sub-district of Cheli, there are about 600 mu of abandoned fields; in Tai Meng Lung, the second sub-district, about 500 mu; and in Kan Lan Pai, the third sub-district, as many as 100,000 mu. The last figure may have included some land which had never been cultivated. Statistics of 66 villages in Cheli, however, definitely show that abandoned land is now a little over 2 percent of land ownership. Flood, drought, lack of fertilizer and inadequate manpower have caused this situation.

This, however, gives a picture similar to other parts of China, where abandoned fields are apparently increasing. Lin Dao-yang, China's foremost forestry expert, recently pointed out the fact that the total cultivated acreage in China, excluding Mongolia and Tibet and Chinghai, was 1,327,185,000 mu, or 11 percent of the total land area, but that the total huangti (abandoned acreage) was as much as 640,808,082 mu, or about 50 percent of the total land under cultivation. (66) In Kwangtung alone there are 14,000,000 mu of huangti. The erosion in north-western China has caused the cultivated acreage in Kansu to drop 32 percent within ten years, i.e. from a total of 26,015,490 mu in 1927 to 17,611,980 mu in 1937. Regardless of whether rice or wheat are cultivated in the area, in a feudal, or pre-feudal society, where the technological level is so low, soil exhaustion or inadequate labor power always results in the abandonment of cultivated fields; and this process once begun is only accelerated because of economic backwardness.

TRIBUTE AND RENT

The tax system, just as land ownership, is an index to the nature of a social and political structure. Every kind of society has its own outstanding features of tax and finance. Tax by consent and through representation is a distinct feature of modern society; tax assessed on the basis of land is not only the salient but also the fundamental factor in a feudalistic administration; and tax by household tribute, not assessment on land, is characteristic of a proto-feudal society. Indeed, the tax in a modern society differs in nature from the medieval feudal tribute, and whereas the feudal tribute is based upon territorial unit the proto-feudal tribute has the community as its base and the household as its unit. It is not difficult to understand, therefore, that the primary form of tax in Cheli is the household tribute, i.e. each house, regardless of the number of its inhabitants, gives so much each year to the chieftain who represents the state or administration.

There are three major forms of household tribute in Shih Shong Baan Naa, of which Cheli is the political center, and these have existed in every other proto-feudal society. The first is tribute in labor or work, the second is tribute in kind or products, and the third consists of cash payment. The requisitioned labor power for building and repairing canals and roads, even for the construction of houses and buildings, concretely illustrates the first form. The second tax has never flourished nor has it been prominent, because there have not been enough products for requisition in the Pai Yi. Long intervals of isolation and peace failed to enhance this kind of requisition. Cash tribute and cash requisition developed in the course of time, chiefly in response to the demands of external feudalistic authorities. When the rulers of Yuan, Ming and Ching (Manchu) Dynasties exacted tribute of cash (silver and gold) from the Cheli chieftain or Zao-pilin, he found it necessary to acquire the tribute by household requisition. Because of the poor productivity of the region and difficulties in transport, Cheli's Mongolian, Manchurian and Chinese overlords naturally preferred cash tribute to tribute in kind. Today, the regular annual household tribute in Cheli is in cash, in silver coins of half a Chinese dollar each and subsidiary copper coins. Paper money, both from the Central Government and from Yunnan Provincial Government, is fast replacing these coins as means of tribute payment.

Although an elaborate system of feudalistic land tax has long been established in most parts of China, in the form of an assessment on all cultivated land according to the size and fertility of the unit, the proto-feudalistic household tribute in the form of military requisitions is still prominent and flourishing, particularly in the war zones. In many places the proto-feudal tribute from the households far exceeds the amount of land tax collected. Land tax and household requisitions in Honan during 1942 were so heavy that it greatly aggravated the difficult rural situation and caused the big famine of that year. (67) The noblemen in medieval Europe might have enjoyed extensive freedom to act as an individual, but "the relations of the noble with other members of the feudal unit were controlled by feudal custom." The noble "must not dis-

sipate his fief to such an extent that he would lack the resources required to perform the service due his lord. Except for this limitation he could exploit his lands as he saw fit." (68) The present Chinese local administrators, who find themselves in a rapidly decaying feudalistic society, do not seem to be aware of any limitation to their excessive taxation and requisition.

Even in Shih Shong Baan Naa, and particularly in Cheli, where there is no land tax to speak of, all forms of household tribute have been multiplied and the burden of a double government has become so heavy that it has further impoverished agricultural production and disrupted the proto-feudal agrarian relations. One of the outstanding features of proto-feudal and feudal tax systems is not the shifting of the tax burden from the rulers to the ruled, but rather the open exemption of the officials from paying household tribute. Such tax exemption hastens the process of proletarian, i.e. making the rich richer and the poor poorer. This social disparity in turn hastens the disintegration of the existing social and political texture and inevitably brings about new agrarian relations in each and every village.

In Cheli the largest majority of tribute-free households is the group of elected and hereditary officials and their relatives. A small minority of exemptions is allowed those households that cannot pay at all and also others that have been hit hard by natural calamities like flood and drought. Some are exempted from paying the main items of household tribute and others are exempted from paying the extra tribute as well. Below is a list of the main and extra tributes collected for 1939 in the 66 villages surveyed.

<u>Main Household Tributes</u>	<u>Chinese dollars</u>	<u>% to total</u>
(1) House tax	4,200.00	28.9
(2) Leprosy prevention	87.00	0.6
(3) Education tax	1,750.00	12.1
(4) For sub-district office	700.00	4.8
(5) Militia fee	700.00	4.8
<u>Household Extra-Tribute</u>		
(6) Lian-long	2,917.30	20.1
(7) Lian-nui	3,317.30	22.9
(8) Her-baan for magistrate's services	145.43	0.9
(9) Her-gin for Zao-pilin's services	705.66	4.9
Total	14,522.69	100.0

About 15 to 20 percent of the households in 19 villages were exempted from paying the five items of the main tribute, and about 15 to 20 percent of the households in 17 villages were exempted from paying the four items of the extra-tribute. Of the 1,900 households in the 66 villages investigated, 8 percent were exempted from the main tribute and over 9 percent from the extra tribute.

According to the report for 1931 of the Cheli magistrate, the household tribute collected was 7,835.20 Chinese dollars for the whole district, and the figures of exempted households can be seen from the following table. (69)

Tribute Exemptions for 1931 in Cheli

<u>Name of Sub-district</u>	<u>Number of Households</u>	<u>Those Exempted</u>	<u>Those Paying</u>
Chiengrung	1,058	238	820
Tai Meng Lung	2,750	765	1,985
Kan Ian Pai	1,088	269	819
Siao Meng Yang	249	47	202
Yu Loh Shan	869	238	631
San Soong	590	158	432
Total	6,604	1,715	4,889

Of the total of 1,715 households exempted, 370 were classified as entirely poverty-stricken and 223 as households badly damaged by flood. The remaining 1,122 were officials and their close relatives. In other words, 17 percent of all the village households were exempted from tribute paying just because of their feudalistic or bureaucratic positions and blood relation to these officials. This 17 percent exemption of all households, however, only refers to the first item of the main household tribute, as the payment reported here is 1.60 Chinese dollars per household for the year. Nevertheless it is the basic tribute, occupying about 29 percent of all tribute payments in Cheli, and such a high percentage of exemption is characteristic of a proto-feudal society. That those who collect tribute should not pay seems to be the logic inherent in this situation. (70)

The five items of the main household tribute, together with the extra tribute of Lian-long, are assessed on the household basis, while the remaining three extra tributes are collected on the village basis. Every village is assessed a certain amount for these three items, to be paid both in cash and in kind, the village headman collecting from the tribute-paying households. Thus, the amount of all household extra-tribute in the 66 villages surveyed, for the year 1939, was as follows:

Lian-long	2,917.30 Chinese dollars
Lian-mui	3,031.80 " "
	and 571.00 <u>tiao</u> of unhusked rice
Her-baan	84.23 Chinese dollars
	and 122.39 <u>tiao</u> of unhusked rice
Her-gin	678.50 Chinese dollars
	and 54.33 <u>tiao</u> of unhusked rice

In accordance with the market price of rice in 1939, i.e. half a Chinese dollar per tiao, the total extra tribute paid by the 66 villages was valued at 7,085.69 Chinese dollars. Deducting 7,085.69 from the total of all household tributes of 14,522.69 Chinese dollars, it is clear that the five items of main tribute amounted to 7,437 Chinese dollars. Since in 1939 some 1,750 households in these villages paid all the tribute, each household paid 4.25 Chinese dollars for the main tribute and 4.05 Chinese dollars for the extra tribute.

This total of 8.30 Chinese dollars per household tallies with other specific information. The 32 households of Man Chang Tsai paid more than 8 Chinese dollars each, including 4.25 dollars of main tribute. In

addition, however, upon every visit of the collector, 0.30 dollars per household was assessed as extra tribute. Thus, each household in Man Chang Tsai actually paid 10 dollars for 1939. In Man Tung, as much as 10.75 Chinese dollars were paid by each household.

The largest item of extra tribute, (23 percent of the total household tribute), is the Lian-nui, sometimes known as Lianai. It is a collection to pay boys to attend the compulsory Chinese school. Furthermore, as demanded by the district magistrate, a general education tax is assessed for the maintenance of this kind of school. This general education levy takes up 12 percent more of the total household tribute. In other words, these two items together, under the name of education, is as much as 35 percent of the household tribute, even larger than the amount of the household tax itself. Yet, the percentage of literacy is not at all high. In the four villages of Man Chang Tsai, Man Tung, Man Luan Tien, and Man Ting, no girls are found in the temple or in the school and literacy is limited to boys and men. Monks occupy 63 percent of the male population, but only 31 percent of the total population. The literate males occupy not more than 14 percent of all the males and a little over 8 percent of the total population.

In addition to the 8.30 Chinese dollars per household regular and direct tribute, there are other special and indirect levies. The militia fee, the slaughter tax, self-government fund, and ferry toll are four concrete examples of this kind of assessment, either special or indirect in character. The guardsmen of the Chinese magistrate were equipped in 1938 with modern rifles, and for this 0.70 Chinese dollars per household was assessed in that year. Another part of this "militia fee" took the form of a surtax to the tea tribute. For every picul of tea produced one extra Chinese dollar is collected. This extra tribute on tea is split three ways: for collection expenditure, 10 percent, for Zao-pilin's Hoslam, 10 percent, and the third, major share, 80 percent, goes to the magistrate's office. (71)

By 1940 the slaughter tax rates were 2.40 Chinese dollars per pig killed, 4.80 dollars per cow slaughtered, and 8 dollars per buffalo butchered. Five percent of the slaughter tax collected is retained by the local Pai Yi officials as administration expense. In a village of Siao Meng Yang (Cheli's 4th sub-district) the production of rice is very meager and the people there cultivate tobacco for their livelihood. Though there are very few pigs to be slaughtered and hardly any cows or buffaloes, the officers arbitrarily assess a slaughter tax of four Chinese dollars per household. (72)

The so-called self-government fund is a uniform assessment in all Chinese administrative districts, the supposed purpose of which is to finance local elected assemblies. Although such assemblies have remained for years a matter of fiction, the fund has continued to be collected in other parts of China. The provincial finance bureau of Yunnan has been collecting this tax from Cheli since June 1938. Here in Cheli it has taken the form of an extra tribute to the slaughter tax and to the tobacco and wine tax. The rates are 30 percent of the tobacco and wine tax and 10 percent of the slaughter tax.

Transit tax or toll is a typical feudalistic levy. It must have been collected in Cheli in very early times when feudalization first set in.

As trade has developed this toll collection has become no less important than the household tribute, which is a typical proto-feudalistic levy. There is a flourishing ferry toll administration at Kan Lan Pai, the third sub-district of Cheli. In crossing the river every person, whether carrying a load or not, must pay 0.20 Chinese dollars. For every horse, 0.50 Chinese dollar is collected as ferry toll; for every cow or buffalo 0.40 dollar; for every animal load of fuel wood 1.00 dollar; and for every pig, 1.20 dollars. Evidently the ferry toll for cows and buffaloes has actually gone beyond the nominal rate of 0.40 dollar per head. Cows or buffaloes with salt load yield 0.90 dollar per head for the ferry toll, whereas the market price of a load of salt costs three dollars at the most. (73) In this particular case the toll is as high as 30 percent of the value of the transported commodity.

Apart from this kind of special and indirect tribute, the burden of the regular and direct household tribute is heavy enough. A cash tribute paid by the cultivators, from 8 to 10 dollars per year per household, usually is as much as 27 percent of the total harvest value. Together with the special and indirect tributes, it amounts probably to one-third of the harvest income. Though this is somewhat lighter than the land tax burden in the time of Confucius, it is comparatively heavier than that in France before 1789. (74) On the eve of the French Revolution, as described by Thomas Carlyle, the French peasantry had to give up one-third of their harvest to pay tax, rent and interest; but now the peasants in Cheli have to pay one-third of their harvests for tribute alone.

There has been no lack of protests and revolts against the increasing tribute burden. In March 1933 people protested throughout Siao Meng Yang against the requisitioning of labor long after the years of military activities. Some eight villages moved out of the boundary *en bloc* so as to avoid such a requisition measure. During June 1937 the Pais and Hsiens (Pai Yi officials) of San Soong held a secret meeting to protest against the extra tribute of Lian-nui. They passed a resolution that they would never recognize any revenue or tribute collector sent from the Chinese magistrate but would cooperate only with the Pai Yi officials from the court of Zao-pilin. (75) Earlier that year, there was a revolt in Chiahsi village, the people demanding the abolition of Her-baan for magistrate's service as well as the slaughter tax on animals killed for the purposes of temple sacrifice and secular ceremonies. Mad crowds clamored outside the court of Zao-pilin and the office of the magistrate.

It is significant to note that the system of collecting tribute in a proto-feudal society like Cheli is already dominated by the characteristics of a feudalistic administration. Perhaps two points in this connection are especially outstanding, both representing a kind of feudal exploitation. First, the nominal number of tribute-paying households as reported is less than the actual number. Second, through a crude manipulation of currency, the actual amount of tribute collected far exceeds the nominal figure reported officially. In the entire district of Cheli there are probably about 13,800 households; but the official record shows only about 8,000 households. Of this latter, about 1,300 households are exempted from household tribute. Thus, according to the official record only 6,700 households are paying tribute, instead of 12,500 in reality. All tribute collected from 5,800 households is not reported but pocketed by both the Chinese magistrate and the Pai Yi Zao-pilin.

In 1912, at the beginning of Republican rule in China, there was no silver coin in Cheli; a round and slightly dented piece of silver was used as money. Silver pieces, salt and rice were at that time practically the only three means of exchange. (76) Later, the provincial mint in Kunming turned out half-dollar silver coins for all the Shih Shong Baan Naa territories. On these coins there are both Pai Yi and Chinese scripts. When Ko Shu-hsun was appointed the chief administrator of this region in 1925, a branch of the Yunnan Provincial Bank was opened and its paper notes came into use. Thus, between 1925 and 1928 many of the silver pieces as well as the silver half-dollar coins were drained out of the Pai Yi land. By June 1938 the paper notes issued by the banks of the Chinese Central Government were officially introduced, thus bringing further complications to the marketing and tax situation.

The following table shows the exchange rates between silver coin, the provincial note and the national note:

Currency in Cheli
(1940)

1.00 provincial note	0.18 silver dollar	0.50 national note
5.50 provincial note	1.00 silver dollar	2.75 national note
2.00 provincial note	0.36 silver dollar	1.00 national note

In practice, however, one silver dollar (consisting of two half-dollar coins) is exchanged for two and a half dollars of national bank notes, or for five and a half dollars of Yunnan bank notes. Similarly, as a sign of the prestige of national notes, one dollar national bank note is exchanged for two dollars provincial note, or 0.40 silver dollar.

Note issues by the Provincial government reflect a definite policy of fiscal exploitation only redoubled by the arbitrary method of tribute collection so characteristic of feudalistic domination. When Shih Shong Baan Naa was flooded by paper notes, the Pai Yi turned them into durable commodities as quickly as possible. The value of notes, therefore, tended to drop. In August 1938 one provincial dollar note could still be exchanged for 0.60 silver dollar, but by January 1939, it dropped to 0.50 silver dollar. Still half a year later it further dropped to 0.30, and by the end of 1939 to 0.20 silver dollar. In 1940, when the rate decreased to 0.18 silver dollar, the five items of the main household tribute was collected exclusively in silver dollars, and paper note was not acceptable for this payment. It would be too cumbersome to transport silver coins from Cheli to Kunming, so, paper notes are delivered by the magistrate, who thus easily pockets the difference between the paper note and silver coins. In short, for every 100 dollars collected he reports 18 and squeezes 82 dollars. On the basis of 6,700 tribute-paying households who yield a main tribute of 4.25 Chinese dollars each, the magistrate is in a position to retain at least 20,000 dollars. Furthermore, there is the collection from 5,800 households that are not officially recorded and reported; this would bring his total squeeze to between 40,000 to 50,000 Chinese dollars a year.

Currency manipulation has also given rise to a disguised income tax. Whereas the main tribute is collected in silver, the salary for all employees in the magistrate's office is paid half in silver and half in

paper money. If 40 Chinese dollars is the average monthly salary, actual payment is 23.60 silver dollars in toto. What is thus a 41 percent squeeze for the Chinese magistrate becomes a 41 percent income tax in disguise to his official employees. Thus robbed of their income, both the Chinese and Pai Yi officials descend on the villagers for more extra tribute and requisitions.

An increase of tax means an increase of rent. Over 60 percent of the cultivated fields in Cheli, or at least in the first sub-district, are held as Nazao by the Pai Yi officials. In face of the Chinese exploitation these land-holding officials naturally tend to increase their rent. There are two forms of rent connected with Nazao: labor and rent in kind, and of the two the latter is predominant. The typical labor rent is to be found in the village of Man Tsin Lan, where 350 na of cultivated land is being worked collectively for Zao-pilin by 35 households. One man from each house devotes three days in the year to this field, but none of them has a share in the harvest. The fruit of their labor goes entirely to Zao-pilin through his agent. Rent in kind or in produce paid for Nazao is either delivered by the village as a whole, or by the households separately.

As in the case of Chin Teh, Man Luan Tien, and other villages, Nazao is distributed for cultivation along with Nawoan; often the harvests of both are mixed; the village officials collect them and deliver a portion of the whole to the land-holders as rent on Nazao. In Man Lung Kan, Man Kwang Lung, and Ko Tung, etc., Nazao is not distributed but is taken on for cultivation by villagers in a voluntary way. In this case the rent in kind is delivered by the cultivating families themselves to the door of the land-holding official.

Rent in Kind of 41,121 Na of Nazao
(53 villages, Cheli, 1940)

<u>Rent in Tiao of Unhusked Rice</u> (per 100 <u>na</u>)	<u>Nazao in Na</u>	<u>% of Na</u>
8	450	1.1
15	200	0.5
20	6,106	14.8
21	350	0.9
22	2,700	6.6
24	1,000	2.4
25	869	2.1
29	280	0.7
30	29,175	70.9
Total	41,121	100.0

As the total rent in kind collected from the 41,121 na amounts to 11,221 tiao of unhusked rice, the average per 100 na rent comes to 27.3 tiao. And as the usual harvest from 100 na of Nazao is a total of 80 tiao or thereabouts, it is clear that the common rate of Nazao rent is 34.1 percent of the produce. In some villages such as Chin Teh, Man Luan Lung, and Man Lung, the Nazao rent per 100 na is as high as 30 tiao, or 37.5 percent of the produce.

Sometimes this rent in kind is collected in cash. In Man Luan Lung, for example, every household that cultivates Nazao delivers unhusked rice to the residence of Zao-pilin. If the rent is not delivered on time, it is collected by Zao-pilin's agent at a time when rice is highest. When cash is paid in terms of 30 tiao, the actual rent is increased to 41 percent of the harvest. That is why the villagers generally seek to avoid payment in cash.

No rent is collected on about 70 percent of all Nawoan. The rent in kind on 30 percent of Nawoan is much lower than that of Nazao. According to the statistics of 23 villages in 1940, about 54 percent of the rent-yielding Nawoan return 10 tiao per 100 na, 34 percent return 20 tiao, and 12 percent return 22 tiao, the average being 17.3 tiao per 100 na, or 21.6 percent of the produce. The Nawoan leased out to other villages, however, have to return 30 tiao per 100 na. This is the same rate that Nawa bear. There is no rent on Naboi, as these newly opened lands can neither be sold nor leased. On the whole, rent in Cheli is not such a pressing problem as that of tribute payment.

CHAPTER 10.

TRADE AND USURY

In the early sixteenth century when the rulers of the Ming Dynasty sent military expeditions to Indo-China, three routes were discussed: through Kwangsi, via Kwangtung, and by way of Mangtze in the south-eastern part of Yunnan. (77) The shortest route through Yi Pang and Yeh Wu (11th Baan Naa) or through Meng O and O Teh (10th Baan Naa) was not known at that time. In the middle of the eighteenth century when the Manchu Emperor Chien Lung decided to punish the Siamese king, the land route through Burma and the sea way from Canton were considered the only two possible military approaches, since it was not known that the shortest way to reach Siam is through Meng Lung (2nd Baan Naa) and Meng Yung (12th Baan Naa). (78) Chinese merchants did not enter Shih Shong Baan Naa until the middle of the seventeenth century. But as late as the nineteenth century they exported silk, satin, tea, brassware and opium to Moulmein in Burma and imported tusk, musk, deer horn and saltpeter therefrom, without going by the direct route from Cheli to Chienmai. (79) Though Captain McLeod had visited Cheli in 1837, Western manufactured commodities were not brought in by Chinese merchants until the 1860's.

There is no separate class of traders in a proto-feudal society, save for a few Pai Yi officials, an inconsiderable number of people who make a living exclusively out of trade or usury; and even the top Pai Yi officials have to derive the major portion of their income from tribute and rent. The real merchants and usurers in the land of Pai Yi are a tiny minority of Chinese who have come from outside. In Cheli money-economy, or the constant use of money, is a recent development. (80) Although silver had been used as an ornament from the fourteenth century onward, at least, silver pieces were not used as media of exchange until 1660. Towards the end of the seventeenth century silver pieces as money were recognized by the Peking Government. (81)

Commodity exchange still plays an important role in the present Pai Yi economy. The Pai Yi exchange their salt production for raw cotton grown by the Akar. Often they take the cotton from the Akar and spin and weave it into cloth, then divide the cloth, usually on a 50-50 basis, with the Akar. Among themselves the Pai Yi exchange rice for Hulong (the Pai Yi name for noodles), Hulong for Hulongbaa (cold rice curd), and Hubon (glutinous rice cakes) for Sili (local tobacco). Often on the village market day, vegetables, known to the Pai Yi generally as pah, are exchanged for gafa (matches) and la (tea) for lo (wine). Gin (meat) and lo are also exchangeable. The barter system is still common in Cheli. The exchange of one catty of chicken for one catty of cotton is almost a daily event.

In a proto-feudal society, as in a feudal society, home handicraft or cottage industry is closely associated with agricultural production. The field productivity is generally low, the field work occupies at most four months of the year, and a peasant family is thus forced to engage in handicraft industry if there is any market. These peasant families sell such handicraft products as bamboo matting, bamboo chairs and tables, baskets and earthenware in Cheli, only to supplement their crop income.

The largest auxiliary production in Cheli is hog raising. Prior to 1939, more than 10,000 households raised over 8,000 pigs every year, of which about 3,000 were sold to the Chinese merchants from Szemao to the north. Owing to a pestilence hog production has been greatly reduced. In the 66 villages surveyed the number of hogs has decreased by half within five years. In the four villages where more intensive study was made, only 56 percent of the village households are raising hogs whereas ten years ago, when the business was most prosperous, some 83 percent of them were engaged in this auxiliary production.

Hog Raising in Cheli
(4 villages)

<u>Village Name</u>	<u>Households</u>	<u>Hog Raising 1940</u>		<u>Hog Raising 1930</u>	
		<u>Households</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Households</u>	<u>%</u>
Man Chang Tsai	35	20	57.1	33	94.2
Man Tung	35	21	88.6	34	97.4
Man Luan Tien	46	24	52.2	35	76.1
Man Ting	52	19	36.5	38	73.1
Total	168	94	56.0	140	83.3

Poor peasant households have no means of taking up auxiliary work. Neither market nor loan facilities could allow these people to do independent trading. Their last resort is to hire out their own labor. As farm hands they are employed by the season, usually for three months - from the time of planting to that of harvest. They receive food during employment, and in addition 15 to 30 tiao of unhusked rice as wages. If hired as day laborers, as some of them are, either to help plant rice or to carry water or wood, they either receive three catties of rice per day without food or get a daily wage of 0.15 Chinese dollars. Some of them find employment on ferry boats, and in that case their daily wage is not more than 0.10 Chinese dollar.

Furthermore, the labor market is very limited. Employment is confined in most cases to the same village, and often within the circles of neighbors and relatives. There is of course regular marketing of commodities, not only of agricultural produce but also of handicraft work. A considerable portion of the peasant households has to buy unhusked rice, and this is the fundamental basis for trade. In Man Tung, 20 percent of the households have to purchase unhusked rice every year; in Man Chang Tsai 37 percent; in Man Luan Tien 40 percent; and in Man Ting as many as 88 percent. The average purchase every year by each household is 6 tiao in Man Chang Tsai, 15 tiao in Man Tung, 23 tiao in Man Luan Tien, and 33 tiao in Man Ting. As far as these four representative villages show, half of the village households make rice purchase, to an average amount of 22 tiao per household. Usually, out of 30 catties of unhusked rice, 7 to 10 catties of polished rice may be obtained. Rice polishing is done by laborers, in their homes, who often completely consume the product.

Market days are distributed among several villages in the same vicinity, four or five places in turn holding the market. There is a fixed place for this market either in, or immediately on the outskirts of, the village, to which place "peddlers" flock from as far as ten miles away. Usually half of these "peddlers" at the market are women, and only

about one-tenth are real peddlers, i.e. those who do no other work besides attending the market. A market is attended by between 30 to 1,500 people; the number of "peddlers" at each market runs from fifty to five hundred as a rule, each carrying with him, or her, commodities usually worth only two Chinese dollars in toto. Thus, there is a great variety of commodities but each in very small quantity. The following two markets may be regarded as good examples.

In Chiengrung, on the street very near the court of Zao-pilin, 96 "peddlers" attended the market there on April 16, 1940. First, there were four stalls of tea. The most each of these four "peddlers" carried was 100 ounces, worth not more than three Chinese dollars. Then came 19 stalls of fresh vegetables such as small tomatoes, green peppers, egg plants, cucumbers, and melons. Then came three stalls of rice cakes known as hubon, four stalls of wine, three stalls of dried pork and beef, three stalls of salted vegetables, two stalls of lime, two stalls of homespun cloth and yarn, three stalls of salt, one stall of bean curd, three stalls of soybean sauce, eleven stalls of tobacco, three stalls of dried fish, three stalls of imported goods from other parts of China, two stalls of bran and broken rice, and thirteen stalls of rice. At the end came one stall of cooked rice, four stalls of betel nut, four stalls of sweets, two stalls of dried rice noodles, five stalls of rice noodles ready for immediate eating, and one stall of locally made paper and paper goods.

The bean curd and soy sauce were made by some Chinese families in Cheli, and not by the Pai Yi. The three stalls of such imported goods as thread, buttons, batteries, knives, scissors, soap, dyes, needles and cloth, were maintained by Chinese merchants from outside. Chinese peddlers usually attend market every day, and visit villages as the market day rotates among them. Each of these three stalls sold 30 to 40 Chinese dollars worth of goods on one day. Other stalls, with much cheaper commodities, could sell only things worth half or one-third of this amount.

Another market actually surveyed was that of Chia Hsi Kai, in the middle part of Cheli city. On certain days a small market is held here, on other days, and less often, a large market is held. On April 24, 1940, there was a small market of 323 stalls. Of these stalls 264 had agricultural products for sale, and 59 had industrial or manufactured goods. Five days later, a large market was held on the same spot. There were no less than 630 stalls, but of these only 76 were of handicraft products and 23 of imported machine-manufactured goods. There were many stalls of locally made dyes, each however carrying only 1.20 Chinese dollars worth of dye.

That stalls selling the same commodity should be closely lined up together, is due not to the close competition, but rather to the established personal relations. Usually neighbors and relatives turn out the same commodity to be sold on the market and they themselves choose to stand together at the market. This again is encouraged by the fact that there is a certain division of handicrafts among the villages. Owing to geographical or historical factors one village may specialize in one kind of hand manufacture and another village in another. The following ten commodities may be taken for example: each comes from one or a few villages only, but none of them is made in a large number of villages:

- 1) Prepared bamboo shoots, a delicate food manufactured in Man Sha, Man Ling and Man Liu.
- 2) Bamboo furniture, from Man Poo.
- 3) Tobacco for the pipe, from Man Ting and Man Hsien.
- 4) Sugar, from Man Chingham and Man Yan.
- 5) Rice noodles, from Ching Tung and Man Tung.
- 6) Rice cakes, from Man Meng, Man Cheng and Man Yin.
- 7) Dye stuffs, from Man Diu, Pai Ko, and Nan Lung.
- 8) Paper, from Man Chang Tsai and Man Sai.
- 9) Wine, from Wei Su, Ching Teh, and Pai Ko.
- 10) Pottery, from Man Lu and Man Dou.

There is no doubt that commercial and usurious exploitation has come in with the Chinese traders, who are regarded as outsiders. After Shih Shong Baan Naa had become a vassal state of the Manchu in Peking, Chinese merchants began to enter the land of the Pai Yi in the middle of the seventeenth century. Tea was their chief attraction. I Pang, Kehtung, Mang Che, Man Tuan, Man Sai, and Yu Loh were six famous tea-producing areas, whence these merchants transported tea by their own horses, donkeys and ponies to other parts of China, including Tibet. In connivance with Chinese military and civil bureaucrats in this region, they enforced the collection of tea at a very low price. Often the Pai Yi peasants were requisitioned to transport tea without any compensation. (82)

Several revolts, as described in the earlier part of this study, were cruelly put down by Chinese military forces. Tea trade flourished again in the nineteenth century. Writing in 1886, Rev. Clark said, "The noted Pu Ehr tea comes from the tea mountains of I Pang...There are a good many Kiangsi and Hunan men at I Pang engaged in the tea trade. ...About three thousand horse-loads pass through Pu Ehr every year; several hundred horse-loads pass through Tali for Tibetan consumption and a fair quantity from I Pang goes to Burma." (83) Towards the end of the Manchu Dynasty another revolt took place in Ting Cheng, near Cheli, during which several Szechuan merchants were murdered by the Pai Yi. But even at present Szechuan and Yunnan merchants still carry on the tea trade between Pu Ehr and Lhasa. A part of this trade now goes through the Shan States, Rangoon, Calcutta, Kalimpong and Sikkim. (84)

Chinese traders import salt and textiles from Szechuan and Kwangtung, and export camphor, tea and cotton. Every year about 10,000 transport animals engaged in this trade are driven through Cheli. (85) Cotton is also collected in Shih Shong Baan Naa by Chinese traders, who often deliver salt to the Akar and in exchange receive cotton from them. As a rule, 300 cattles of salt are exchanged for 200 cattles of cotton. In 1940 one Chinese merchant who dealt with an Akar in this barter gave the following business account. He went to Cheli with three horses and

and returned with two of them, one having died of disease. His cash expenses were 96 dollars of provincial notes as the total return for 300 catties of salt, 78 notes as fodder fee for three horses on the incoming trip, 60 notes as fee for two horses on the return journey, 24 notes for "consumption tax" on the two horses and 32 notes to pay for customs revenue. These came to a total of 290 dollars of provincial bank notes. As 200 catties of cotton were worth 400 dollars in provincial notes, some 110 dollars of provincial notes might represent the gross income of this deal. Out of this, of course, the merchant had to defray his own food expense.

It is significant that even in this kind of barter deal the merchant does not go to the Akar cotton producers directly, but rather indirectly deals through the Akar village headmen. Naturally, the headmen, as in all similar cases of compradorship, must have their share of profit in connection with such a business transaction. Just as the modern Chinese business agents or compradors for Western commercial firms have gradually developed into independent traders, so a similar tendency is obvious among those Pai Yi headmen and officials who have acquired a business knowledge through their contact with the Chinese merchants.

The Pa of Man Ting, for instance, often bought 100 to 200 tiao of unhusked rice and then sold it for profit. Several Hsien in the village of Man Chang Tsai have done likewise to the tune of 50 tiao of unhusked rice, but a Hsien has to maintain 50 people whose annual consumption is not less than 730 tiao. His rent income covers only 70 percent of the food for his whole household. He manages to make up this deficit and to live a rather luxurious life, by the Pai Yi standard, by trading activities. He has a tea company of his own, which exports tea to the extent of 400 to 800 horse-loads each year. Along with this he also exports 10 to 20 horse-loads of camphor.

Chinese magistrates in this region, like some of the Western colonial officers in Asia and Africa, not satisfied with the squeezes and briberies which are matters of open secret, even indulge in trading affairs, too. Chang Chun-hui, former magistrate of Cheli, is a typical case. He brought with him several sons and nephews to Cheli, who together organized the cotton trade. Nearly 70 percent of cotton production in this district came into their sphere of influence. They advanced a sum of money to the cotton growers and fixed a price with them, i.e. combined trade and usury. When the market price for cotton was 50 Chinese dollars per picul, the fixed price was only 35 Chinese dollars per picul. The Chang family eventually sold cotton for 75 Chinese dollars per picul, making an enormous profit.

Chinese merchants in Cheli also trade in foreign commodities, manufactured things from Europe and America. The quantity and variety of these goods are of course very limited, because of the very low purchasing power and the difficulties of transportation. When the boundary agreement was signed by Great Britain and China in 1894, the railway project from Rangoon through Mandalay and Zimmé to Cheli had been abandoned. The Kunming-Hanoi railway was completed in 1910, but the commercial route from Kunming to Cheli through Szemao and Pu Ehr has often been harassed by bandits. Cheli is nearer to the Yunnan-Burma Highway than to the Kunming-Hanoi Railway, and the import of foreign commodities was greatly facilitated by the activities on that

highway during the recent war years.

There are as yet far less foreign goods in Cheli than in Kengtung or Taunggyi (two large trading centers of the Federated Shan States). Whereas in the latter places there are several types of imported hoes such as the Circular Saw Brand from Wolverhampton, England, and the Horse Brand and Farmer Brand from Germany, the hoes used in Cheli are mostly imported from Szechuan. There are hardly any British or German hoes to be seen either in the fields or at the market in Cheli. In the Shan States the market is full of such imports as Japanese-made iron cauldrons, German-made Petromax lamps, Dutch cotton blankets, and British-made Apollo Brand iron bars; but in Cheli only a few European odds and ends are sold, such as matches, pins, needles and small looking-glasses. Whereas the temples in Kengtung use yellow wax cakes of English manufacture, the temples in Shih Shong Baan Naa still use wax of Chinese handicraft product.

The Chinese have carried the twin brothers of trade and usury to the land of Pai Yi ever since the middle of the seventeenth century. A Chinese poem written before 1727 depicted the sufferings of tea peasants in Cheli. Chinese merchants advanced food to them, and when tea was collected at a low price, both principal and interest were deducted. Interest rates were so high that many peasants had to run from their homeland. The Chinese poet Hsu Ting-hsun compared this with outright robbery. (86) In 1826 Yang Tien-pang, an Imperial Censor, sent a memorial to Peking urging six reform measures for Yunnan. In that memorial he described the land of Pai Yi as having been harassed by traders from Szechuan, Kwangtung, Kiangsi and Kweichow, who, in connivance with Chinese garrison commanders, extended exploitation by usury. There have always been some business relations between the Pai Yi chieftains and Chinese traders. In fighting for the right of succession these chieftains often borrowed heavily from the Chinese. Tiao Tsun-cheng, for instance, was in debt for several hundred Chinese dollars. (87)

Trade and usury, twin forms of Chinese economic penetration and exploitation in Cheli, have long become factors of disintegration. Together with tribute and rent, they have worked steadily for the disruption of this proto-feudal society. In the four villages of Man Chang Tsai, Man Tung, Man Luan Tien and Man Ting, as many as 28 percent of the households had a rice loan in 1940, each household having borrowed an average of 10.5 tiao of unhusked rice. Of the total of 1,900 households in the 66 villages investigated in 1940, 358 households, or 18.8 percent, took rice loans.

Extent of Rice Loans in Cheli
(66 villages, 1940)

<u>% of Borrowing Households to Total</u>	<u>Number of Villages</u>	<u>% of Villages</u>
0	20	30.3
1-10	4	6.1
11-20	15	22.7
21-30	11	16.7
31-40	4	6.1
41-50	5	7.6
51-60	3	4.5
61-70	3	4.5
71-80	1	1.5
81-90	1	-
Total	66	100.0

Many village headmen are engaged in this rice usury, the interest rates of which are 20 percent for three months and 100 percent for one year. Often the charge for the loan of an iron plough during the planting season is as high as one and a half times of unhusked rice.

CHAPTER 11,

OTHER FACTORS OF DISINTEGRATION

During the war years, particularly in 1940-45, transportation on the Yunnan-Burma Highway was very active. It was then the only open land route for China's external trade and for her direct contact with the outside world. Lashio, an important communication center in the Shan States, is situated on this highway not far from the Chinese border. From Lashio a motor road leads directly to another Shan town, Kengtung, and then by horse or donkey it is a four-day journey to Shih Shong Baan Naa. Ta Loh, a village situated on a river bank, guards the entrance. From there, through the town of Fuhai, one may reach Cheli in two days. Thus, within two weeks people, as well as goods, can reach Cheli from Kunming. This is actually half the distance compared to the journey through Pu Ehr and Sze Mao. In other words, Cheli is now less isolated than at any time in the past.

This new trading route has in no uncertain terms accelerated the economic activities of the land of Pai Yi. The excess of imports over exports has increased rapidly. The annual export from Fuhai between 1943 and 1945 was valued at about 800,000 Chinese dollars, while the annual import was valued at least 1,350,000 Chinese dollars. (88) (These are in terms of silver coins.) As there is no visible increase of production in general, the specie drain from Shih Shong Baan Naa is only too apparent. And this has been intensified by an exchange rate manipulation in Kengtung, which may be regarded as the center of Pai Yi external trade.

In March, when cotton and tea are collected for export, the exchange rate at Kengtung is 100 rupees for 180 Chinese silver dollars, but in September of the same year when iron, textiles and dye stuff are imported, the value of the silver dollar drops to 100 rupees for 250 Chinese silver dollars. This exchange manipulation, linked with international trade, has indirectly ruined Cheli's tea production. As the collection price has been forced down to something less than the cost of production, often as much as one-third of the tea harvest has been abandoned.

The increase of grain trade in general did not help the welfare of the Pai Yi. In fact the price of rice in Cheli increased faster than that of imported salt. Between 1938 and 1940 salt prices went up 28 percent whereas the price of rice increased 40 percent, the primary cause being inflation. Taxation, inflation and "unfavorable" balance of trade all hastened the decrease of silver specie, the half-dollar coin and subsidiary copper coins. In 1912 there was a total of 100,000 ounces of silver species in Cheli; but it decreased to less than 10,000 ounces by 1940. The total value of the half-dollar silver coins in this district was 160,000 dollars in 1925, but by 1940 it decreased to less than 20,000 dollars.

Feudalistic Chinese administration has not in any way helped to improve the livelihood of Pai Yi. It has virtually robbed the people in this proto-feudal society and has caused a rapid economic and social disintegration. The economic factor which has of recent years attracted more Chinese traders and more Chinese officials, is the increased commercialization of agriculture, not only in Cheli but in Shih Shong Baan

Naa as a whole. One of the sub-district chiefs, a Pai Yi, started the Tung oil business in as early as 1935. Within a few years he planted a total of 156,000 Tung trees in Cheli and its vicinity. More cotton and more camphor have been planted both by Pai Yi chieftains and Chinese business people. The extension of the tea area has become a definite policy of the provincial government.

At present tea export is a government monopoly, and the profit therefrom is taken and shared by Yunnan provincial administration. Furthermore, the government at Kunming has desired to create a basis for its own independent trade by establishing new and larger tea plantations. In 1938, one such government tea plantation was decided upon for Nan Nu Shan (northeastern part of Cheli). Lands belonging to village communities and to Pai Yi officials were condemned to grow tea. Naturally, the Hsiens, the Pa, and the Zao-pilin all protested and demanded a regular rent, or some due compensation. The government refused to allow any rent but promised to appoint these Pai Yi officials as nominal officers of the tea plantation with the prospect of receiving salaries after three years. For it was expected that tea would be produced in three years. The government project of planting two million tea trees in Nan Nu Shan within five years, however, turned out to be a complete failure. Market conditions, shortage of labor, and poor management were the chief causes.

Nevertheless, people are forbidden to open any Naboï in this area. Thus much potential new land has been lost to the Pai Yi. Depriving them of more cultivable land, the government also gave the privilege of colonization to Chinese tobacco peasants who returned to China from Siam during the war years. Between January and May 1940, some 400 Chinese peasants entered Shih Shong Baan Naa and about 100 of them settled in Cheli. Lands which were potential Naboï and abandoned Nawoan were granted to them at the rate of about 30 mu for each family.

No tribute, or land tax, is demanded within the first three years. At the end of this period the government is to conduct a land survey, after which the cultivating family will receive a land deed and then pay land tax each year. The land will become private property belonging to the family. This kind of private land ownership is, of course, quite new in this region. It introduces to the Pai Yi in Cheli and in their territories west of the Mekong a new form of land property, a kind of Naboï under permanent ownership instead of mere permanent leasehold.

Combined trade and usury had already menaced the existence of Nazao and Nawoan. Peasants who are in debt have begun to mortgage their right of tenancy, and Pai Yi officials who hold Nazao and are in debt have begun to mortgage away their rent income. The process of disintegration of the Pai Yi agrarian system has started with increasing momentum. Communal land is being transformed not into Nazao but into outright family private property of non-officials. Labor rent is disappearing and in the meantime the burden and extent of the rent in kind is on the increase. Share rent on a fifty-fifty basis is developing, which is a higher rent than hitherto exacted from Nazao or from Nawoan. All these developments simply aggravate the social and economic disparity and unmistakably undermine the very foundation of this pre-feudal society.

Notes

- (1) William C. Dodd, The Tai Race, Elder Brother of the Chinese, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1923, p. 344. When Dodd commented on these figures he said, "We are certainly well within bounds."
- (2) Archibald R. Colquhoun, Amongst the Shans, London, 1885, p. 55. To this book the French professor wrote an introduction entitled "The Cradle of the Shan Race."
- (3) H.R. Davies, Yunnan the link between India and the Yangtze, Cambridge, 1909, p. 378. In this excellent book the author wrote a very valuable appendix entitled "Tribes of Yunnan," pp. 332-98. Samuel R. Clarke, for thirty-three years a missionary in China and more than twenty years a resident in Kweichow, wrote a popular account of the Yi in his Among the tribes of South-west China, London, 1911. In Kweichow the Yi are called Chung-chia. Mr. Clarke said: "Wherever the Chung-chia are found in Kweichow, and we believe also in some parts of Kwangsi, they invariably assert that their ancestors were Chinese who came from the province of Kiangsi, and many of them name the prefecture and county from which their forefathers came. But it must be borne in mind that these people speak a language which is not a dialect of the Chinese, but resembles the speech of the Shans and Siamese." p. 97. See also R.F. Johnston, From Peking to Mandalay, London, 1908, pp. 276 and 292.
- (4) Davies, *ibid.*, p. 364 ff. Also see Tao Yun-kwei, Geographical Distribution and Population Estimate of Several Tribes in Yunnan, published by the Historical and Philological Research Institute of Academia Sinica as its Memoir Vol. 7, No. 4, Shanghai, 1938. Mr. Tao discusses the migration of the Yi in Yunnan, pp. 438-440.
- (5) According to Li Chi, author of The Formation of Chinese people, Harvard University Press, 1928, the order was a reverse one. The Yi came after the Fan but before the Miao and Yao. Robert Heine-Geldern, in his Sudostasien, in Illustrierte Voelkerkunde, Stuttgart, 1923, describes the Yi as following the Fan who in turn had followed the Miao and Yao. C. C. Lewis, in his The Tribes of Burma (Ethnographical Survey of India-Burma, No. 4 Rangoon, 1919) seems to make the Fan the first aborigines, followed by the Miao and Yao and then again by the Yi.
- (6) These figures have been given by William C. Dodd, based on the statistics published by the South Siam Mission and in the Annuaire General de l'Indochine, and the estimate for Burma by Mr. Cochrane. The southward movements of the Yi may be seen from E. H. Parker, Burma, Relations to China, London, 1893; W.A.R. Wood, A History of Siam, Bangkok, 1933; and Paul Le Boulanger, Histoire du Laos Français: Essai d'une étude chronologique des principautés laotiennes, Paris, 1930.

- (7) William C. Dodd, ibid., pp. 170-71. Tai Nua was known as Ta Po Yi and Tai Lu as Siao Po Yi in ancient Chinese literature. Pai Yi is really the modern name for Siao Po Yi who have long lived in the southernmost part of Yunnan. See Ting Su, "Research into Southwestern Nationalities", in Pien Cheng Kung Lung (Monthly for Frontier Administration) Chungking, March 1942, Vol. I, Nos. 7-8, p. 69.
- (8) Tao Yun-kwei, ibid., pp. 443-44. The Pai Yi occupy about 22 percent of the total population of the 26 districts by this anthropology field worker.
- (9) For a description of the degrees of Chinese influence over the Pai Yi see Tao Yun-kwei, "The Relation Between the Pai Yi and Chinese Government", in Pien Cheng Kung Lung, Chungking, May 1942, Vol. I, Nos. 9-10, p. 9. William C. Dodd calls this fourth region Sipsawng Panna, which is not so close to the pronunciation by the Shui Pai Yi themselves.
- (10) Tao Yun-kwei, Geographical Distribution and Population Estimate, p. 443, gives the following figures for population of this territory in 1935:

District	Total Population	Pai Yi Population	%
Cheli	41,159	32,927	80
Nanchiao	25,106	20,086	80
Fuhai	22,314	18,967	85
Changyueh	17,604	8,802	50
Lokshun	31,238	17,181	55

- (11) H.R. Davies, ibid., p. 382.
- (12) Terrien de Lacouperie, Les Langues de la Chine avant les Chinois, Paris, 1888, pp. 65-66.
- (13) A. R. Colquhoun, Across Chryse, 2 vols. London, 1883, Vol. I, p. 52.
- (14) Ibid., Vol. II, p. 406.
- (15) The very elaborate process of Pai has been described in detail by Tien Ehr-kang in his mimeographed report of over 80,000 words in Chinese, entitled Pai of The Pai Yi, circulated by the Sociology Department of Yunnan University, Kunming, 1941. This report is summarized by Lee Ching-han, in his article Pai of the Pai Yi, in Pien Cheng Kung Lung, Chungking, March 1942, Vol. 1, Nos. 7-8, p. 51-63.
- (16) A literal version of this Sanskrit term in Ptolemy's geography was Chryse. See Archibald R. Colquhoun, Across Chryse, London, 1833, Vol. 1, p. vi.
- (17) Lee Fu-yi, Cheli, Shanghai, 1933, pp. 23-31. The total Pai Yi population of Shih Shong Baan Naa (or Sipsawng Panna) and its adjacent territories in Kengtung State of Burma and in French Indo-China was in 1913 about 400,000. See William C. Dodd, ibid., p. 185.

- (18) Pictures of agricultural implements used by the Pai Yi in this region may be seen on p. 83 of A.R. Colquhoun and Holt S. Hallett, Report on the Railway Connexion of Burmah and China submitted to HMG and the British Chambers of Commerce, London, 1887.
- (19) According to a report of the Cheli magistrate to Yunnan Provincial Government dated November 8, 1931, duplicate now in the archives of Cheli District Government.
- (20) Davies, ibid., p. 334
- (21) Davies, ibid., p. 383. The observation made in 1882 by Archibald R. Colquhoun was too general and not specific enough for our purpose. In Colquhoun's words, "The language and appearance of the Pai of southern Yunnan resemble strongly those of the Pai or Shans of Western Yunnan. Both these again, in writing and language, as well as in physique, are the same as the Thai, Laos, or Shans of the Shan country proper." Colquhoun, Across Chryse, Vol. 2, p. 67.
- (22) Otto Bauer, Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie, Wien, 1924, p. 126.
- (23) E. von Eickstedt, Rassenkunde und Rassengeschichte der Menschheit, Stuttgart, 1934, p. 9.
- (24) Davies, ibid., p. 367.
- (25) A. R. Colquhoun, Among the Shans, London, 1885, p. 300.
- (26) Colquhoun, ibid., p. 312.
- (27) A. R. Colquhoun, Across Chryse, vol. 2., p. 66.
- (28) Dodd, ibid., p. 181.
- (29) According to Nan-Chao Yeh Sze (Unofficial history of the Nan-Chao Kingdom) the southernmost of these 37 tribes were living in the Red River Valley and further east. In Tan Tsai, Nung Pu Sui Loh, Vol. 12, there is a description of the aristocrats just north of the present Kunming. These aristocrats exploited the Pai Yi who were from territories southward in the Mekong valley.
- (30) Fan Tso, Man Shu, Vol. 7; Vol. 9. Man here means Nan-Chao.
- (31) A similar agricultural system might have existed in Japan during the Tokugawa period. Honda Masanobu, one of Tokugawa Iyeyasu's closest advisers, wrote: "The peasants are the basis of the empire. There are ways of ruling them. First, clearly mark off the boundaries of each man's fields; then have each one estimate the portion of the crop necessary to feed him for a year, and make him pay the rest as land tax." Nihon Keizai Taiten, edited by Takimoto Seiichi, Tokyo, 1928, Vol. 3, p. 21.
- (32) See Nan-Chao Yeh Sze. Another earlier rebellion of the 37 tribes took place in 1119.

- (33) Lee Yuan-yang, Yunnan Tung Chih (Yunnan Provincial Chronicle), "The Geography of Ling-an"; Tsao Shu-yao, Tien Nan Tsa Chih (Notes on Southern Yunnan), 1810.
- (34) Yuan Sze, Vol. 174, biographical essays.
- (35) Ibid., the biography of Tung Wen-ping.
- (36) Yuan Sze Pen Chi and Yuan Sze Hsin Pien.
- (37) Lee Yuan-yang, ibid.
- (38) Feng Keng, Tien Kao (Researches on Yunnan).
- (39) Ming Ching Sze Liao (Materials Relating to the Histories of Ming and Ching Dynasties, published by the Historical and Philological Research Institute of Academia Sinica as its Memoir Vol. 7, p. 600.
- (40) Mao Chi-ling, Yunnan Man Sze Chih (Chronicle of Barbarian Regions in Yunnan); Ming Sze, biographies of tribal chieftains.
- (41) Ni Shuai, Yunnan Shih Liao (Notes on Yunnan affairs).
- (42) Hsu Ting-shun, Pu Cha Nien (Poem on Pu Ehr Tea) in the Pu Ehr Prefecture Chronicle, 1725. Also see the Imperial Edicts of 1826 in Vol. 1 of this Chronicle.
- (43) Cha Shan Shih Pien (Tea Mountain Revolt in 1732) in the Pu Ehr Prefecture Chronicle.
- (44) Oer Tai, Hsi Lin I Kao, Kunming, 1774; also in the Pu Ehr Prefecture Chronicle, Vol. 28, pp. 7-8.
- (45) Wei Yuan, Ching Tai Wu Kung Chi, Vol. 7.
- (46) Colquhoun, Across Chryse, Vol. 2, p. 198.
- (47) Hsieh Fu-cheng, Boundary Question of Yunnan and Burma, 1893, pp. 57-58. Thirty years after the visit of Captain McLeod in Cheli, a Frenchman by the name of Louis de Carue arrived here from Saigon in 1867. He found some English manufactured goods in Cheli which had been transported through Zimme in northern Siam and also through Mandalay, Toungoo and Takow Ferry. See Colquhoun, Across Chryse, Vol. 2, pp. 18 and 220-24.
- (48) G. W. Clark, Kweichow and Yunnan Provinces, Shanghai, 1894, pp. 16-17. This book was written in 1886.
- (49) Ko Shu-hsun, Pu Sze Hien Pien Chih Liao (Notes on the Boundaries of Pu Ehr and Sze Mao). The latest example of the cruelty of a feudalistic government was the way in which the Nanking Government recently suppressed the rebellion in Formosa in March 1947. Christopher Rand, New York Herald-Tribune correspondent, wrote from Taipei on March 21, 1947 that "the ruthlessness and treachery of the Chinese government in dealing with

them [the rebels] has deeply shocked all neutral observers." Chinese troops in a few days massacred at least 5,000 unarmed Formosans in the streets or in their houses. "This massacre, which was accompanied by widespread torture and looting, was wholly uncalled for." See Rand's dispatch in New York Herald-Tribune of March 24, 1947. A later dispatch by Tillman Durdin in Nanking to the New York Times said that neutral witnesses in Formosa had estimated 10,000 killings "completely unjustified." See New York Times, March 29, 1947. An American Journalist, John W. Powell, who had made a trip to Formosa shortly after the massacre, published his article in China Weekly Review, Shanghai, April 5, 1947. He said in this article that the story "sounds as if it had occurred several centuries ago."

- (50) As it was described and definitely told in Ko Shu-hsun's notes, this policy of Shei-liu pou kai-tu was a direct imitation of what the British had done in the Shan States.
- (51) H.R. Davies, *ibid.*, p. 379: "Probably the only reason why the Shans have been allowed to retain possession of any of the fertile valleys of Yunnan is that the lower-lying places are feverish and the Chinese find them too unhealthy to live in. The dividing line between Chinese and Shans comes at about 4,000 feet. Above this height the valleys are healthy, and the Chinese have consequently settled there in sufficient numbers to absorb or drive out the Shans."
- (52) According to Cheli Magistrate's Order, No. 3, dated May 10, 1937, the cash salary of the Chinese assistant in a sub-district office was 20 Chinese dollars per month. Of this total 15 dollars were defrayed from the tax income of the magistrate's office and 5 dollars were to be assessed as an additional revenue in the sub-district.
- (53) From Cheli Magistrate's Order, No. 283, dated Dec. 2, 1939, addressed to sub-district head Tiao Pingnan and Chinese Assistant Chou Shan-chung of Tai Meng Lung.
- (54) A typical case of this kind was a united appeal made by Tai Meng Lung sub-district Pai Yi officers to the Cheli Magistrate for the dismissal of Chinese Assistant named Chang. He was accused of having assessed all families in Tai Meng Lung for his own private expenses. This was in August 1937.
- (55) On April 8, 1932, Zao-pilin and the Hoslam jointly reported to the Cheli magistrate that they had collected a total of 259 Chinese dollars for a school in Chiengrung, and also they had urged the Meng to requisition students.
- (56) From the letter by Karl Marx written in London, June 10, 1853, and published in the New York Daily Tribune, June 25, 1853.
- (57) Dodd, *ibid.*, p. 190. Kengtung is a political and commercial center of the Federated Shan States in Burma, directly connected with Fuhai by a highway.

- (58) Large feudal estates still exist in Rajputana which are being worked by many tenant peasants. This is in sharp contrast to the dominant owner-cultivating situation in the Punjab. It can be traced back to the historical difference that the Sikhs, when they made military conquests in the Punjab, divided the land among all their rank and file. Rajputana and the Punjab thus represent two types of feudalistic agrarian systems. The power of Patel, village headman in Rajputana, is much weaker than that of Papan, village chief in Cheli; and for the grievous taxes and cruel rule in Rajputana one should read Hilda Wernher's recent work, The Land and the Well, New York, 1946. It should also be noted that while Nazao in Cheli is mostly distributed to the villagers for cultivation along with Nawoan, the "official land" in Rajputana is directly leased by the aristocratic landlord to the peasant.
- (59) The following villages in Cheli were surveyed: (1) Ehr Meng, (2) Man Kwang Lung, (3) Man Mei, (4) Man Ling, (5) Man Teh, (6) Tung Lao, (7) Wei Suo, (8) Man Li, (9) Man Tsin Lan, (10) Man Ting, (11) Man Nong, (12) Man Sha, (13) Man Tung, (14) Cha Tung Kai, (15) Ching Tung Mai, (16) Man Luan Tien, (17) Man Mo, (18) Man Liu, (19) Ching Yu, (20) Man Nan, (21) Pai Ku, (22) Man Tsai, (23) Man Ying, (24) Man Lung Kan, (25) Ching Meng, (26) Man Ta Kiu, (27) Man Wan, (28) Man Hwa, (29) Man Kung, (30) Man Chang Tsai, (31) Lung Hun, (32) Man Siu, (33) Ko Sung, (34) Man Tai, (35) Man Hay, (36) Man Peng Nai, (37) Man Ching Pang (38) Man Ching Ham, (39) Man Bien, (40) Man Tiu, (41) Man Se, (42) Man Kwan, (43) Man Pung, (44) Man Kwei, (45) Man Nofong, (46) Man Chwansi, (47) Ching Hang, (48) Man Lung, (49) Man Hai, (50) Man Mien, (51) Man Kwang Mai, (52) Man Yan, (53) Man Ken, (54) Man Hun, (55) Man Aou, (56) Fei Lung, (57) Man Mong, (58) Man Cha, (59) O Sie, (60) Man Cheng, (61) Man Tao, (62) Man Ching, (63) Man Luan Lung, (64) Man Koi, (65) Man Yan Li, (66) Kwang Woi.
- (60) According to the estimate of the acting magistrate in Cheli, who is a Chinese named Tsou and has been in the Cheli office for more than ten years, Nawoan is supposed to occupy 80 percent of the total, Nazao 16 percent, and Naboi about 4 percent. This kind of official estimate simply reflects the situation described by old documents of many years ago. Recent developments have caused Nazao to increase to 65 percent, Nawoan to decrease to 22 percent, and Naboi to increase to little over 10 percent, as tabulated here. It is also very significant to note that owing to the lack of fertilizer and probably also labor power, the abandoned land has amounted to as much as 2 percent of the total land ownership.
- (61) Prof. S. V. Yushkov, On the Question of the Pre-feudal ("Barbarian") State, in Voprosy Istorii, No. 7, 1946, published by the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, translated by Owen Lattimore. Earlier in 1940 Prof. S. V. Yushkov's book History of the State and Law, USSR was published in Moscow.

- (62) Long before the introduction of Pao Chia there was already a decimal system of organization for military purposes in the Pai Yi area. This is clear from the following quotation from Chien Ku-shun, Pai Yi Chuan (Records Regarding A Hundred Kinds of Barbarians), prefaced by Yang Tai-yung in 1398, copied in Chao Chi-mei's hand writing in 1610, photostatic edition published by Kuo-Hsueh Tu-shu Kwan, Shanghai, 1929. "In the capital of Yi the chief commander of military and civil affairs is called Tiao Meng. Under him are Zao Lu who commands a little over 10,000 people, Zao Kang who commands a little over 1,000 people, Zao Pei who commands 100 people, Zao Haas who commands 50, and Zao Cheng who commands 10 people. All these officers have their land-holdings from which they can exact and requisition anything they wish. But in general there is no public granary, nor tax in kind. The annual tax consists of silver, called Chai Fa, collected by the agents of these officers, from one to three ounces from each large house and one ounce from each small house. All kinds of labor requisitions are made, not excluding work by old women."
- (63) These figures are from a report by the Cheli magistrate to the Provincial Government of Yunnan dated November 14, 1939. Its duplicate is deposited in the archive of the magistrate's office. The number of able-bodied youth given in this report is entirely too low. It could be easily around 5,000. The low figure was deliberately reported in order to avoid labor requisition to the fullest extent.
- (64) 42 Na is equal to 1.68 hectares and 31.6 Na to about 1.26 hectares.
- (65) All three figures are from the District Magistrate's report to the Yunnan Provincial Government in November, 1939; a duplicate copy is in the district government archives. One li is 0.57 kilometre or 0.35 mile, and one mu is 0.06 hectare or 0.15 acre.
- (66) D. Y. Lin, "Five-point New Deal for Farmers," in The China Weekly Review, Oct. 19, 1946, Shanghai, p. 197 ff. The figure of 640,808,082 mu may be an exaggeration, as it may have included some land which had never been used before. But in recent years, even in the thickly populated provinces in central and eastern China, wars and requisitions of labor have caused a sudden increase of abandoned land.
- (67) Raymond D. Brooke, "Agrarian Changes During War in China, in India and World Affairs (quarterly), April, 1945, Calcutta, pp. 8-17.
- (68) Sidney Painter, "Individualism in the Middle Ages," in Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1942, Vol. 3, p. 242.
- (69) This is compiled from Magistrate Hsu's report to the Yunnan Provincial Government, dated July 30, 1932; a duplicate copy is in the District Archives.

- (70) In the proto-feudal society of Western Chou Dynasty in China, from 1000 to 600 B.C., the nobles and warriors lived in the walled cities and enjoyed the tributes of peasants producers, who alone paid household tribute but were excluded from ancestral temples. Tribute assessment by land unit did not begin until Confucius' time. This has been explained in detail by Hou Hwai-lu in his recent book, Chung-Kuo Ku-Tai She-Hui Shih-Lun (Discourse on the Ancient Society in China), Chungking, 1943, pp. 98-101.
- (71) From the records of the 4th District Council Meeting in 1938, which took place on June 26 of that year.
- (72) From the report by the Pai of Lung Kuo village to the Chinese district magistrate, dated May 25, 1939.
- (73) From the magistrate's orders to Zao-pilin, dated Dec. 10, 1931, and Oct. 1, 1932.
- (74) In the kingdom of Chi, after the Western Chou Dynasty, land tax was fixed at two-thirds of the total harvest. This was discussed in detail by Hou Hwai-lu, ibid., pp. 93-95.
- (75) From a report by the head of the sub-district, Wang Yin-Chang to Magistrate Chang, dated July 16, 1937.
- (76) Ko Shu-hsun, Pu Sze Hien Pien Chih Liao (Notes on the Boundaries of the Pu Ehr and Sze Mao), pp. 34-37.
- (77) Wei Yuan, Ching Tai Wu Kung Chi, Vol. 6, pp. 58-59.
- (78) Wei Yuan, ibid., Vol. 6, p. 38, Nanking, 1935, edition.
- (79) On Burma and Siam, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 9th edition, 1876.
- (80) In the proto-feudal society of Western Chou Dynasty in Shensi, Shansi and Honan, there was some trade but no usury. Even the trading was carried on only between tribes and not between cities and villages. Money economy in this proto-feudal society was never developed to the extent as known in the ancient Greek society, where credit relations were already sharp and clear. See Hou Hwai-lu, Chung-kuo Ku-tai She-hui Shih-lun, Chungking, 1943, p. 107.
- (81) Nie Sai, Tien-Yun Li-nien Chuan (The Annals of Yunnan), Vol. 12, p.2
- (82) The Pu Ehr Prefecture Chronicle, 1729, Vol. 48, p. 16.
- (83) G. W. Clark, Kweichow and Yunnan Provinces, Shanghai, 1894, pp.42-43. These Kiangsi and Hunan traders transported the tea through western part of Kwangsi to Canton and Hongkong for export.

- (84) There are Chinese tea agents in Darjeeling and Calcutta who handle the produce from I Pang and Yu Loh and other Pai Yi areas.
- (85) This is the estimate of many Pai Yi officials as well as that of Chang Chun-hui, magistrate of Cheli from 1938 to 1940.
- (86) Hsu Ting-hsun's poem on tea, in Pu Ehr Prefecture Chronicle, Vol. 48, I Wen Chih, (Miscellany).
- (87) The Pu Ehr Prefecture Chronicle, Vol. 28, p. 23. The usual monthly interest on cash loans in Cheli at present is 5 percent.
- (88) From the magistrate's archives in Fuhai, where a branch of the Chinese Government's China Tea Company was maintained for several years up to 1946.

PART II

THE KAMBA IN SIKANG

CHAPTER I.

THE KAMBA AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL CHINA

In the southwest section of China the Tibetans form a distinct nationality. They occupy a compact and contiguous territory, which, to the west, embraces Tibet, Sikkim, Bhotan and Ladakh; and to the east, Sikang, Chinghai and north-west Szechuan. They have a written language common to themselves. Lamaism is their religion. Their culture and social structure represent the early stages of feudalism, as clearly demonstrated by the prevailing agrarian system.

Charles Bell estimated in Tibet, Past and Present that there were from four to five million Tibetans. In addition to all of the places mentioned above, he must have included in his estimate the northern parts of Yunnan where Tibetan tribes are also to be found. But according to General Huang Mou-soong, a scholarly-minded Chinese military commissioner who visited Tibet in the 1930's, the population in Tibet itself could not be much more than 1,000,000. In 1939, there were 268,870 Tibetans in Chinghai Province. (1) At about the same time their number was 573,981 in the eastern half of Sikang Province, including nineteen districts east of the Kin-sha River; (2) and 321,945 in the western half. (3) Adding to these numbers the Tibetan population in northern Yunnan and northwest Szechuan, the total would reach at most 3,000,000, within the boundary of China.

"Tibetans", said G.A. Combe, "commonly distinguish themselves as Kamba and Lhasawa, people of eastern and western Tibet respectively. Kam includes all of eastern Tibet, from Golok country in the north to the Yunnan border in the south, and from Dartsendo in the east to Chamdo in the west". (4) The original domain of the Kamba, therefore, extended over a small area of eastern Tibet, a large area of Chinghai, parts of northern Yunnan and all of Sikang, even including the northwest corner of Szechuan. In western Tibet the people are known not only as Lhasawa, but in the Tibetan language as Tsangba, and the land as Tsang. That is why in China today, both officially and popularly, Tibet is called Tsang, while Sikang is referred to as Kam. As the Kamba live not only in Sikang but also in Chinghai, northwest Szechuan and north Yunnan, they may roughly claim two-thirds of all Tibetans in China, whereas the remaining one-third, the Tsangba, live in Tibet.

The Tibetans, both the Tsangba and the Kamba, have never been a purely nomadic people. From ancient Chinese literature it is learned that the Tibetans, then living in Ninghsia, Kansu and northern Shensi and known as the Chong, cultivated fields, (5) and even captured them from the Hans (the Chinese). After the tenth century, when they began to withdraw from the north, they cultivated thousands of acres in Chinghai alone (6). In the fourteenth century both irrigated and dry fields were extensively cultivated in the eastern parts of Sikang. (7) At present, both in Tsang and in Kam, wherever the land is cultivable, agriculture flourishes. The Tibetans are at once a pastoral and an agricultural people. (8) Some of their tribes do field work almost exclusively, others look after the pasture, still others attend to both. Nomads and peasants may indicate tribal differences, but they do not help to establish any racial differentiation in this instance.

Historically Tibet and Sikang have had the same development, generally speaking to the same degree, as both have been subject to identical outside influences and there now obtains essentially the same agrarian system and virtually the same social structure. Even regarding the spoken language, there is only a dialectal difference between that of Lhasa and the prevailing language of Kongting, Kantze and Lihua, in eastern Sikang. Thus, in their relations with the Hans (the Chinese) in Central China, the Tsangba and the Kamba should not be considered separately but should be studied together.

In the pre-historic epoch those who were later to be called Hans probably lived together and mingled with the Chong in China's northwest. (9) In Chinese history the Tibetans were known as the Tsun from the thirteenth century to about the third century B.C. Since then and up to the second century A.D. they were known as the Chong. During the Han Dynasty in China they were sometimes named according to their tribes, sometimes after the places they inhabited, and sometimes by a combination of both. During the Tang and Soong Dynasties, from the seventh to thirteenth centuries, they were called Turfan. During the Yuan Dynasty, when in the fourteenth century, the Mongols ruled China, they were popularly known as Sifan. In the Ming Dynasty, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries, they were simply called the Fan, and their domain known as Uhatsang. From the beginning of the Manchu rule in China (the Ching Dynasty which began in the seventeenth century) to the present, they have been called Tibetans, and their domain Wei, or Tsang, or Sitsang. The eastern part of Sitsang was later made the province of Sikang.

When, about 700 B.C., the military and political power of the Chow Dynasty began to decline, the Tsun in the northwest penetrated into Honan, on both banks of the upper Yellow River. (10) Later, known as the Chong, they established four kingdoms in north China, extending to territories near Tsinan and Nanking, from the third to the fifth century. (11) The most flourishing period of the Tibetans was from the seventh to the tenth century, when they maintained a strong empire known as Turfan, with its capital in Lhasa. The military strength of Turfan at that time threatened Central China. Princess Wen Cheng and Princess Kin Cheng of the Tang Dynasty were married to Turfan rulers in 641 and 710 respectively. The Tang Emperor and Turfan chief settled the international boundaries between them, and in 782 concluded a treaty of alliance on the basis of equality and mutual assistance. (12)

Towards the end of Tang Dynasty, in the beginning of the tenth century, internal political struggles prevailed in Tibet and Turfan's military power rapidly waned. Immediately to its east and southeast the Nanchao Empire rose (938) in west Yunnan, and in its own domain in the north the Sihsia Empire rose (982-1277) in Kansu and Shensi. (13) By the time the Mongols entered China and established the Yuan Dynasty towards the end of the thirteenth century, Turfan or Tibet had been reduced to a protectorate of the Yuan rulers. (14)

Even after the collapse of the Yuan Dynasty, the Mongols were still powerful in China's northwest. Throughout the sixteenth century Mongolian tribes dominated the fertile land in eastern Chinghai and subjugated the Kamba in that region. (15) In the first half of the seventeenth century the

Mongolian tribe Choschot in Sinkiang, under their leader Gusri, marched southward and conquered almost all of Chinghai, Sikang and Tibet, (16) Gusri organized a Lhamaist State in 1643 with four separate regions: Kokonor (Chinghai), Balkam (Sikang), Wei (Western Tibet) and Tsang (Eastern Tibet). Undoubtedly the Kamba at that time entered into close relations with the various Mongolian tribes. (17)

When the Mongolian tribe Choschot, under the leadership of Gusri, ruled over the Tibetans, there were five political regions in Sikang as it is known at present. First there were the Mongolian fiefs or feuds in the agricultural region, known as Hor, or Horsakanga. These have been inherited by the five chieftains of Kungse, Mashu, Peili, Changko, and Tungke, in the present districts of Kantze and Lohou, in northeastern Sikang. (18) Second, there were the Mongolian fiefs or feuds in the pastoral region, known as Nwa-chepu, now inherited by the chieftains of Maoya and Choteng and others, immediately southwest of the first region. The third was the region under the supervision of Mongolian military commanders, i.e. garrison stations, at Kongting, Lihua, Paian, Tsaya, and Lolungtsung; these are situated along the highway throughout the middle of Sikang connecting Szechuan to the east and Tibet to the west. The fourth was the region under the direct control of the Lamas, known as the land of the Khutukhtu, or "Holy Land" in the Mongolian language; Changtu, formerly known as Tsamoutu, located in north central Sikang, belongs to this region. (19) The fifth region remained within the autonomous rule of the Kamba, such as the present district of Tehke, situated between Changtu and Kantze.

Some differences regarding administration in these regions may still be traced. They represent the only remnants of the erstwhile Mongolian power in Sikang. But as the Mongolian sovereignty never attempted to change the social-economic system, here, as in other parts of China, there is today no difference in social structure even as between Tehke and Kantze. The land system in all regions of Sikang and most parts of Tibet is essentially the same.

Of the original vast domain occupied by the ancient Tibetans two principal parts can be discerned. Both are of the present west borderland of China. To the north is the upper basin of the Yellow River containing the provinces of Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia and northeast Chinghai. To the south is the upper valley of the Yangtze River, chiefly the province of Sikang, southern Chinghai and Tibet. Since the tenth century the Tibetans have continuously withdrawn from the northern part, which was then dominated first by the Mongolian tribes and later by the Chinese bureaucracy and Chinese immigrants. (20) The agrarian system here has undoubtedly undergone some fundamental changes. In contrast, in the southern part an older system is still preserved by the Tibetans.

No wars were ever fought between the Chinese and the Tibetans during both the Yuan and Ming Dynasties. Military attacks against the southwest domain of the Tibetans, offensive campaigns organized by Central China, did not take place until the very beginning of the eighteenth century. From 1700 to the present there have been three distinct stages of military relations between the Kamba and Central China. (21) The first stage which ended towards 1800, resulted in the loss of political independence of the lama government in Tibet. The second, 1894-1911, resulted in the appointment of Chinese administrative officials in place of the Kamba chieftains

in Sikang. In the third and last period, 1918-1932, the Tibetan forces were checked and consequently administration in Sikang was restored to the authority of Central China. In these successive developments it is clear that the military power of Central China became weaker and weaker and therefore less and less aggressive.

China of the eighteenth century was quite different from China of the nineteenth century. Whereas during the eighteenth century the repeated costly and powerful military expeditions of the Manchu rulers in China subdued the southern domain of the Tibetans, just as the rulers of Han and Tang had done to their northern domain, the Manchu government in the nineteenth century, having been repeatedly threatened by European Powers and Japan from without and by long periods of peasant rebellions from within, did not have sufficient political prestige, adequate financial resources, nor vigorous military strength to effect a real policy of conquest. (22) Because of this, perhaps more than any other single factor, the social-economic structure in geographically well-secluded Tibet and Sikang has remained so long unchanged.

Political relations between Central China and Kam-Tsang, the southern part of Tibetan's original domain, have always been influenced by the military situation. On the strength of the powerful Mongolian army a political system called Tu-sse was introduced to control all the non-Chinese tribes in China's southwest. The recognized local chieftains were appointed by the Imperial Court in Central China as administrative officers of their respective areas. Through them the Emperor indirectly ruled over the tribes. These appointed local chieftains came to be known as Tu-sse during the Ming Dynasty. (23) On the one hand they were granted the right to hold a hereditary post, special privileges to enhance their prestige, and military assistance in case of need. On the other they were subject to dismissal if proved to be delinquent or disloyal. Thus, while the Tu-sse had become a part of the Imperial Administration, they enjoyed considerable autonomy in their respective areas and the social structure in these areas was hardly disturbed.

There were many Tu-sse posts in Sikang and parts of Chinghai, Yunnan, and Szechuan, some completely nominal and others gradually becoming real; but from the very beginning in 1270 there was only one Tu-sse for the whole of Tibet, the head of the Sa-skya lamasery. The Manchu emperors in the eighteenth century, backed by repeated military campaigns in the southwest, went further and adopted a definite policy of replacing all Tu-sse by appointed non-hereditary officers. This policy aimed at the transfer of an indirect to a direct Imperial Administration, in other words the complete abolishment of the Tu-sse system. But because of the political and military weakness of Central China in the ensuing period, this has not been realized in Tibet; and even in the nearer territory of Sikang only very limited success has been attained.

The zenith of Imperial power in Tibet was reached in the period from 1792 to 1894, particularly in the first fifty years of this period. A viceroy took up his official residence in Lhasa, where the Dalai Lama was under his supervision and guidance. Both jointly recommended two candidates to the highest military, financial and requisitional offices, respectively, and the final choice was made by the Imperial Court. Regulations regarding the succession of the Dalai Lama were fixed by the

Emperor in Peking. A regular army of three thousand soldiers was organized, subject to semi-annual review by the viceroy. A mint for coining silver dollars was established in Tibet, and the use of Nepal currency was prohibited. Peking settled the boundary lines between Tibet and Nepal, and the Peking-appointed viceroy became overseer of commerce and auditor of the budget in Tibet. A new law was promulgated to restrict exemptions from corvée. Another reduced land tax in kind, in order to oblige the farm manager to pay the same amount to the requisitioned field laborer. Still other edicts were proclaimed to encourage various social reforms. (24)

During the nineteenth century, however, Great Britain steadily extended its special influences in the three small states immediately south of Tibet: Bhotan, Sikhim and Nepal. In 1912, shortly after the establishment of the Republican government in China, the British Minister in Peking sent a memorandum to the Chinese President opposing the entrance of Chinese troops, the reorganization of Tibet into a province, and any other interference in Tibetan administration. The Foreign Office in London again demanded the complete autonomy of Tibet in 1922, and two years later British troops entered Tibet for the second time. Chinese authorities had never dealt with the local administration in Tibet, but since the Republic Chinese influences have further waned. (25) Even indirect control from Central China has been seriously weakened.

When the British troops first entered Lhasa in 1904 and the British-Tibetan Treaty of that year was concluded, Chinese authorities both in Peking and in the western provinces were greatly agitated. As a measure to strengthen national defense, the organization of Sikang as a province was advocated and successfully undertaken. Backed by a military expedition, three districts in eastern Sikang were first set up in 1905. Two more districts were organized in the following year, three in 1908, seven in 1909, fourteen in 1911, and three in 1912. In 1938 several districts of southwestern Szechuan were incorporated into the province of Sikang. With the appointment of district magistrates, the Tu-sse system was to have been abolished. A Tu-sse in Sikang now has no legal status. But as the agrarian system and social structure remain the same as in the seventeenth century, he still exercises real power in the province.

In the history of economic relations between Sikang-Tibet and Central China, tea trade has been the keynote. The nomads and semi-nomads seek tea from Central China, just as the people of Central China depend on the western steppes for the horses. During the two dynasties of Soong and Ming, the exchange of horses and tea instituted a regular barter system. The demand for good horses in that period was pertinent to the defense against non-Chinese tribes in the north. Prior to that there had been tea trade, of course, but, as in the Tang Dynasty, it had been regarded as disadvantageous to China. (26) The rulers of the Yuan and Ching Dynasties came from the north and semi-nomadic regions and therefore had no great need of imported Tibetan horses. In the Ching Dynasty the Manchu Emperors instituted a monopoly system for tea trade in order to enhance their control over the Tibetans, including the Kamba. Since the eleventh century, therefore, with the exception of the brief period of Yuan, tea trade has been the principal economic tie between the two peoples for about eight hundred years.

It was in the Soong Dynasty, particularly in the twelfth century, that the exchange market of horses and tea shifted from Chinghai-Kansu-Ninghsia in the northwest to the Sikang-Szechuan border in the southwest. There was a great lack of horses in the Imperial Army during the eleventh century when national defense against the northern tribes became increasingly pressing. Attempts were made to acquire horses from both north and south border areas. But those to be obtained from the south, in Sikang, were fewer in number and of rather poor breed. (27) As the Soong rulers lost more and more territories in north China, however, they were compelled to buy more horses from the south border area. Of the 11,900 war horses imported between 1165 and 1173, about half still came from the north. (28) Of the 12,994 war horses imported between 1174 and 1189, about 75 per cent came from the Sikang-Szechuan border region. (29)

Although horse-trading centers had been established by the Soong Emperors as early as the tenth century, business transactions in that period were carried on once a month, sometimes quarterly, and in other cases semi-annually. At first only copper coins were paid for the horses. But when it was later discovered that the Kamba had melted these coins to make their utensils, and even weapons, from 983 on only a very small amount of cash was paid and instead cloth, silk and tea were given in barter. (30) It was recorded that by 1081 the Kamba had been demanding tea more than either cash or textiles. Soon after the unification of a government tea bureau and a horse bureau, in 1078, the regular barter between horses and tea was organized as a recognized trading system. (31)

During the Yuan Dynasty there was no government-sponsored barter market for horses and tea, though state monopoly of tea was maintained as before. (32) During Ming, however, in about three hundred years from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries, not only was the barter between horses and tea vigorously revived, but it was regarded as the sole instrument of befriending the Kamba. It was then considered important to prevent any possible alliance between the Kamba and the Huns. (33) Thus it was that as late as 1570 the Chinese bartered their silk, satin, cloth, iron pots and boilers for Mongolian horses, hides, bullocks, gold and silver. Troops from both sides were stationed at the annual markets, which in all cases lasted not more than a month. When the Mongolian tribes requested a regular barter market for horses and tea in 1577, it was bluntly refused by the Ming Court. (34)

The Imperial Army of Ming kept 32,500 horses even in peace time. A little over 10,000 horses were obtained every year by the tea barter. (35) But bureaucratic management in this trading system soon bred corruption and consequent deterioration. Thus the officially-fixed barter rate was of decreasing benefit to the Kamba as time went on. In 1392 the government bureau sent 500,000 catties of tea for 3,800 horses, but in 1424 not more than 300,000 catties of tea were given for as many as 10,300 horses. Furthermore, when the Kamba were not satisfied with the quality of the Chinese tea, they resorted to bringing in poor and lean horses. In the meantime illegal private tea trade with the Kamba began to flourish. In Central China pasture lands were gradually seized as wheat and rice fields, making the maintenance of horses on a large scale increasingly more difficult. By the sixteenth century the annual import of horses was less than 3,000. This was in a rapid decline until 1551 when the official barter trade stopped completely. (36) The

collapse of this barter system created a great shortage of horse supply, and as the organization of cavalry was none the less important, it was decreed in 1562 that anyone presenting horses to the state would automatically receive an official rank.

When in the middle of the seventeenth century the Manchu from the northeast came to establish the Ching Dynasty in China, these rulers brought horses from their home land. Thus there was no need of horse requisition, nor a system of barter with the Kamba. During the Ching Dynasty, however, there was a more effective policy of controlling the economic life of the Kamba in China's west borderland. Border tea trade was granted as a monopoly by the government. Both the area of tea collection and the area of marketing were specified, and competition was thereby eliminated. In the meantime, both the minimum of production and the minimum of sale were designated, so that a fixed amount of annual revenue was to be paid by the monopoly merchant. The monopoly right granted to the merchant was hereditary. He and his descendants have had to manage the tea collection, tea refining, transport and marketing, i.e. the entire process from the hands of the producer to those of the retail shops in Sikang and Tibet. The total marketable quantity was fixed from time to time by the government. But from 1820 to 1910, the annual sale in Sikang and Tibet was about 5,000,000 kg. (37)

As measures of supporting this tea monopoly granted to the Chinese tea merchants, the government in Peking administered severe punishment to those who dealt directly or indirectly with private tea trade in the border region. Anyone caught with 500 cattles of tea not allowed by the monopoly specification was subject to military banishment, i.e. exile to a distant military colony in the borderland of the west. The Manchu Dynasty system of government-granted tea monopoly, on the other hand, went far in stabilizing the border region trade in tea. Both the demand and the supply were regularized. It also helped to improve transport and communications between Central China and the lands of the Kamba, thus stabilizing other types of commerce as well. As the Chinese and the Kamba used different silver dollars, furthermore, the border tea trade also partially performed a function as a medium of commodity exchange. The Chinese monopoly tea merchants were in a position to and did extend loan after loan to the chieftains and lamas in Sikang and Tibet. Such usury relations caused the Kamba ruling families to become increasingly dependent on the Chinese tea transactions.

Altogether the policy of border tea monopoly has done much to cement the political and cultural relations between the Chinese and the Kamba. Yet, paradoxically, it was this same system that later blocked economic progress in Sikang and Tibet. The British-Tibetan Treaty of 1904 opened Ah-tung (on the Bhotan border), Kiangtze (important highway center between eastern and western sections of Tibet), and Ketark (in the extreme west of Tibet, near the Indian border) as three ports of international commerce (article 2). It was also provided that all commodities of British and Indian origin should enter Tibet duty-free (article 4). Taking advantage of this, British merchants organized tea import into Tibet from India. This tea was prepared exactly after the fashion in Szechuan, Yunnan and Kongting. As the Chinese monopoly tea was sold in Tibet at a price twenty times higher than in Szechuan and Yunnan, it could in no way compete with the Indian tea. (38) But when the Chinese viceroy strongly recommended a sound policy of combatting the Indian tea import and developing Tibet economically, by

reduction of transit duty on tea and encouragement of tea cultivation in Tibet and Sikang, it was obstructed and never approved. The effective hindrance came from the long-consolidated interests of Chinese monopoly merchants and Tibetan chieftains and lamaseries who have also been deeply involved in trade and usury connected with Chinese tea. (39)

When the relations between Central China and the land of the Kamba are recapitulated, it is seen that by the eleventh century the Kamba had retreated from China's northwest and by the fourteenth century even from the Kin-sha (or Tatu) River valley immediately west of Szechuan. Since then both the Kamba and the Mongolians have embraced Lamaism. During the sixteenth century the religious tie between the two races drew them so close that, in the seventeenth century, Mongolian chiefs ruled directly both Tibet and Sikang-Chinghai. As the Tibetans, the Kamba and the Tsangba maintained a cultural and religious superiority over the Mongolians, the social structure of the Kamba was in no way changed by the rule of Mongolian tribes.

Imperial rulers in China from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries consistently emphasized political harmony with the Kamba rather than military campaigns to subdue them. Even when the Manchu emperors sent expeditions of conquest, during the eighteenth century, the political strategy of actively supporting local chieftains and lamaseries was often employed to great advantage. Indeed, as these troop movements had to utilize the corvée, they actually led to the legalization of all labor requisitions and also to the intensification of other feudalistic practices.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Tibet and Sikang were pressed between Chinese influences and British imperialistic power. Having been badly beaten by European and Japanese navies and armies, and herself reduced to a semi-colonial status China could not muster sufficient political and administrative strength to bring about reforms in the land of the Kamba. Though the British had enough prestige and technical ability to introduce a modern transport system, they abandoned such a project in 1926 out of consideration for preserving the Tibetan tax system which to a large extent is based upon the use of the bullock cart. (40) So far no external relation of the land of the Kamba has exerted that positive influence which might have been decisive in breaking through the sluggish and stagnant dam of Kam society.

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN SIKANG

Feudal community is obviously the basis of the Kamba social structure. Their agricultural community is no longer a matter of clan organization. Their internal as well as external relations are not dictated by blood and lineage. Exodus of refugees of various types and influx of immigrants have been equally frequent. The majority of the population has had a considerable mobility while only the minority remains in the same community generation after generation. Out of the minority has emerged the ruling class who have held their hereditary posts for centuries. The chieftain of Tehke, for instance, is a descendant of forty-nine generations reaching back more than 1,400 years. (41)

Weak feudal communities are usually attached to strong ones by some political affiliation or even by a military alliance. But all communities maintain their own administrative autonomy. Like medieval Europe here is a decentralized feudalism. According to a Chinese official description of Sikang in the eighteenth century, "All southwest tribes from Ta Tsi Lu (Kongting) to Tsang Ti (Tibet) are generally from Turfan, each with its established chieftain and each with its own subjects, none completely subordinate to the other." (42) In 1729, at the end of General Yo Chung-chi's military expedition, there were some 118 feudal communities in Sikang, the chieftain of each of which was granted the official title of Tu-sse by the Manchu emperor. (43) These same communities stand intact today.

When a chieftain of the Kamba assumed the title of Tu-sse, he personally was incorporated into the Chinese Imperial Administration and his name appeared on the roster of a vast bureaucratic system; nevertheless, the social and political structure of his feudal community did not undergo any fundamental change. By the 1920's some Tu-sse in Sikang had been driven away or killed by Chinese troops. The majority of Tu-sse had lost the official title but still retained their position as chieftain of the community. Regardless of the presence of chieftains, however, the old political system of a feudal community as it prevailed several centuries before continues to function at the present time. (44)

In Tehke the chieftain still personally rules over the entire community, though his title of Tu-sse was taken away from him sometime ago. The principal chieftains in Kantze, those of Kungse, Mashu and Chu-wei, have disappeared in recent times, but the original feudal system of rule still persists. It is true that feudalism has been better preserved in Tehke than in Kantze, yet, as far as social structure is concerned, there is no basic difference between these two or any other two places in Sikang. As late as 1939 the Chairman of Sikang Provincial government, General Liu Wen-hui, said, "As yet the Tu-sse system has not been entirely done away with. Other than in Kongting the people of Sikang are being controlled by the chieftains and their assistants. Chinese government is still unable to reach the common people directly. The most difficult places to deal with in administrative ways are those pastoral communities such as Maoya, Choteng, Chunghsi, Yuke, Choschia and Lokema. The Kamba here are very remote from the Chinese magistrates. Though the hereditary chieftains were legally abolished thirty years ago, Chinese administrative authorities

still have no real idea of what is going on in Kamba society. Relatively easier to manage are places where some Chinese agricultural settlers are to be found, places like Tehke, Kungse, Peili and Tungke. The Kamba here are nearer to the Chinese officers. Even so they cannot be directed without going through the Kamba political system." (45) A contemporary authority on Sikang, Chen Tung-fu, described how, despite the abolishment of the Tu-sse system, the people still clung to their chieftain. (46)

The Tehke chieftain exercises real power over the present four districts of Tehke, Tengko, Peiyu and Shihchu. His subordinates, including those who are considered superior as well as those inferior officers without any rank, number nearly two hundred and are distributed throughout the region. The superior officers are divided into three ranks. Six of them belong to the first rank: one Hsiangtze takes exclusive charge of revenue and finance, one Chiamayi acts as the superintendent of the chieftain's household affairs, and four Yehba are expected to do any job or errand at the command of the chieftain. One of the latter four is appointed as the chief Yehba, who maintains a regular office. Next in rank are the Tingkoc, the most talented of whom become candidates as Yehba. The rank comprises a number of Huangcha, who are either appointed as village headmen or remain in Yehba's office ready for any particular errand. Out of the common people a large number of inferior officers without rank are selected for their ability and experience. These are called O-ba, whose duty is to assist the village headmen in collecting taxes, managing corvée and other requisitions, and attending miscellaneous affairs.

From the nearby tribes that have lost their chieftains for one reason or another, the Tehke chieftain also receives regular annual tribute. The Tehke chieftain's post is hereditary, and the right of succession is dictated by family lineage. His subordinates, who manage general affairs, attend to correspondence, look after the income or expenditure of revenues, collect fodder requisitions, take charge of his household affairs and serve as bodyguards, are treated as personal servants. (47) On the strength of his prestige he has promulgated a mixed civil and penal law of thirteen articles. Crimes of robbery and even of murder are not punishable by death, but, following the ancient custom, they are atoned for by heavy fines. The scale of such fines depends on the social position of the victim. If, for example, a common person is robbed, the criminal is fined three times the value of the loot. If a Kamba official is robbed, the fine is six times the value of the loot. If a Chinese official is robbed the fine is nine times the value of the loot. Similarly, the penalty for taking a life is determined according to this social scale. (48)

The chieftain in Tehke has granted land to all his subordinates of the first two ranks of superior officers, i.e. all those above the Huangcha. These feudal officers received land as a reward for their services to the chieftain, but they have had neither the time nor the ability, and above all, they have never had the inclination, to work on the land. They have therefore called in peasant families to cultivate for them. These particular peasant families are known as Ko-ba. In Sikang the term Ko-ba has also the general connotation of agricultural serf, whose status and relations will be dealt with later.

In Kungse and Mashu, in Kantze district, the local chieftains have

long since been wiped out by Chinese military forces. This, however, produces only a slight and nominal difference in a comparison of Kantze and Tehke. The feudal political structure in Kungse and Mashu, that is the structure below the chieftain, remains the same as in Tehke. The Kamba officers immediately below the erstwhile chieftains are called, in Kantze, Chei-tsong. ("Chei-tsong" is not the exact spelling in the Tibetan language, but a close transliteration of the sound in Kantze.) This term means "those who help to maintain the livelihood of the people". In the two localities of Kungse and Mashu there are more than twenty families holding this title. The Chinese used to call the Chei-tsong "Ta Tou Jen," or the Chief Lieutenants of the Tu-sse. The entire local administration is still in their hands.

The title and position of Chei-tsong must have evolved long ago in the primitive tribal society of Sikang. It was only after the Manchu military conquest that Chei-tsong adopted a rotating system of holding office. By this system of holding office. By this system a few Chei-tsong take their turn in managing the administration and adjudicating disputes regarding corvée, revenue, etc. Those Chei-tsong who are in office are called Pao-cheng by the Chinese administration. A Pao-cheng lives where his office is located, and his office is usually in a military fort, in appearance like a blockhouse, built by Chinese garrison troops. In fact, the Pao-cheng have always been the real administrators even in the days when there was a chieftain.

Below Chei-tsong are the O-ba. In Tehke, O-ba assist Huangcha, who are village headmen, in administrative matters. But in Kantze, O-ba themselves are virtually the village headmen. In the Kamba language, O means head and ba means man, or men. Like Chei-tsong most of the O-ba in Kantze are hereditary office-holders. O-ba is actually the headman of several or indeed of many villages, as the population here is spread thin. He therefore administers the area of three to twelve villages, sometimes over a territory which can be traversed only by horse in an entire day. Most of the O-ba in Kantze district occupy no special public buildings, but do the official routine work in their own homes.

The assistants to O-ba are called the Tsong-nga, who often act for the O-ba during his absence. The acting O-ba, however, limits his power to a village or a particular area, and is not supposed to deal with inter-village or inter-area affairs. There are much fewer Tsong-nga than O-ba. In Kungse and Mashu there are only four families serving as Tsong-nga. So far no one has succeeded in tracing the origin of this institution.

At the bottom of this feudal ladder are the O-u who are simply the servants of O-ba. These O-u closely resemble household slaves, though at present no hard-and-fast status of slavery is prescribed for them. Nearly all of them have once been independent farming families. Because of their inability to stand the heavy revenue and burdensome requisitions, they have voluntarily become the servants of O-ba, whom they look to as their protectors. Thus, this system of actual administration by Chei-tsong, O-ba, Tsong-nga and O-u represents the original social structure, or at least the upper stratum of it, prior to Chinese conquest. As an administrative system it is still in full operation.

The administrative system in Tehke differs from that in Kantze only in one respect: under the rule of a chieftain it is more centralized in

Telke; the absence of a chieftain in Kantze has resulted in relative decentralization. Basically, however, there are at least five characteristics common to both areas. First, there is the widespread practice of holding hereditary posts. Second, the conception of, or attitude towards, an assembly or a council is very weak and certainly not operative. Third, and in consequence, there is only personal and not collective responsibility in administrative matters. Fourth, there is a series of graded personal substitutes in handling the administration. Thus, O-u carried out the order of O-ba in matters of corvée and other requisitions; O-ba administers all affairs for Chei-tsong; and Chei-tsong often controls O-ba of the region for its chieftain. Fifth and finally, there is no fixed salary, or rather no salary at all, for all administrative officers, who rely for their income on tribute and bribes from the general population. Through Sikang, with the exception of two or three of the largest cities, this early form of feudal administration still prevails.

When the title of Tu-sse was granted to the chieftain of a tribe or of a region by the Imperial court in Peking, he became the lowest ranking officer in the Chinese bureaucracy, lower than any Chinese official, while he maintained his position of the highest rank among the Kamba people. This was the beginning of a two-strata administration. Later, when the new district magistrate was appointed, this kind of administration developed further in the ranks below the chieftain. Towards the end of the nineteenth century some of the Chei-tsong in Kantze were appointed by a high Chinese official as Tse-ba to administer a sub-district area and to supervise all of the O-ba there. The Tse-ba was paid a monthly stipend. He might report to the high Chinese official any disobedience on the part of any O-ba. Thus, the same Chei-tsong became responsible at the same time both to his chieftain and to his Chinese superior. (49)

At the beginning of the twentieth century the entire district of Kantze was divided into more than seventy villages, a small village numbering eighty families, a large village more than a hundred families. The people in each village were supposed to elect a headman. The headman of a large village received twenty-five Tibetan silver dollars per year; of a small village about ten silver dollars. In addition, several Pao-Cheng were appointed to supervise the sub-districts. The official tenure for Pao-cheng was one year, subject to renewal. To be exact, there were five Pao-cheng in Kantze, each receiving a stipend of six taels per month. (50)

With a fixed stipend and a definite tenure of office, this system of Pao-cheng appears to be a new system of officialdom. In reality, however, there has been no substantial change in administration. The office of Pao-cheng is rotated among more than twenty Chei-tsong in Kantze. Inasmuch as Chei-tsong represents their social position, Pao-cheng represents their administrative office. They consult each other before submitting a list to the district magistrate, who makes the appointment from it. On his appointment Pao-cheng becomes the official liaison between the entire Kamba community and the Chinese officialdom. All local administrative matters remain exactly as they were before. O-ba still serves as village headman and Chei-tsong as his overseer.

A full-fledged two-strata system was established when the Pao-chia administration of Central China was introduced. The same set of people

continues to be respectively Chei-tsong, O-ba, Tsong-nga, and O-u, and simultaneously becomes respectively Chu Chang, Hsiang Chang, Chung Chang, Pao Chang and Chia Chang. By way of comparison there is no doubt that the older system is in full operation while the new Pao-chia system is nominal and supernumerary. Pao-chai was introduced in Tehke and its nearby districts as late as 1938, but often the village headmen have been identified with the hereditary chieftains. (51)

In the district of Lihua (formerly known as Litang), directly west of Kongting, there are two headmen for each village in many cases, both hereditary. Under them serve the lower headmen whose tenure of office is only one year. The order of the Chinese magistrate passes on to the lamasery first, then in turn to the hereditary headmen, and finally to the lower headmen for action. (52) In Chanhua, a district directly north of Lihua, the higher headmen (called Tung-peng) have been appointed Chu Chang; and the lower headmen (called Tei-peng) Pao Chang. Apparently the new nominal stratum of administration rests entirely on the old traditional social organization. (53)

Generally speaking, the most powerful person in the present two-strata administration is, as he has always been, the local hereditary chieftain or the hereditary Chei-tsong. As this two-strata system develops further down the official ladder, however, subordinate officers begin to usurp the power of the hereditary rulers. Nevertheless the people are heavily burdened by the double exploitation caused by this dual process of administration. (54) This is the more so because of recent developments in transport and communications. Above all, as the tax system is based upon land, the present administrative system freezes all possibilities of a long-overdue land reform, without which the two-strata rule can only encourage social and economic stagnation.

The supremacy of the lamasery in Sikang, as in Tibet itself, clearly reflects the nature of the feudalistic social structure, in which the influential lamas themselves play an important role. Since, generally speaking, various sects of Buddhism, including Lamaism, have assumed a cultural leadership among different East Asiatic peoples and the institution of lamasery has become so prevalent throughout the Kamba land; and since the Imperial authorities in Central China have always favored the lamasery for the purpose of establishing a check against the secular chieftains, whose political power in the course of time has considerably waned, the lamasery in Sikang still exerts a dominant influence, directly or indirectly legally or otherwise, as the case may be in various parts of the province.

In this respect Sikang may be said to have three types of political superstructure. The common type, which is more widespread, is illustrated by Tehke and Kantze as described above. Here the secular administrators have direct control over the community, with the lamaseries enjoying special social and economic privileges. The second type occurs where the lamasery itself maintains the highest and direct control over the community. This exists in the land of Khutukhtu, as exemplified by Changtu and Tsaya. (55) In the third type of administrative organization the lamasery is the virtual ruler. Here, either because of military and political disturbances or because its locale is too remote from a secular administrator, political control has passed into the hands of the lama.

Lihua in Khutukhtu is a good example of the third type. The district magistrate has to rely on the authority and power of the lamasery, which alone controls the low ranks of secular officials to enforce his administration and jurisdiction. Though legally not belonging to Khutukhtu, the big lamasery in Lihua maintains administrative offices in the villages which are staffed by lamas appointed by the lamasery. Civil disputes and penal cases in Lihua may be settled either by the garrison commander, the district magistrate, or the lamasery. Of these three the lamasery is invested with most power; it has the instruments of authority and its own prison. About 8 percent of the trials in Lihua are held in the lamasery, as its decisions and verdicts are more binding than those of either of the other two authorities (56)

Wherever there is a lamasery, and the districts of Tehke and Kantze are no exception, it exerts strong social and economic control. This is because of the fact that the big lamaseries possess land and the labor power of the serfs as well as money and commodities.

Combining the position and power of landlord, merchant and usurer, the lamas also have entered into matrimonial relations with the families of the secular chieftains. All this prestige is the basis of their political supremacy in their localities. Besides, the lamas have undisputed authority in religious matters. For the atonement of sins - for prayer in connection with natural calamities; for divine services in sickness, marriage, death and funerals; and even for the dates to be chosen for planting and harvesting and for veterinary cure, the people look to the lamas for guidance and help.

Most of the lamaseries own land and collect rent in kind. In Kantze, for example, twenty-six lamaseries possess 24 per cent of the total cultivated land of about 3,500 acres, in that district. (57) The land of the lamasery derives partly from donations by chieftains at various times, and partly from bankrupt peasant families who have given up the land because of their inability to pay revenues. With the land also go the serfs, and the lamaseries can commandeer any requisition, including corvée, from these destitute people.

According to the official lamasery regulations, there should be a common fund to organize the caravan trade with distant places such as Lhasa, Chinghai and Central China. The management of such a commercial enterprise rests with the wealthiest lamas, who also look after their private trading interests. Because of long accumulation of capital and the magnitude of its trading enterprises, the lamasery has been able to establish a virtual monopoly and to organize armed guards for protection. In addition to its large-scale import and export business, the lamasery, as well as the individual lamas, is engaged in retail trade. Thus it has entered into close economic relations with Chinese merchants on the one hand and with the local peasant buyers on the other. The lamasery is in actuality a commercial center.

The lamasery is a center of usury as well. In the land of Kamba, as in feudalistic societies elsewhere, trade is combined with usury. The buyers receive commodities of daily need on credit, but when they return the principal plus a high interest they usually hand over in payment a large portion of the harvests. The lamasery also extends loans in cash, particularly to the headmen and chieftains, on which it demands

usurious interest. Headmen and chieftains in this and other respects has become a sort of state bank in Sikang. The management of loans and funds also rests with the wealthy lamas.

Indeed, the internal organization of the lamasery, with its rigid system of hierarchy and almost unlimited personal power, closely resembles the secular feudal organization of Kamba society. The highest lamas, whose succession is determined by the law of incarnation, are powerful and wealthy. Their material comfort and often extreme luxury present a sharp contrast to the hard-working and poverty-stricken lamas of the same lamasery. These poor lamas live an extremely simple life, and for their meager food and dilapidated lodging they work as hard as the serfs.

Any notion of a collective economy is very feebly demonstrated in the lamasery organization. Here private economy is the basic factor. A wealthy person enters the lamasery and becomes a wealthy lama. He can build his own house in the lamasery, where he can conduct trade and usury and lead a luxurious existence. A poor secular person enters as a poor lama, and often has to return to his home to perform corvée and farm work. Sometimes he subsists on the border of starvation. From the materialistic viewpoint he has no part in a collective life. His share in the alms and donations received by the lamasery is very small, as these are distributed according to the many grades of ecclesiastic posts.

It is clear that lamaism, as a religious system, has not decisively influenced the social system of Sikang. On the contrary, it is that social pattern that has produced the lamasery organization. Though it gives spiritual comfort to the people and moderates somewhat the surplus labor power, its organization is a part of the feudalistic social structure. The wealthy and powerful lamas are intimately related to the chieftains and headmen and together they form a definite class of rulers. It has been easy to abolish the title of Tu-sse and weaken the position of the chieftain; but so far the prestige and position of the lamasery are still high, and the lamasery continues to be the bulwark of a simple feudal society.

In such a society there is a sharp division of two groups of people: the ruling group and the producing group, each having further differentiations. Thus, to the first belong the chieftains, the landlords, the lamaseries, and the employers; to the second belong the Tse-ba, Ko-ba, La-da, and Ta-du. The first is a category of leisurely aristocrats, the second a collection of hard-laboring people. The relationship between the chieftain and Tse-ba, that between the landlord and Ko-ba, that between the lamasery and La-da, and that between the employer and Ta-du, form the basic production relations of this society. It should be pointed out that while the four categories of peasants in Kantze and Tehke in northern Sikang are called Tse-ba, Ko-ba, La-da and Ta-du, they assume different names in other parts of the province. Nevertheless, their basic production relations are common to all locales.

The relation between the chieftain and Tse-ba is one which fully expresses the subordination of the people to their feudal ruler. In the Tibetan language, Tse-ba means those who give tribute and are subject to requisitions in kind and in labor. It is a common term not only in Sikang but in Tibet as well. Tse-ba, being subjects of the chieftain, form the major group of farm hands. In 37 villages of Kantze, for example, out of

1,744 households 1,321, or nearly 76 percent are Tse-ba. As the chieftain represents the state and is the owner of state land, and as all Tse-ba are in service to him, every Tse-ba household receives a portion of land for cultivation.

In return, Tse-ba are obliged to do virtually everything for the chieftains. In addition to cultivating their farms, Tse-ba must also work on their fields. Apart from such field work, they have to serve by rotation in the chieftains' residential quarters. Whereas at an earlier period Tse-ba only had to pay tribute and meet the corvée and other requisitions, later they have had to give up a part of the harvest as rent. The Tse-ba in Tekke owe to their chieftain three items of payment. First, rent in kind for which a first-class household pays annually $3\frac{1}{2}$ tu of oats, a second-class household $2\frac{1}{2}$ tu, and a third-class household $\frac{1}{2}$ tu. (One tu equals about 13 pounds). Second, several forms of annual tribute such as butter, hay, sheep, rough woolen cloth, gunpowder, and money for printing holy scriptures of lamaism. As far as butter and hay are concerned, payments differ according to the three classes of households. Other tribute is assessed on a village basis, each village reassessing in whatever way is feasible. Each village has had to donate thirty Tibetan silver dollars every year for the scripture expenditure. Third, the corvée, i.e. forced labor without compensation, chiefly in three forms: cultivating the chieftain's land or the land of other aristocrats, coolie work in transport or housework, and furnishing animal power whenever required.

The chieftain, it may be said, is a miniature autocrat, and Tse-ba, his subjects, are docile servitors in his household. He selects from among them the officials who manage his finances and his court. Even certain housework is done by Tse-ba in rotation. (58) Inasmuch as Tse-ba are not bound together by family ties or blood relationship, but rather represent a definite economic and social status, they are not of a caste but a class. Indeed, anyone in the community who can pay the three main items described above may become Tse-ba and receive a piece of land from the chieftain for permanent cultivation.

In the course of time the burden of Tse-ba has increased to an alarming extent. While they still have to pay rent, tribute and corvée to the chieftain, they are also in direct contact with the revenue collectors and administrators, the headmen of the ranks of O-ba and Chei-tsong, and consequently have to bribe them regularly. In places where the chieftain has disappeared, the extortions of O-ba and Chei-tsong have become even worse. More recently, since Tse-ba have also been obliged to pay taxes to the new district government headed by a magistrate appointed from outside, their burden has become literally crushing. As a result there is a tendency towards differentiation among the Tse-ba themselves.

Some of the Tse-ba families have become wealthy through long stable management in farming through trading and usury. They have good credit relations with the lamaseries. They even have surplus land for Ko-ba to cultivate, and in this way all their tribute and requisition burdens can be shifted to Ko-ba. They are the prototype of a rich peasant class. They may also emerge as landlords. But the majority of Tse-ba are poor, with inadequate land and an insufficient number of field animals. Always in debt, their condition borders on starvation. These are to become the

the future tenants and hired farm laborers. On the whole, however, the differentiation among Tse-ba has not overtaken the sharp opposition between the chieftain and his ruling class on the one hand and Tse-ba as the ruled and exploited class on the other. Two reasons account for this: one is the still overwhelming political and dictatorial power of the chieftain and the lamasery over the Tse-ba as an entire group; the other is the slow development of private land property in this simple and early form of feudalism, which tends to check the emergence of any new class differentiation.

A small portion of the chieftain's land is not cultivated by Tse-ba, but by his house servants who are called Ko-ba. In the Tibetan language, Ko-ba means those who have to follow and obey their masters. Ko-ba cultivate their chieftain's land as well as perform miscellaneous errands in his household. In return they receive a small piece of land to cultivate for themselves, seeds, implements and animal power being furnished by their master or landlord. The entire harvest from this little piece of land belongs to the Ko-ba. In other words, the Ko-ba pay labor rent, or rent in the form of labor, to their landlord, for the use of a little piece of land which often is not sufficient for their own subsistence.

As the headmen usually have much land at their disposal, they also obtain labor rent from the Ko-ba. Some wealthy Tse-ba, too, when they have more land than they themselves can cultivate, also use the help of Ko-ba. Ko-ba, therefore, may have the chieftain, or the headman, or Tse-ba as their landlord. In Kantze, of the 1,744 households of 37 villages, 141 households or 8 percent are Ko-ba. The status of Ko-ba is obviously lower than that of Tse-ba. Ko-ba do not pay tribute, *corvée*, or any portion of the harvest on the leased land. Their liability is limited to paying labor rent to their landlords.

A Ko-ba is so poor that his family is usually small, consisting of only one or two able-bodied laboring persons. Of course, he willingly hires himself out to do field work in order to receive additional income. During the busy season, however, when agricultural laborers are most needed, a Ko-ba has to work on his landlord's land. Thus he is not free to hire out. During the months when there is no field work, he is more than glad to work in his landlord's household. Although no wage is paid, he can at least expect to fill his stomach, however inferior the food the landlord gives him. Indeed, he is often debtor to his landlord for loans in cash or in kind. The latter may ask the Ko-ba to do errands for him at any time. In these circumstances a Ko-ba has neither the time nor the means to acquire a handicraft or any other avocation.

An insolvent Tse-ba whose laboring member of the family or field animal may have died, who may have exhausted his seed supply in the planting season, or whose harvest may have been wiped out by natural calamity, or whose indebtedness is so heavy he can no longer meet obligations of tribute, requisition or rent, often gives up the land allotted to him and involuntarily becomes a Ko-ba. Tse-ba and Ko-ba are both serfs in Sikang, but Ko-ba are the lower stratum of serfs. (59)

The relation between the lamasery and La-da is sometimes the same as that between the landlord and Ko-ba, at other times similar to that between the chieftain and Tse-ba. In the Tibetan language, La-da means the subjects

of a god. La-da cultivate land for the lamasery, and in return receive a small piece of land for subsistence. If they use the implements and animal power of the lamasery to cultivate this little piece of land, they, like the Ko-ba, have to do work for the lamasery other than cultivating its land in payment of labor rent. If they use their own field animals and implements, then, like some of the well-to-do Tse-ba, they need only cultivate the lamasery's land, without other obligation.

In many places La-da have to pay a portion of the harvest, and are also subject to corvée and other requisitions. In some places that portion of harvest is halved or entirely exempted, but La-da still have to meet corvée and requisitions. In other cases the reverse is true, i.e. corvée and requisitions are exempted but not rent in kind (which is really a form of tribute). Again, in a few cases, both are exempted. These variations have come from the different origins of the lamasery lands. Some land was granted by the chieftain to the lamasery in the remote past, and some land was granted recently under new conditions. Some was shifted to the lamasery by Tse-ba, and some was taken over by the lamasery by sheer force. In some instances where the locality did not have the necessary number of Tse-ba to shoulder the tax or requisition assessment, the lamasery ordered its La-da to pay tribute as Tse-ba.

In principle, however, La-da are exempted from paying corvée, requisitions and any portion of the harvest. Generally speaking they are economically slightly better off than Tse-ba. Whereas Tse-ba are completely at the mercy of the chieftain, La-da often have the protection of the lamasery against the oppression and injustice which may come from the chieftain. In Kantze, out of the 1,744 households of 37 villages, 138 households, or nearly 8 percent are La-da. The percentage of La-da is about the same as that of Ko-ba.

As the whole of Sikang is still in the early stage of feudalism, there can be only a very limited market for labor power. The relation between employer and employed is not fully developed, and therefore the employer is more like an alms-giver and the employee like a beggar or alms-receiver, with a rather weak working relationship between them. The employee is called Ta-du, meaning side-dwellers, that is, not full-fledged members of the community. Unlike Tse-ba, Ko-ba, or La-da, they receive no land for their subsistence. Unlike Ko-ba or La-da they have no identified master to follow or to look to for protection. Ta-du are the poorest of the Sikang population.

The household of Ta-du is never large; each usually has one or two elderly people who can no longer do any work. One or two members of each Ta-du family must hire out for miscellaneous daily work in order to provide food for the household. They are even more mobile than Ko-ba, and thus have no obligations of corvée, requisitions or rent payment. A very few of them lease in on a temporary basis a piece of land from some Tse-ba. The vast majority of them, when unable to find employment, flock to some religious ceremony, which usually lasts three or four days, and receive alms from the lamaseries or from their fellow villagers. The best of Ta-du, and they are a very small minority, do skilled work such as stone-carving for religious scripture, sewing, knitting and tailoring, and hide-preparing. In Kantze 144 households, or over 8 percent are Ta-du. They are evidently the forerunners of handicraft workers and hired field laborers.

While it is clear that Sikang is still in the early stage of feudalism, nevertheless in comparison with the proto-feudal society of the Pai Yi in southernmost Yunnan, there are at least six characteristics which present a marked difference between these two types of social organizations. First, whereas there is no private land in Ch'eli, there is some private land in Kantze. Though generally the institution of private land ownership is only incipient in Sikang, no communal land is to be found now in the entire province, such as is still found in Ch'eli and several nearby districts. Second, while there is no class differentiation among the ruled in the Pai Yi community, the groupings of cultivators in Sikang have already assumed several diverse strata. Third, the large-scale commerce and usury practiced by the lamas and chieftains in Sikang are not to be found in Pai Yi society. Fourth, elected officials are functioning in Ch'eli but not in Kantze. Fifth, remnants of the earlier tribal councils are to be found in Ch'eli and not in Kantze or in Tehke. Sixth, while labor service in Ch'eli is based on the family or household unit, the corvée in Sikang is inherently and completely tied up with the land granted for cultivation. As tribute based on land means feudalism, Sikang is fully feudalistic just as southernmost Yunnan is not yet purely feudalistic. Labor rent and corvée dominate all of Sikang, entire Kam. Almost every form of labor and service is performed by corvée, the basis of which can only be called a feudal land system.

THE LAND SYSTEM IN SIKANG

As tradition has it among the people in Kantze today, the cultivators of the land of Kam, in the remote past, were called Sig-ba, meaning people who till the land. According to this ancient lore everybody was said to have been given land for cultivation and there were no four strata of people such as constitute the present Sikang society. It was said that when kings, or Gea-bo, came to rule over the land, all land belonged to the Gea-bo, who allowed two categories of cultivators. Those who tilled the king's land and furnished corvée and animal power, but who did not pay a portion of the harvest as land tax or tribute, were called Tse-ba. Those who tilled the land granted by the kind to his subordinate officials were called Ko-ba. Gea-bo was identified with the tribal chieftain, or chieftain of a definite area, as in the later period. Tu-Sse was the title at one time given to him by the rulers of Central China. His subordinates have had various different names according to official duties, but in Kantze they became known as Chei-tsong.

Thus the local folk-lore tells us that the present land system is not what it used to be; there had probably also been a proto-feudal society a long time ago. It proves further that the appearance of a feudal society in Sikang had preceded the Manchu policy of abolishing the Ty-sse system in the eighteenth or even the Mongol policy of instituting it in the thirteenth century. At any rate, there has been nothing in Chinese historical records or writings that explains the origin of the estate and cultivated land of Tse-ba. Evidently Tse-ba had been cultivating land long before the Kamba came into contact with the Chinese of Central China.

At a time when society in Sikang was evolving from independent clan organization to an organization with a definite territorial basis comprising several tribes or clans, the sphere of political power of the chieftain was accordingly widened. Whereas before, the clan chief had been the chieftain of only one tribe, now the chieftain ruled over several tribal or clan chiefs. This new chieftain, or Gea-bo had at his disposal the local headmen, the people and the land. He, or by his consent the headman, granted land to the newcomers from either another clan or from a different territory. In return for this grant, corvée was imposed. Hence the land of Tse-ba is known today as Ch'ai Ti, meaning in Chinese "land of the official servant," and even the house of Tse-ba is called Ch'ai Fang, "house of the official servant."

That the chieftain has always had, and still has, the authority and power to grant land is an important, indeed the key point regarding the land system in Sikang. In this connection it is necessary to understand why the new Tse-ba, instead of acquiring land directly from the old Tse-ba, have had to receive a grant from the headman or the chieftain. There are at least four reasons for this. First, the Gea-bo, who traditionally owned all land, would be loath to part with this claim, as authority over land is synonymous with that over labor power. Second, he would welcome the new Tse-ba by presenting him with working animals to do the cultivation, and there was therefore no need for Tse-ba to buy land.

Third, the new Tse-ba, being refugees from other localities, did not have the money to buy land. Money economy was not well developed, in any case. Fourth, as there were relatively only few Tse-ba who could afford to reserve a portion of the land for the Ko-ba to cultivate, they were not in a position to transfer land to the new Tse-ba.

As late as the beginning of the twentieth century, there was very little private land property in Sikang. Most of the agricultural and pastoral lands belonged to the Tu-sse or to the Khutukhtu. The Tu-sse, that is, the chieftain, granted land to the lamasery, to his relatives, to his faithful and deserving headmen, and to all the worthy Tse-ba who were engaged in cultivation. There was no land tax levied on such granted land. Land tax was collected only from land which had been opened up by the colonists. In the Kongting and Tsa ya areas, the land of Tse-ba and the land of headmen were "sold" in the 1870's, but ten or fifteen years after the "sale" the land automatically returned to the original manager or cultivator. Before 1900 only the Chinese military colonists around Pa-tang (now Pa-an) really sold and bought land, but the transaction never exceeded several hundred mu.

Even at the present time, regular and permanent sale of land in Sikang is rather restricted. The Chinese administration recognizes the permanent land ownership of the Tu-sse and of the lamasery and the ownership of the Chinese colonists. It regards the fields and pastures of the Sikang people at large as not privately owned. Actually, the major part of the land is in the hands of three special groups: the chieftains, the headmen and the lamaseries. A purely business transaction regarding land rarely occurs. When there is no one in the family to continue the cultivation, a near relative or a close associate is called in to work on the land, but always with the consent of the headman or the chieftain of that locality. Otherwise, there are only two ways of transferring land. One is by direct military occupation, and the other by giving in exchange some small compensation without receiving a regular land deed but asserting a recognizable military or political threat.

Generally speaking, the land in Sikang, in particular the land held by a grantee, is not subject to sale. In Chanhua, for example, there is no tenancy system at all. Inasmuch as man power is regarded as belonging to the state, whose sole representative is the chieftain, any cultivated or uncultivated land is likewise owned by the state. Any piece of cultivated land that is abandoned must be given to a new cultivator. About 100 miles south of Chanhua is the district of Lihua, earlier known as Litang, which is nearly halfway between Kongting to the east and Pa-an to the west. Here also each household cultivates land, on the average of an area sown by half a picul of seed. Thus there is hardly any land sale or purchase. In Tan-pa, a district north of Kongting, most of the land is granted by the ruling authority, each household receiving an average of close to 19 mu. In such a land distribution one unit of irrigated valley land is regarded as equal to two units of dry land on the hill slopes. Both lands may be mortgaged but not sold. In Kiulung, a district 100 miles directly south of Kongting, although much land has been taken over by the Chinese settlers, nevertheless there is very little business transaction of land.

The few places where land is sold and bought prove to be the exception. In Sanyen, now the district of Wucheng, half-way between

Pa-an to the south and Tehke to the north, nearly all land has been opened up by new settlers. This land is subject to sale and purchase, but there are hardly any tenant cultivators. The price of the land is very high here. A piece of land of about 20 square meters cost in 1940 anywhere from 12 to 20 Tibetan dollars. In one particular village, Ba Ba, the land price is especially high. In measuring the best land, a horse lying on the ground is used as a radius, and the price of the land so encircled is determined by the worth of the horse. In a similar manner a bullock is used to measure the next-best land. The price of this land unit will then equal that of the bullock. Here, land is expensive, families are monogamous, and lamas are very few in number.

Wucheng, Pa-an, and the places surrounding the district cities seem to be the only localities where land is bought and sold, though such transactions are not without complications and disputes. Generally speaking, however, land opened up by private initiative and not originally granted by state authority may be bought and sold sometimes in a somewhat secret transaction and in only small amounts. Land other than the Chai Ti was sold secretly in Kantze during 1940, at a price of 160 Tibetan dollars for two-and-a-half square meters. Though the Chai Ti, that is, land granted for cultivation, cannot be permanently transferred, it may be leased out.

In the language of the Sikang people, to lease out land for cultivation is called Si-dong. Dong means to let out, and Si is land. Most of the families that follow this system of Si-dong are those Tse-ba who find themselves on the brink of bankruptcy. They are too poor to meet the chieftain's requisitions, including corvée, having neither enough cash nor commodity to comply with the seemingly incessant demand. Consequently, they lease out a part of their land and obtain rent in advance. For every land unit called tai chung, meaning a sack of seed, equivalent to two-and-a-half square meters, the rent payable before the harvest is eight to ten Tibetan dollars. The tenure is only one year, at the end of which either the lessee returns the land or pays another annual rent fixed by new negotiation.

The above-described system of land leasing prevails in Kantze, where out of the nine villages surveyed in 1940 four had land leased out. To be more specific, out of the 410 households in 9 villages, 21 households, or 5.12 percent leased out some land. On the average these households leased out as much as half of their cultivated land. As far as can be learned, there are three types of leases in Kantze that may be described as follows:

First, we may take as an example the situation reported by a Tse-ba, whose name is Dinagaza, a young man of about 20 years old. He had four tai chung of land, of which three are already barren. He leased out the remaining one tai chung of land, on the condition that the lessee or tenant pay all taxes due directly to him. Second, instead of a leasehold for tax payment, it may be one for interest payment. A female Tse-ba, by the name of Gonganamo, borrowed 40 Tibetan dollars and gave her two tai chung of land to the creditor. The harvest on that land was regarded as annual interest, and land was to be returned to her when both the interest and principal were fully paid (60). Third, land was leased out for rent in all forms. As a female Ta-du, Lusuchinzu, reported, she leased in one tai chung of land and had to work 40 days

for her landlord as labor rent. A female Tse-ba, Yamalozo, leased out two tai chung of land. While she paid the taxes, the lessee had to furnish seed and the harvest was equally divided between them. Another female Tse-ba, Ishchinzu, leased out half of her three tai chung of land for five successive years. The annual rent was three quarters of one sack of oats. In both cases the rent was in produce. Finally, there is also cash rent. Lizusi, a female Tse-ba with five tai chung of land, leased out as much as four tai chung to four different families. From each she collected 10 to 15 Tibetan dollars a year.

The type of leasehold arising from loans has been modified in some places, notably in Lihua, so that the loan given to the Tse-ba who leases out land is called "rent deposit". A tenure of a definite number of years is fixed. There is no annual rent payment, but at the end of a number of years the land is to be returned to the Tse-ba. In Lihua, as well as in Pa-an, Kiulung and other districts, share-rent prevails. In some cases the Tse-ba who lease out land provide seed but more often than not they furnish only the land. Share-rent in all these cases is usually on a fifty-fifty basis. (61)

Though subject to lease the granted land, or ch'ai ti, held by the Tse-ba is to be neither sold nor divided. Sale is not permitted because the land granted by the chieftain belongs to the State; therefore public property may not be alienated by private transaction. Division of land has become unnecessary because of polyandry. The question is, what has been the basic factor that has fostered this unique social system?

The popular explanation is that polyandry with brothers and polygamy with sisters, both quite common in Kam or Sikang, have been possible solely because of the non-division of land, and that land is not divided because of the fear of sinking further into poverty. Dorje Zödba, whose Christian name is Paul Sherap, an educated native of Sikang from Ta Tzi Lu or Kongting, said in 1924, "polyandry is due to the family's fear of poverty. If three brothers were to marry three separate wives and set up three separate establishments, the field inherited from their father would have to be divided up. They therefore share a wife; and the children, whoever the actual begetter may be, are held to belong to the eldest brother, the others being regarded as uncles." (62)

This, however, is not a true and correct explanation for polyandry in Sikang. There is in this province still much arable land not yet cultivated. Furthermore, from what has been observed on field trips, considerable portions of cultivated land have been abandoned. There is certainly no lack of good land to make the people prosperous. Nor is polyandry due to the scarcity of women.

Dorje Zödba remarked, "the sexes are about equal in number. About half of the women remain unmarried (though not usually childless), and many, in recent years at least, have gone off with Chinese soldiers. In fact, the balance is the other way: owing to the number of men who enter the lamasery, there are more women than men available for marriage." (63)

It is not true that the nomads do not practice polygamy and polyandry because of the fact that they can easily divide their property in cattle and herds. According to the Rev. J. Huston Edgar of the China Inland Mission, who had spent twenty-three years in the regions west of Kongting,

the nomads around Litang (Lihua) seem peculiarly given to polyandry. (64) Early Chinese writers in the nineteenth century described polyandry as prevailing in Tibet and Sikang, and without understanding the real meaning of this social system, one of them praised it as of great virtue. It is supposed to be socially valuable in the interests of union; that is, the woman is a central figure in a certain pattern of relationships. (65)

The basic factor that has brought about polyandry in Sikang and Tibet (combined as Kam) is not land division but the system of corvée. As it has been established under customary law, whereby one household, in return for one portion of ch'ai ti, or granted land, is obliged to give a definite amount of unpaid labor, or corvée, to the chieftain, a division of the household would mean multiplying the amount of corvée. While on the part of the Gea-bo or chieftain, there might be a tendency to break up the household in order to obtain more units of labor power, on the contrary, the Tse-ba household would tend to preserve a large household undivided, by following the practice of polyandry.

In the Lho-i Chö-jung, an excellent history dealing with the Bhutanese hierarchy, rules have been recorded which were established to prevent the evasion of corvée. Sir Charles Bell aptly remarked, "in countries where land is plentiful but laborers are diminishing, the tax roll must always be an object of especial solicitude." (66) The following are the laws enacted by successive rulers of Bhutan: "The son succeeds to the property. If there be only a daughter, she succeeds. Two estates or holdings must not be combined into one with the result of rendering only one quota of service. In the case of an aged couple, who have neither children nor servants, let them render such service as they can conveniently perform. On the decease of the old ones, let the nearest in flesh and bone succeed them, and let the estate be maintained.

"An evil custom has arisen by which two or three holdings are combined under one owner. Thus it comes that the dry tax (grain or money) alone is paid, while the labor tax is evaded. This custom is injurious to all. In such cases, if a family has sons and daughters, they should each be made to maintain separate holdings, and to pay the taxes due from each.

"The sure guiding principle should be this, that, if any one hold a property and yet pay no tax, he must be forced to render such as he is able to do, having regard also to the amount of cultivation held by him." (67)

These laws clearly reflect that by way of evading tax or tribute, especially that of corvée, the people of Bhutan have not been too willing to divide their household; and that the surest method of preserving a large joint family or household was by maintaining polyandry. By means of the practice of polyandry, instead of several, only one share of labor service is rendered. Thus polyandry is not the cause, but the result of non-division of land or household; and this non-division has been designed to evade corvée. Of all the tributes in Sikang and Tibet, corvée is the most burdensome.

On the whole, labor power in Sikang is on the decline. Many Tse-ba households do not have enough labor power to manage their land holdings

and perform all the work required by corvée. In other words, these households would find it difficult to divide the household goods and land even if they should desire to do so. Often a Tse-ba household is so poor that it cannot afford the required equipment, implements, seed, and working animals to deal with an adequate amount of cultivation, divided or undivided. Surplus labor power is sent to the lamasery, and the family tie is kept up by polyandry with brothers, or polygamy with sisters, as the case may be.

The relatively few well-to-do Tse-ba households can afford to divide their land and set up new families, each performing its share of corvée service. In practice, however, they too do not desire to divide the household and land and seek to evade corvée by whatever means possible. They may either call in the Ko-ba to cultivate for them, or they may send their sons to the lamasery to enter the trading and usury business. This general tendency towards a diminishing labor power available for corvée has naturally increased the amount of corvée that each Tse-ba household has to render. The increased burden in turn intensifies fear of corvée and makes household division less desirable, for such a division, accompanied by land division, must eventually become unproductive and uneconomical.

Some of the nomad tribes present a different picture. They are not tied to field cultivation and their herds and cattle are easily divided. Furthermore their tribute is paid not in the form of corvée but either in cash or in natural produce. For this reason, polyandry practice is not usually found among the pure nomads. Tribes living around Litang are partially nomadic, and in fact their corvée burden has been greatly increased by the military campaigns conducted by the Chinese from time to time.

The fact that the corvée system prevails throughout the entire land of Kam, and that this system of labor tribute is so firmly entrenched through the system of granted land, or ch'ai ti, and that very little new land is opened up by private initiative and other means; all combine to establish an early form of feudalism in Sikang.

One of the factors that has basically transformed a proto-feudal social structure to that of an early form of feudalism, is the land ownership by the chieftain, who imposes labor rent on its cultivators. In the office of the district government of Kantze there is recorded a detailed account of the surrender of the two chieftains of Kungse and Mashu, written in 1910. According to this document, in the territories ruled by these two chieftains or Tu-sse, there were 1,097 households of Tse-ba who cultivated a total of 4,256 tai chung ti (a unit of land in Sikang equal in area to 0.23 hectare). At the same time the Tu-sse of Kungse owned land, mostly in the three villages of Ni-mo, Sse-mo, and Si-Ngo, amounting to 98.7 tai chung ti; and the Tu-sse of Mashu owned 41.5 tai chung ti. By comparison, while the chieftains owned 140 land units, the Tse-ba received 4,256 land units for cultivation, a ratio of 1 to 30.4. But, among the 1,097 Tse-ba households each cultivated an average of 318 tai chung ti. This meant that the Mashu chieftain owned land nearly ten times larger than the average area cultivated by a Tse-ba, and that the Kungse chieftain owned land as much as twenty-six times larger than the land cultivated by an average Tse-ba. The private land possession of these chieftains is thus seen to have been very extensive.

Generally speaking, however, the private land of chieftains in Sikang is not extensive. In the course of time, such land has been taken over by their subordinates or the headmen of smaller localities. As shown in the document mentioned above, the chieftains' private land was cultivated by requisitioned labor, and because of the limited labor power in any one locality, such land naturally could not be concentrated at one place. For example, Peipanima, a Yeh-ba (manager) of Kungse's, female Tu-sse, was in charge of her private land in the two villages of Sse-mo and Kung-sie. While the Tu-sse was imprisoned by the Ching Dynasty official for a certain offense, her Yeh-ba reported to the official how her land had been cultivated, as follows: The villagers were requisitioned, under the Yeh-ba's supervision, to plant, weed and harvest. At the end of the season, the Tu-sse, as a "reward" for their field work, distributed butter and oats to the Yeh-ba and all the other laborers.

Actually, all the planting, weeding, harvesting, threshing, transplanting and milling is the work of the Tse-ba, i.e. the corvée exacted of the locality, where the Tse-ba are the subjects of the chieftain. (68) As the labor mustered by corvée must be limited at any one locality, parcelation or the scattering of land ownership is automatically created. Taking Mashu and Kungse as examples we find that the 41.5 tai chung ti owned by the Mashu Tusse were separated into 25 lots each averaging no more than 1.6 tai chung ti, or 0.368 hectare. The much larger land ownership of 98.7 tai chung ti by the Kungse Tu-sse was scattered in 57 lots each averaging no more than 1.7 tai chung ti, or 0.391 hectare. Thus we see that just as the power of modern machine farming fosters land integration, so the system of medieval or feudalistic labor must result in land parcelation.

Just as the chieftain grants the use of land to Tse-ba and exacts from them labor rent in the form of field work on his private land, so the headmen, the subordinates of the chieftain, similarly lease out plots of land to Ko-ba (the tenants) and also obtain from them labor rent in the form of work on land received by Tse-ba. Thus, whereas Tse-ba are tenants and subjects of the chieftain, Ko-ba are tenants in turn to the well-to-do Tse-ba who can afford to lease out a piece of land, or to the headmen who likewise lease out land. Here the difference between the headmen and the Tse-ba is that whereas the land of the former is of private ownership that of the latter is a grant from the chieftain, theoretically only for its use.

Some of the powerful headmen in the district of Tehke command as many as one hundred households of Ko-ba each. In Kantze, among nine villages investigated, the average land holding per household of Tse-ba is 6.66 tai chung ti, or 1.53 hectares. The largest Tse-ba holding, however, is as much as 40 tai chung ti or 9.2 hectares. Fa Tseng a Chinese Buddhist scholar, recently wrote the following description of a typical well-to-do agricultural family in Sikang. (69) Such a description applies to both the headman's and the wealthy Tse-ba's household.

"A large Sikang household maintains eight servants and two lamas who chant the holy scripture daily. It is not only engaged in field work but attends to some dairy production as well. The entire living quarters is in appearance like a blockhouse for defense. The household

begins its busy season in the beginning of March, when the ice first melts. Then, early in the morning, a servant stands on the roof and calls to the tenants (Ko-ba) to come to work according to the customary order. To the tenants who come to work food and drink are provided by the household in a limited quantity. When every lot is ploughed and prepared, the sowing and planting begin. After the sowing and planting are done, tenants help make food and fodder. By the end of May they are busy weeding the field. The weeding is done mostly by women. When more farm hands are available, more weeding is demanded. All members of the wealthy household either participate in the work or closely supervise it.

"There is usually a vacation after the weeding. Various forms of entertainment and recreation are provided and managed by the wealthy household for the benefit of the Ko-ba or tenants. Opportunity is taken on this occasion to inspect their health and their defense weapons. In the autumn the tenants go to the field again to harvest the wheat crop. After harvesting, threshing, cleaning and storing the wheat, the wealthy household again provides a sort of celebration when the tenants are amply provided with food, drinks and games."

It must be pointed out that while the crop and other income of the chieftain are usually completely consumed by the lavish maintenance of too many servants and guests, the headmen and the wealthy Tse-ba households have had a better chance to accumulate their income. For this reason, headmen and wealthy Tse-ba in Sikang are invariably engaged in extending loans with usurious interest. They have become the chief source of usurious activities. Again, while the land and labor rent of the chieftain is gradually on the decline, the power of the headmen and the wealthy Tse-ba and the labor rent connected therewith are increasing in influence. Two characteristics are still salient in the present land system in Sikang: (1), a rapid process of differentiation continues among the Tse-ba. (2) labor rent dominates the entire system of tenancy as rent in kind is still limited and not commonly used.

In 1910, when the total land holdings of Tse-ba, in Kungse and Mashu amounted to 4,256 tai chung ti, the land held by the 26 lamaseries in these two places totaled 1,352 tai chung ti. The ratio was 1 to 3.14. As there were about 1,750 lamas in these lamaseries at that time, each lama was evidently supported by an average of 0.77 tai chung ti, or 0.18 hectare. Compiled from the surrender document of the Tu-sse in 1910, the following table shows land distribution among the lamaseries as follows:

																Total
Land Unit	0	7	10	15	17	24	25	27	28	31	40	42	60	139	465	1,352
(<u>tai chung ti</u>)																
No. of lamaseries	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	3	1	1	2	1	26

It is clear that while two lamaseries had no land at all, one exceptionally rich lamasery had 465 tai chung ti, or 107 hectares. Land ownership by the lamasery has no relation to the number of lamas. In the lamasery of Kang Ma there are 104 lamas, with only 40 tai chung ti, while in the lamasery of Gian Keng 12 lamas enjoy the income from 139 tai chung ti.

In the same way that the headmen and Tse-ba exact labor rent from

their tenants (Ko-ba by giving them plots of land to cultivate for self-subsistence, so the lamasery obtains labor rent from its tenants (La-da). Apart from the labor rent in the form of field work, the La-da also have to carry water and mill flour and do other coolie type of work for the lamasery. Labor rent dominates the tenancy system of the lamasery, although both share-rent and fixed rent in kind are to be found to a small extent. In the case of share-rent it is usually of fifty-fifty ratio, and if fixed in kind the rent for every tai chung ti, or 0.23 hectares, is about one sack of oats.

In fact, some lamaseries exact three kinds of rent at the same time. In the lamasery of Ahpatsasung, in Kantze, two La-da tenant households cultivate seven tai chung ti for the lamasery; one La-da cultivates two tai chung ti and mills flour; two La-da pay 50-50 share-rent; and one La-da sends oats as a fixed annual rent. Still, labor rent is by far the dominant form. A medium-sized lamasery usually gives 70 to 80 percent of its land to La-da and retains 20 to 30 percent for the La-da tenants to cultivate as labor rent. In this case 50 La-da households cultivate some 60 tai chung ti (14 hectares) to maintain the livelihood of the lamas. Of course, these 50 La-da households also have to do ordinary menial work for the lamasery.

In the 1910 surrender document there is a full description of a medium-sized lamasery in Kantze named San Chu. According to the story told by Si-nag, the leading lama of this lamasery, there were 300 or more lamas in the San Chu. Most of the land was contributed by lamas to the lamasery, a small portion was bought from the bankrupt Tse-ba (at the price of 200 Tibetan dollars for one tai chung ti and 50 La-da households were each given five to six tai chung ti and together to cultivate for the lamasery some 60 tai chung ti. Besides, each La-da household had to contribute to the lamasery menial labor amounting to one man for one month each year. From the lamasery's 60 tai chung ti the total harvest was more than 200 sacks of oats, far from being sufficient to seed the 300 lamas as a group. But the lamasery had some real estate and also the return from cash loans extended to the La-da. The annual interest derived from these loans amounted to less than 192 Tibetan dollars. In order to meet all ends the lamas had to ask for alms, which usually totaled about 100 sacks of oats and about 100 Tibetan dollars annually.

Larger lamaseries with insufficient land have all resorted to business undertakings. Indeed, by and large, the economics of the lamasery is not so much based on land as on trade and usury. In places where the lamasery has special political position and privilege, all kinds of extra-economic exploitation has been carried out. But it should be observed that a lamasery has rarely accumulated capital for investment in productive agriculture. The income, though in various and different forms, has always been wasted in elaborate religious ceremonies and by the luxurious living of the high-ranking lamas. It must also be observed that, though each individual lama participates in his own household's agricultural and corvée labor, no lama ever does field work for the lamasery. In the lamasery the lamas regard themselves as a group-landlord, whose tenants and servants are the La-da.

In contrast with Tibet, where the land ownership of the aristocracy is much larger and more extensive, the private land of the Sikang chief-

tains and Sikang headmen is relatively smaller and not extensive. Also, the Tibetan lamaseries own much more land and are far more powerful than the Sikang lamaseries. Evidently the aristocrats or nobles of Tibet are economically more dominant than the chieftains and headmen of Sikang. There are three types of nobles in Tibet: the descendants of ancient kings and chieftains, the families from which the incarnated ruling lamas have come, and meritorious high officials or their direct descendants.

In Tibet even ordinary officials are given large estates by the State. They as well as the nobles are considered the owners of their extensive lands and all the people residing on it. Needless to say, the Tibetan ruler himself has large land estates. He also maintains a unique organization called Shang Shang to handle all requisitions, levies and corvée. And this organization itself has land for its own expenditures. The chief land owners in Tibet are the Tibetan ruler, the nobles, the officials and the lamaseries.

A second point differentiating Sikang from Tibet is the fact that there are more small land owners among the peasants in Tibet. These small land owners, who are themselves cultivators had in the distant past leased in land from the nobles indirectly, and later lost connection with them and their agents and therefore ceased to pay rent entirely. In Sikang there have never been such indirect leases because of the smaller size of land ownership. Only a very few Tse-ba have established themselves as landowners. It is significant to note that the small cultivator-owners in Tibet, in their management of corvée for the State and the nobles, often use the requisitioned and unpaid labor on their own land. This rarely happens in Sikang where the ula (Manchurian name for corvée) system is equally prevalent.

Still a third point of difference between Sikang and Tibet is that the cultivators or peasants in Tibet have far less freedom of movement from one place to another. This has been due to scarcer labor supply in Tibet, the more scarce because of the relatively much larger land estates. In Tibet when a peasant desires to leave his locality for a month or two, he must first obtain permission from his landlord or the landlords' superintendent. His family must offer a sort of guarantee for his return. Also, when a peasant desires to enter a lamasery, he must secure the consent of his master. Here, more than in Sikang, the landlord is identified with the master. It appears that land ownership in Sikang being more parcelated and more scattered, it has therefore been less difficult to secure adequate labor power from the locality. Consequently, peasants of Sikang have remained relatively free in their personal movements, at least in comparison with the peasants of Tibet.

Although there is more private land among the cultivators in Tibet than among the Tse-ba in Sikang, such private land is in reality not considerable in comparison with the land owned by the State, the chieftain, the nobles, the officials and the lamaseries. In other words, feudal ownership of land dominates both in Tibet and Sikang. Although more rent in grain is collected in Tibet than in Sikang, labor rent still prevails in both places. The abuses of labor rent are more flagrant in Tibet than in Sikang, because there are more indirect management and supervision in the former region. As described by Sir Charles Bell, a Pa-Lha noble owned 13 pastures and at least 1,400 lots of fields, attached to which there were no less than three or four levels of rent supervision.

Finally, common to both Sikang and Tibet is the all-permeating influence of the powerful ula system, or corvée. The ruler as well as land owner in both regions command ula service at will; and as subjects and tenants the cultivators of the soil have to meet this almost constant demand with no real compensation. This type of land ownership and rent payment has apparently hindered political and economic progress in the land of the Kamba. But as the concentration of land ownership has gone further in Tibet, feudalism in Tibet is also more developed than in Sikang.

CHAPTER IV

FOUR TYPES OF PEASANTS

There are four types of peasants in Sikang: Tse-ba, Ko-ba, La-da, and Ta-du. An old-resident Tse-ba can be identified by his very name; because of the fact that to his given name is appended a family name the new Tse-ba and the other three types of peasants do not possess a family name. The ordinary person in Sikang has two names: the name of the house in which the person dwells (known as Knga-ba g min) plus the given name to the individual, the latter usually after a certain idea of lamaism. In addition to these two names, all old-resident Tse-ba have a third one, a family name (known as mi-chan g min). This family name carries with it social prestige and commands respect in the community. All old residents, therefore, are addressed by this name only.

The old-resident Tse-ba in Kantze claim 20 percent of the total number of Tse-ba, or 13.8 percent of the entire population. In other words, about 80% of Tse-ba in this district are new residents. Since the economy in Sikang is so stagnant and life so sluggish, residents of half a century or less are all considered new, while the old families have lived in one locality for as long as a thousand years. In the second half of 1940 eight representative villages in Kantze were investigated. It was found that of a total of 373 households only 69 had family names, these being old-resident Tse-ba.

The Number of Tse-ba in Kantze

<u>Name of Village Investigated</u>	<u>Total Households</u>	<u>Total Tse-ba</u>	<u>Tse-ba having family names</u>
Shun-ko	77	54	11
Jen-ku	41	26	11
Chu-mo	14	9	3
Chi-jui	65	37	9
Tso-ou	111	74	13
Hsun-en	84	71	11
Se-Se-Ting	50	35	4
Teh-la	56	37	7
Total	498	343	69

The reason why as many as 80 percent of Tse-ba are not old residents may be readily understood from the migratory nature of the village population. When there is no descendant or heir in the family, the name of course goes out of use. In the large majority of cases, however, a Tse-ba family emigrated or simply fled, either to avoid too heavy a requisition burden, or because of famine, plague, or cattle pestilence, or simply because it had been involved in some incident of ill-repute. Those who came later and received the same land lot for cultivation would not and did not use the same name. It became the local customary law for the new Tse-ba not to bear any family name.

It may be said that every village in Sikang has had its emigrés at one time or another. A field investigation in 37 Kantze villages reveals that between 1935 and 1940 some 200 households of a total of 1,321 households of Tse-ba, or fully 15 percent, have moved away from their villages. During the same period, of the 660 Tse-ba households in eleven villages of Kungse, no less than 151 households, or nearly 23 percent migrated to other regions. In this respect Kungse, or the entire district of Kantze, is not unrepresentative of the whole province.

If a Tse-ba were asked how much land he cultivates, he would answer by giving the size on the basis of which land revenue has been paid in recent years. Confusion arises here because sometimes the revenue basis includes, and sometimes does not, the land in fallow. In other words, the revenue land may or may not mean the area actually under crops. A comparative study of the revenue land and the crop land clearly reveals this difference.

In nine Kantze villages investigated there are 410 Tse-ba households with 2,920 tai chung ti revenue land, or 2,729 tai chung ti under crops. Tai chung ti, as explained above, is the local land unit equivalent to 0.2328 hectare or 3.492 mu. The total revenue land among the 410 Tse-ba, therefore, is 679.78 hectares. The average per Tse-ba household has 7.12 tai chung ti, or 1.658 hectares, or 24.85 mu, of revenue land. It must be pointed out that of the total of 410 Tse-ba households, 270 or 65.85 percent hold land below this average. These 270 Tse-ba households are supposed to cultivate only 39.71 percent of the total revenue land.

Revenue Land in Nine Kantze Villages
(1940)

<u>Size of land holdings</u> (in <u>tai chung ti</u>)	<u>Tse-ba Households</u>		<u>Land-holdings</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u> of Total	(in <u>tai chung ti</u>)	<u>%</u> of Total
1 - 5	196	47.80	694.5	23.79
5.1 - 10	149	36.34	1,146.5	39.26
10.1 - 20	56	13.66	784.0	26.85
20.1 - 60	9	2.20	295.0	10.10
Total	410	100.00	2,920.0	100.00

Of the total of 410 Tse-ba households, the largest group of 57 households work on 4 tai chung ti or 0.93 hectare, per household. Next is a group of 49 households which works on 3 tai chung ti or 0.69 hectare, per household. Both these groups, together comprising 106 Tse-ba households, hold land far below the average.

Next, analyzing the distribution of the total of 2,729 tai chung ti under crops, (the equivalent of 635.31 hectares) it is found that the average per Tse-ba household cultivates 6.66 tai chung ti, or 1.55 hectares. Of the total of 410 households no less than 255, or 62.2 per cent work on crop land below this average size. These 255 Tse-ba households are supposed to cultivate only 35.27 percent of the total crop land. In other words, the remaining 37.8 percent of Tse-ba cultivate 64.73 percent of all the land actually under crops.

Crop Land in Nine Kaitze Villages
(1940)

<u>Size of crop land</u> (in tai chung ti)	<u>Tse-ba Households</u>		<u>Land under Crops</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>(in tai chung ti)</u>	<u>%</u>
0	5	1.22	0	0
1-5	207	50.48	710	26.02
5.1-10	140	34.15	1,084	39.72
20.1-40	50	12.20	695	25.47
20.40	8	1.95	240	8.79
Total	410	100.00	2,729	100.00

Again, of the total of 410 Tse-ba households, as far as the data from which the above table is compiled reveal, the largest group of 59 households cultivates 4 tai chung ti per household, and the next largest is the group of 49 households cultivating 3 tai chung ti per household.

The difference between the total revenue land and the total crop land, i.e. 191 tai chung ti, is explained by the fact that out of the total revenue land 127 tai chung ti represent fallow ground and 64 tai chung ti are leased out for cultivation. When the above two tables, concerning the distribution respectively of revenue land and actual crop land, are carefully compared, it will be seen that, with the exception of those households working on 1 to 5 tai chung ti, all items of household and of land in the crop-land table are much less than those corresponding in the revenue land table. This is highly significant. This comparison bears out the fact that the less land a Tse-ba household holds the less fallow ground he can afford to maintain. Less fallow ground often means quicker soil exhaustion. It is also true that the less land a Tse-ba holds, the closer his crop land approximates the size of his revenue land.

Land leased out by Tse-ba is limited. As shown above, of a total of 2,920 tai chung ti of revenue land only 64 tai chung ti are leased out. Such leasehold occurs only in 5 out of 9 villages investigated, and there are only 21 Tse-ba households, or just about 7 percent of the total households of those 5 villages, that have leased out land. The total leased land amounts to less than 3 percent of the land held by the 5 villages. Furthermore, when it is considered that the 21 Tse-ba households lease out only 64 of their 129 tai chung ti holdings, it must also be noted that even these 21 households cultivate, on the average, half of their land holdings. They cannot be compared with the type of landlords in eastern China, especially in the south-east, who lease out all their land.

On the other hand, the tenant in Sikang, generally termed Ko-ba, is much worse off than the tenant in eastern or south-east China. For a Ko-ba in Sikang pays his rent in the form of farm work and other kinds of labor. What he pays is labor rent, which is always higher in value than all other forms of rent. The landlord, usually the Tse-ba, provides the plough and working animal for the Ko-ba's use. He also furnishes seed or seedling, and sometimes even food and salt, especially to the new Ko-ba. He marks out about 5 tai chung ti of land for the Ko-ba's household to work on, and leases out to him only about one tai chung ti. For the privilege of cultivating this one tai chung ti for his own subsistence, therefore, the Ko-ba has to pay his labor rent on five tai chung ti held

by his landlord. In terms of share-rent, the Ko-ba gives up about 83 percent of his produce to his landlord.

Besides, he must perform other services for the landlord. In addition to field work, he does transport and housework. In fact, he must be at the landlord's beck and call at all times. Apart from field cultivation the Ko-ba works at least 30 days in the year for his lord. In the village of Se-si-ting the Ko-ba works 50 days, in the village of Shun-jo 60 days, in Jen-ku and Hsun-en 90 days, and in Teh-la as many as 180 days.

In six Kantze villages investigated there are 38 Ko-ba households, or tenant families. They have leased in, so to speak, a total of 44 tai chung ti of land, and an average of 1.16 tai chung ti (0.27 hectare) per household. As may be seen from the following table, about 70 percent of the Ko-ba cultivate 0.27 hectare each for their subsistence, and 5 percent of them cultivate 0.14 hectare each to eke out a mere animal existence.

Distribution of Leased Land Among the Ko-ba
(in 6 villages in Kantze, 1940)

<u>Crop Land</u> per Ko-ba (in <u>tai chung ti</u>)	<u>Ko-ba in Villages</u>					
	<u>Shun-ko</u>	<u>Jen-ku</u>	<u>Tso-ou</u>	<u>Se-si-ting</u>	<u>Teh-la</u>	<u>Hsun-en</u>
0.5	4	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	1	7	12	6
2	3	5	0	0	0	0
Total	7	5	1	7	12	6
			<u>Total Ko-ba</u> <u>Households</u>		<u>Total land leased</u> (in <u>tai chung ti</u>)	
			4		2	
			26		26	
			8		16	
			Total 38		44	

The third type of peasant in Sikang is called La-da who are the tenants of the lamaseries. In six Kantze villages there are 44 La-da households, holding a total of 120 tai chung ti for their subsistence. Thus it will be seen that each La-da household, on the average, enjoys the use of only 2.73 tai chung ti, or 0.63 hectare. The majority of them, i.e. 24 out of 44 households, as may be seen from the following table, have the use of 2 tai chung ti, or 0.46 hectare each.

Distribution of Leased Land Among the La-da
(in 6 villages in Kantze, 1940)

<u>Crop Land</u> <u>per La-da</u> (in tai chung ti)	<u>La-da in villages</u>					
	<u>ChuMo</u>	<u>Chi Ehr</u>	<u>PuYuLung</u>	<u>Tso-Ou</u>	<u>Hsun-en</u>	<u>Se-si-ting</u>
0.5	5	0	0	0	0	0
1.0	0	1	0	0	0	0
2.0	0	24	0	0	0	0
3.0	0	0	0	1	0	0
3.5	0	0	0	0	0	1
4.0	0	1	0	1	2	0
5.0	0	0	2	0	0	0
6.0	0	0	1	5	0	0
Total	5	26	3	7	2	1

	<u>Total La-da</u> <u>Households</u>	<u>Total Land Leased</u> (in tai chung ti)
	5	2.5
	1	1.0
	24	48.0
	1	3.0
	1	3.5
	4	16.0
	2	10.0
	6	36.0
Total	44	120.0

According to reports by the La-da themselves, they have to labor for the lamasery at least one month a year (as in the case of Chu Mo village). In Pu Yu Lung and Hsun En a La-da has to work three months for his landlord, the lamasery; in Chi Ehr, five months; in Tso-Ou and Se-si-ting, six months; and in Tso-Ou as many as nine months. It must be noted also that even in the same village the work demanded of the La-da is not always the same. With some, only field work is required, while others have to do miscellaneous jobs such as house repairing, water carrying, dung transport, and housework. The amount of field work performed for the lamasery has not been exactly ascertained. But it is safe to assume that, like the Ko-ba or tenant of the secular landlord, it would cover about 5 tai chung ti of land.

The rent burden for the La-da is probably a little lighter than or rather not so heavy as that for Ko-ba. For, if we assume that a La-da cultivates 2.7 tai chung ti for subsistence and 5 tai chung ti for the lamasery, and from this total of 7.7 tai chung ti some 30.8 tai or sacks of grain are harvested, in the same proportion as land cultivated, the lamasery would receive 20 sacks and the La-da 10.8 sacks. In other words, considered in terms of share-rent, the La-da pays a labor rent equivalent to at least 65 percent of the total harvest.

A few lamaseries supply the La-da with food during the field-working days. But in most cases the tenants themselves have to provide food, drink, and fuel. The dung belonging to the lamasery can be used only on the land of the lamasery and is not permitted to be used on the leased land. When a La-da leases in a piece of land larger than is customary he must pay land revenue in addition to the labor rent. In Tso-Ou village, for example, one La-da family leases in six tai chung ti and pays six ton (or half a sack) of grain as revenue.

Sometimes, however, a lamasery is exempted from land payment. In that case the La-da does not have to pay revenue either. Because of this exemption, to which may be added the holding of a rather large land lease, the La-da occasionally becomes well-to-do. In the village of Tso-Ou a La-da household leasing in six tai chung ti can even afford to hire a laborer to do the six months of field work for the lamasery, and the La-da himself is thus free to engage in trading activities. The vast majority of La-da who lease in very little land are naturally deprived of any chance to rise above the subsistence level. Their degree of impoverishment is comparable only with the poorer Ko-bas.

The fourth type of peasant in Sikang is called Ta-du, who, generally speaking, is not attached to any land, either granted or leased. Among the 56 Ta-du households in seven Kantze villages, 41 households, or 73.2 percent, have not held nor leased in any land. The minority of less than 27 percent hold a tiny piece of land in each case. The privilege of using this small land lot is granted either as a temporary leasehold or is given as a temporary gift by a family member or the master household.

In the village of Tso-Ou a certain Ta-du has leased in from a Tse-ba $1/3$ tai chung ti of land, and the annual rent is paid either by a cash payment of three Tibetan dollars or five to six days of labor. Another Ta-du has leased in $1/2$ tai chung ti, and the annual rent is either five Tibetan dollars or fifteen days of labor. These are examples of a temporary land lease. A daughter who cannot get along with her mother and wants to live separately may receive from her mother the use of $1/2$ tai chung ti of land without paying the revenue, which would be paid by the mother. The village headman may give a small piece of land to his servants to use as part of the latter's subsistence. Occasionally there are Ta-du who pay a small amount of land revenue, but their right of land utilization, unlike that of Tse-ba, is never regarded as permanent.

As may be seen from the table below, of the 56 Ta-du households investigated, each holds only 0.33 tai chung ti (0.076 hectare) temporarily. Even among the 15 Ta-du households that hold some land, the average per household holding which is also temporary, is not more than 1.22 tai chung ti (0.28 hectare). Eight of the 15 hold just one tai chung ti (0.23 hectare) each.

Distribution of Cultivated Land Among the Ta-du
(in 7 villages in Kantze, 1940)

<u>Land</u> (in tai chung ti)	<u>No. of Households of Ta-du in Villages</u>						
	<u>Shun-ko</u>	<u>Chi-Ehr</u>	<u>Pu-Yu-Lung</u>	<u>Tso-Ou</u>	<u>Hsun-En</u>	<u>Se-si-ting</u>	<u>Teh-la</u>
0	10	1	5	22	1	1	1
0.3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
0.5	0	0	0	3	0	0	1
1	0	1	0	1	4	2	0
4	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
Total	10	2	5	29	5	3	2
	<u>Total No. of Households</u>		<u>Total Land Area (in tai chung ti)</u>				
	41		0				
	1		0.3				
	4		2				
	8		8				
	2		8				
Total	56		18.3				

Towards the end of Chapter 2, on "Social Structure in Sikang" mention was made of the percentages of four types of Sikang peasants in the 37 villages (1,744 households) investigated in 1940. They are: Tse-ba 75.75 percent, Ko-ba 8 percent, La-da 7.91 percent and Ta-du 8.26 percent. Evidently only 0.8 percent of the population is not of the peasantry. In the same year, another group of nine villages in Kantze (with 548 households) was investigated, showing a larger percentage of the Ta-du. This is not quite representative of the whole province. For Sikang as a whole the distribution of four types of peasants is better shown by the percentages derived from the above-mentioned 37 villages. But for a study of the relation between percentages of households and of land holdings, the statistics of the nine villages, as seen in the following table, are very useful.

Distribution of Land holdings Among Four Types of Peasants
(in 9 villages of Kantze in 1940)

<u>Types of Peasants</u>	<u>Households</u>		<u>Landholdings</u>		<u>Average Landholding per household</u>		
	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>tai chung ti</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>tai chung ti</u>	<u>Hectare</u>	<u>Index</u>
Tse-ba	410	74.82	2,729	93.74	6.66	1.55	100
Ko-ba	38	6.93	44	1.51	1.16	0.27	17
La-da	44	8.03	120	4.12	2.73	0.63	40
Ta-du	56	10.22	18.3	0.63	0.33	0.08	5
Total	548	100.00	2,911.3	100.00	5.31	1.24	—

It is clear that, with the exception of some land belonging to the lamaseries, Tse-ba hold 93.74 percent of the land while all the other types of peasants together hold only 6.26 percent. As in Sikang a single able-bodied person should consume at least 3.13 sacks of oats a year, a family of two 6.26 sacks. (70) To meet this minimum annual family need and to reserve the necessary seed for replanting a harvest of 7.91 sacks is required. (71) As the land revenue takes away at least 25.78 percent of the harvest, a gross crop of 9.95 sacks of oats is required. Allowing one-third of the available land for fallow purposes, four tai chung ti is the minimum necessary for producing anything like 9.95 sacks. Presumably, these four tai chung ti (0.92 hectare) are all under oat cultivation. Should any part of this area be used for raising peas or wheat, then the total production would hardly be adequate to meet the family's annual food requirement.

Therefore, to provide a revenue-paying peasant family its minimum annual food requirement a safe minimum of at least five tai chung ti of land is required for cultivation, with a small fraction of it under fallow. And this estimate deals with a family of two adult persons, i.e., two full units, or their equivalents. In other words, even the smallest family or household should have for its bare food requirements a land-holding of five tai chung ti (1.15 hectare). This of course does not allow for any other expenses of the family during the entire year.

Yet, our statistical table regarding Tse-ba's revenue land shows that 48 percent of the Tse-ba households hold five or less than five tai chung ti of land per household. This simply means that nearly half of the Tse-ba, the common people and peasant, live below the subsistence level. Both La-da and Ko-ba usually do not pay land revenue, and under favorable circumstances they can easily reserve some seed for the next planting; as compared with Tse-ba, they may do with a little less land. But the statistics again appallingly reveal that in the six Kantze villages investigated, 38 out of 44 La-da families, or 86 percent hold 5 or less tai chung ti each.

CHAPTER V

CHINESE AGRARIAN POLICY IN SIKANG

The policy of replacing hereditary tribal chieftains by administrative officials subject to the appointment and dismissal of the Peking Imperial Court did not affect Sikang until 1905. It has been carried out rather extensively throughout the province since 1911. Although it has not fundamentally changed the land system and labor relations in Sikang, certain indelible influences have been wrought upon property rights and tax administration. For an understanding of the present agrarian system such influences must be fully considered.

In the years 1905-07 both Chinese-appointed magistrates and Tu-Sse, the local hereditary rulers, administered affairs in Sikang. When Chao Erh-feng took up his post in 1906 as the Viceroy of the Szechuan-Yunnan Border Regions, the policy was adopted of abolishing all Tu-Sse. Its salient features were confiscation of the private lands of the Tu-Sse, land tax in the form of grain, and new attempts at colonization and land settlement. This policy was carried out in Sikang purely on the strength of Chinese military power, and shortly after was interrupted by the Chinese Revolution.

The confiscation of land began with that belonging to disloyal Tu-Sse, or village headmen. The land held by male and female Tu-Sse who had been held guilty in a revolt or who had committed some criminal offense, was confiscated and returned to government ownership. Seed or seedlings originally taken from these Tu-Sse or headmen were returned to them after the first harvest, but thereafter the land was given to Tse-ba to cultivate and 50 percent of the crop income went to the government. (72) The land thus confiscated was very small in area, and even in Kantze, where a major revolt took place, the land later seized did not total 50 hectares.

As it was found impracticable for the government to collect rent in kind on land so small in area, following the customary practice, labor rent was adopted. Chinese agrarian policy failed to change the existing Sikang land system. Nevertheless it has definitely helped to restrain the Tu-Sse economy and at the same time encourage the growth of Ko-ba management. The very fact that Tu-Sse's land was confiscated tended to undermine the prestige and power of the hereditary chieftains, whose land holdings had already been diminished by grants to their subordinates, the village headmen. Furthermore, Chinese administration was inclined to favor the headmen as against their former rulers. With the decline and disappearance of Tu-Sse, the labor rent paid by Tse-ba also began to decline. The tenancy system as managed by Ko-ba, on the contrary, was becoming more prevalent. These conditions have become dominant factors affecting the distribution of land among the four types of peasants.

Prior to the rule of the Manchu Dynasty the local chieftains in Sikang had been paying annual tribute to the Imperial Court in Central China. More often than not such tribute was not specified as to kind and amount. After the military conquest of Sikang by the Chinese and Manchu troops towards the end of the eighteenth century, however, the annual tribute from each of the Tu-Sse had become definite and specific, comprising both cash tribute and tribute in kind. While the cash meant solid silver, the tribute in kind was invariably a special local product in fixed quantity. The govern-

ment collected this tribute, now referred to as a tax, directly from the Tu-Sse, who in turn requisitioned the same from the people. In fact, it led to a sort of tax farming.

In 1907, after Chao Erh-feng had become the Viceroy, another change in the tax system took place. Instead of the farming system, the government fixed a definite amount of tax that each household was to pay. This was first carried out in Pa Tang, now the district of Pa-An. By order of Chao Erh-feng, "all cultivators, Chinese and non-Chinese, lamas and the common people, must pay a certain amount of their harvest. What is paid to others is rent; what is paid to the government is tax in grain. Land cultivated and yielding harvests may be divided into three grades according to its fertility, but in every case 30 percent of the produce should go to the government." (73)

The 30 percent tax in grain, as first carried out in the districts of Pa-An and Tinghsian, was not based on any actual land registration or land measurement, but rather on a general and rough estimate of the land cultivated by each household. The high tax rate thus levied was intended as punishment by the Viceroy of these two districts which had led the revolt in Sikang a few years before. The tax in other districts was not so high. It varied from 10 to 15 percent, and in many places land fertility was taken into consideration in fixing the tax rate. Generally speaking, tax in grain during this period was about 12 percent of the harvest. (74)

The importance of this new tax system based upon a fixed sum to be paid by each household as introduced by the Chinese administration in 1907, cannot be overemphasized. It was obviously a sudden increase in the tax burden, because of the fact that the percentage rate in reference to harvest, once fixed, was valid and unchangeable for the years to come. The percentage did not refer to any specific current year; it was only instrumental in fixing a definite amount of grain to be paid each year. This tax system soon began to destroy the original communal or tribal social polity, or whatever remained of it. The change from a tribute from the whole community to a fixed and inflexible tax to be paid by each household was thus disastrous and fatal to the old order. The effect was the same as if the cultivators had had to pay a fixed annual rent instead of a flexible share-rent. In bad years, when harvests were not up to the normal, people had to resort to loans in order to meet the tax payment. They were no longer able to give extra-tribute to their old chieftains, nor could they continue to contribute towards the common village treasury.

Furthermore, this new tax system acted as a powerful lever in dislodging the original, fairly equal land distribution. The collection of this tax in grain could not be done directly by the Chinese administrators, the maintenance of whom in sufficient numbers would have been almost prohibitively expensive. It could be done only through the existing headmen of the village. Taking advantage of this situation, the headmen became bolder and bolder in manipulating tax payments to the detriment of the majority of the people. The tax burden began to be increasingly unequal, and tax administration mercilessly aggravated the differentiation of social classes. Just how far the tax burden and its unequal distribution went by 1940 may be seen from the following table.

Tax Burden In Nine Villages
(Kantze, 1940)

<u>Village</u>	<u>Total Harvest</u> (sack of oats of 58.3 liters as the unit)	<u>Total Land Tax</u> (sack of oats as the unit)	<u>% of Tax to Harvest</u>
Shun-ko	881.0	189.6	21.52
Jen-ku	675.5	189.5	28.05
Mi-mo	78.0	13.0	16.67
Chi-ehr	877.5	174.0	19.83
Pu Yu Lung	520.3	254.5	48.91
Tso-Ou	2,143.5	370.5	17.28
Hsun-en	958.7	303.0	31.61
Se Si Ting	521.0	161.5	30.99
Teh-la	353.0	151.0	42.78
Grand Total	7,008.5	1,806.6	
Average			25.78

Inasmuch as the rate of tax in grain is anywhere from 16.67 to 48.91 percent of the harvest, with a general percentage of 25.78 or more than one-fourth of the harvest, the tax burden in Sikang approaches the rent burden in Central China. The inequality of this burden is not only to be found among the various village communities in the same district, but it is also glaringly true as from household to household. In the following table, it should be noted that of the 416 households investigated in the nine villages mentioned above 30 percent pay a tax of less than one-fourth of the harvest; 28 percent pay about one-fourth of the harvest; but the majority, i.e., 42 percent, shoulder a tax burden much higher than one-fourth of the harvest.

Inequality of Tax Burden Among Households
(416 households in 9 villages, Kantze, 1940)

<u>% of Tax to Harvest</u>	<u>% of Paying Households to Total</u>
6.1 to 20	3.13
10.1 to 20	26.44
20.1 to 30	27.89
30.1 to 40	20.43
40.1 to 50	17.55
50.1 to 60	1.68
60.1 to 70	1.68
70.1 to 90	0.48
above 100	0.72

In fact, of these 416 households more than 22 percent pay a tax in grain which is more than 40 percent of the harvest, and about 5 percent pay over half of the harvest.

In the extreme eastern parts of Sikang, between Ya-an and Kongting, Chinese colonization began as early as the latter part of the eighteenth century. But further west, between Kongting and Lihua, it met the stubborn resistance of Tu-Sse and their subjects, who naturally wished to

prevent encroachment on their pastoral lands by outsiders. One more land settlement could only mean to them one piece of grazing ground lost. (75) A serious attempt to introduce a land colonization project in Pa-An (Patang) and Tingshian was proposed in 1906 in connection with the policy of abolishing Tu-Sse. It was not expected that peasants from Yunnan, Kweichow, and Shensi should come as colonists to Sikang, for the distance was too far and the expense too great. (76) Peasants on the Szechuan border were considered to be the prospective colonizers.

As far as can be ascertained, two different colonization projects were initiated. One, formulated by Wu Hsi-cheng, the Revenue Commissioner in Patang, proved to be abortive. The other, as authorized by the Viceroy, Chao Ehr-feng, was carried out in Hsian Cheng (now Tingshian) but lasted only a few years. Wu's project entirely avoided the question of land ownership. It was proposed as a land settlement on government land by hired agricultural laborers. These were to be recruited from Szechuan, where farming technique was considered to be more advanced, and as soon as one hundred of them arrived they were to begin the work of colonization.

From the day of their recruiting the colonists, or hired colonizers, were to be paid three silver taels per month. For every ten of them one cook was to be provided, whose monthly wage was fixed at 2.7 taels. One of every ten colonizers was to be selected as a headman or foreman, with a higher monthly pay of 3.8 taels. In addition to these Chinese peasants, some thirty Chinese soldiers were to be chosen out of the total garrison force of 83 men at Patang, and ten to twenty Kamba village headmen were also to be sent to assist the new land settlement. The Kamba headmen were to receive a monthly stipend of 2.4 taels each, and the soldier-peasants 1.5 taels each. The whole project was a combination of hired labor and military colonization. Owing to political difficulties at the time, it was never authorized by the government. (77)

The other project which was authorized by the Viceroy and actually put into practice was regarded as a part of the political program of abolishing Tu-Sse. "On the new land settlement various alternative procedures are allowed. Those cultivators who are fed by the government and given a regular wage shall not have any share in the harvest, which shall go entirely to the government. If, in the second year, they should subsist on their own food and continue the field work by borrowing seed from the government, then a share-rent shall be paid and the seed returned to the government. The cultivators in this case are allowed to keep half of the harvest, out of which seed must be deducted without interest. In the following year, the third, they shall no longer borrow seed but pay a fixed tax in grain." (78) It was also provided that those colonizers who furnished their own subsistence and their own means of farm production, should be exempt from "tax" payment for the first three years.

Other features of this project were: 1) Colonizers were sent from Szechuan at the government's expense and each was given 15 taels for initial expenses, but those who could refund this allowance were permitted to receive land and to cultivate it as private property. 2) Colonizers were allowed to cultivate land near or adjacent to the government land settlement at their own expense, and within three years the land was to be measured by the government and official deeds issued granting it as private property.

3) Colonizers originally hired on the government land, and who later became its sharecroppers or tenants, were not permitted to own the land. They were to be regarded as permanent tenants, who could be expelled or evicted if they should commit a criminal offense. (4) Colonizers were not confined to the Chinese; any married but landless Kamba upon petition might obtain the same opportunity of work and attendant privileges.

Although private land ownership was thus introduced along with this colonization project, the main agrarian policy as advocated and carried out by Chao Ehr-feng in the beginning of the twentieth century was intended to preserve state ownership of land. All the land of Sikang was in fact declared to be owned by the Imperial House, representing the state. Permanent tenancy was encouraged, but, with few exceptions, the sale and purchase of land was forbidden. (79) Chinese soldiers at Patang were engaged in buying and selling land, at a maximum of 50 to 100 mu at one time; but this also was forbidden by a subsequent order of the Viceroy.

In spite of the great enthusiasm for colonization on the part of the Viceroy, and in spite of the presence of several Japanese agricultural experts engaged by the government, the project was not successful. This was due largely to bad management, shortage of funds, and the reluctance of Chinese peasants to go to distant Sikang, where life is not attractive. The project was finally abandoned in 1912, shortly after the Chinese Revolution and consequent changes in the provincial administration of Szechuan. (80) It lasted a little over four years and in total opened up only 300 mu of land in Patang. As there are ten areas of fertile and cultivable land in this district, consisting of some 50,600 mu, the new land settlements did not go beyond 0.6 percent of this total. As regards other districts, where land is not so fertile and climate not so favorable, practically no colonization project has ever been attempted.

Since 1912 political confusion and administrative chaos have rendered colonization policy quite impossible. In fact, there has been a tendency among the peasants to abandon the land. The only successful new land settlements in Sikang in recent years have been directed and managed by the Catholic missions. They have opened up 400 or more mu of land in Kongting, the provincial capital. In Luting, just southeast of Kongting, they have opened up more than 10,000 mu. The Catholics have also opened up new lands to the north, in the districts of Tanpa, Taofu, and Luhow, and to the west, particularly in Pa-an and Yentsin. Catholic missions in Sikang have become large landlords. They bought land with cash from the Tu-sse, their tenants are all Chinese peasants, and the rent collected is in grain.

The colonization record of the Catholic missions clearly indicates that for the future development of agriculture and mining, the settlement of the questions of land, must be a prerequisite. In this connection it will be interesting and instructive to examine briefly the proposals made in 1940 by the Sikang Provincial Government. These may be summarized as follows: (1) All cultivable and uncultivated land together with forests are to be nationalized. (2) All pastoral land is to be the common property of the people engaged in cattle grazing. (3) All Tse-ba and the land they cultivate are to be controlled by the government. (4) All land opened up by colonizers at their own expense and

continued under cultivation for more than twenty years shall become the private property of the colonizers. 5) Public or State land may be worked by peasants to be recruited according to government regulations, and such newly opened land shall be subject to tax payment after the first three years. 6) Land cultivable but uncultivated and belonging to Tu-Sse may be sold to colonizers for cultivation, or may be purchased by the government at a minimum price, to be worked later by colonizers. 7) All cultivable and uncultivated land shall be subject to a tax which is to increase in rate each year. 8) A maximum limit shall be set for any private ownership of land, thus preventing the peril of landlordism.

Of the above mentioned items, the first, third and fifth are apparently the continuation of Chao Ehr peng's colonization project. The proposals were prompted by a colonizing policy. Both nationalized land and private land are allowed to co-exist. But land property rights of any of the four types of Sikang peasants are not fully defined. Indeed, this set of proposals reveals certain opportunistic and contradictory features. On the one hand the lands of the tribe and of the Tu-Sse are supposed to be nationalized while on the other, colonizers may pay a land price and enjoy private ownership.

Under the backward economic conditions of Sikang, it would be much easier to introduce private land ownership rather than nationalize the land with some degree of effectiveness. In a book entitled Bird's Eye View of Sikang, compiled by the provincial government, difficulties of land nationalization have been frankly admitted. The authorities in Kongting pointed out two distinct trends in land policy: the first towards nationalization, and the second towards private ownership. It was openly stated that the first, though more thoroughgoing, must confront almost insuperable obstacles. (81)

Each of these two developments consists of two steps. The first step towards nationalization is to give the uncultivated land nominally under the Tu-Sse or headmen to colonizers from outside; no part of this land to be given to a non-cultivator. The second step is to declare land nationalization when Chinese colonizers have come in sufficient number. Cultivators thus become permanent tenants of the State, and land shall not be subject to any business transaction. As to the policy of establishing private ownership, the first step is to recognize the private ownership of the cultivated land of the temples, the Tu-Sse and the headmen, and for the government to buy up all uncultivated land at a low price. This government land shall be given to Chinese colonizers, who later may buy the land and become its owner. The second step is to discourage landlordism by introducing a progressive tax on the larger landlords and by forbidding any land transfer to non-cultivators. The aim is to see all tillers become the owners of the land they till, as their permanent property.

Apparently the prerequisite to an extensive establishment of private land ownership in Sikang is the presence of a large number of Chinese colonizers. Here, the difficulties of communication, of acquiring adequate funds, and of maintaining good mutual relations with the Kamba are real enough. That is why to date not much private land property has been established through colonization projects. At any rate the projects carried out so far have been very limited, and have in no way brought about a fundamental change in Sikang's agrarian set-up.

The land problem here is not a simple and physical one, it is woven deeply into the local social and economic fabric. The solution of this problem depends much upon the change in social structure. What is the essence of social structure? It is manifested in the relationship between one group of people and another. In Sikang the bed-rock of this relationship is to be found in a special labor system called in the Manchu language ula. It is actually a system of exacting unpaid labor, and is similar to what was known as corvée in Europe during the Middle Ages. It is the keystone of Sikang's agrarian structure. Without its abolishment there is no possibility of agrarian reform.

CHAPTER VI

ULA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Very recently A. T. Steele reported in the New York Herald-Tribune that in Portuguese West Africa forced labor (ula) was commonly practiced on roads and public works. "When an Angola plantation owner requires labor, he notifies the government of his needs. The demand is passed down to village chiefs, who are ordered to supply fixed quotas of laborers from their communities. If the required number is not forthcoming, police are sent to round them up." (82) This is true also in China, especially in the western borderland which comprises Sikang, Tibet, Sinkiang and parts of Szechuan and Yunnan. The system must have originated in the slave society and persisted throughout the proto-feudal and feudal societies. But while in eastern China corvée often accompanies the paid labor, ula permeates the entire labor relationship in Sikang.

It is safe to say that ula is the dominant and controlling factor in the feudalistic structure of this province. The relationship between the chieftain and Tse-ba is built on ula; so is that between the chieftain, the chei-tsong and the wealthy Tse-ba on the one hand, and the Ko-ba on the other; so is the relationship between the lamasery and the La-da. In fact, ula is not limited to labor relations, it also includes requisitions in kind. It is, in fact, an all-inclusive tax or exaction system, legalized by customary law.

The Chinese historical records show that the ula system flourished during the early Chow Dynasty in Central China. During this period, from the tenth to the fourth century B.C., each household had to perform ula three days of the year in a good harvesting year; two days if the harvest had not been so good; and one day in a bad harvesting year. In the Han Dynasty, from the second century B.C. to the second century A.D., people had to pay both corvée and tribute, but corvée was sometimes substituted by payment in money. In the Sung Dynasty, from the eleventh to the thirteenth century, corvée was performed chiefly in water works or canal repair, but sometimes substituted by tribute in rice, silk or cloth.

In Central China the form of corvée as a regular tax or tribute system, i.e. as ula, was legally abolished in 1581, towards the end of the Ming Dynasty. In that year by Imperial decree both corvée labor and tribute in kind were incorporated as a land tax based on the size of land ownership and fertility of the land. Nevertheless, a remnant of the corvée system is to be found in almost every province of China. (83) The decree of 1581 was made possible because of the ability of the peasantry to pay money and in kind, and this because of private peasant ownership of land. Since then corvée in central China has been taken out of the regular tax system, but has been utilized for military purposes and irrigation works not confined to one definite locality. In Sikang and the western borderland private peasant ownership of land is not prevalent and therefore the corvée, or ula, remains the basic and regular "tax" system, with all its social and political ramifications.

Though ula is a Manchu word, ula had been practiced in Sikang long before the Manchu conquest, at least as early as the power of the local chieftain. It still prevails in Tibet where there has never been any extensive Manchu military conquest. Both in Tibet and Sikang the domain of the chieftain, or Tu-Sse, forms the basis of the ula system and does not extend beyond that territory. This indigenous forced labor, however, was greatly intensified and made much more rigid than ever before by the military requisition of the Manchu Imperial troops. The original flexibility and leniency disappeared completely. The burden was suddenly increased by a double basis of imposition. While the O-ba requisitioned the ula in labor and in kind on a household basis, the Imperial rulers collected from the O-ba on the basis of land ownership and livestock ownership.

In the ula regulations promulgated in 1901 by Viceroy Chao Erh-feng there were six points. 1) Ula requisition was exacted according to the scale of land tax. Those who paid less than a minimum tax were exempt from ula. Ula was required in a progressive rate as the land-tax scale went up, from one laborer to two laborers from each household, and then usually from one to two horses from each landowner. (Article 12) 2) Though by custom female laborers were often sent to meet ula exactions, it was expected that no person, male or female, should be taken who was under 15 or above 50 years of age. (Article 13). 3) Those households that owned no land but possessed livestock were required to meet ula also in a progressive scale. Those who kept 10 head of horses or cattle paid one horse as ula, and for each additional two head, an additional half an ula unit was exacted. Those who kept less than 10 head paid in labor (Article 14). 4) Owners of 100 sheep paid one horse each as ula, and for each additional 50 sheep an additional ula unit. Those who kept fewer than 100 sheep paid in labor (Article 15). 5) Households that owned both land and livestock had to meet the combined requirements for ula (Article 16) 6) Ten horses, or ten ula units, were fixed as the maximum requirement (Article 17).

Chao Erh-feng enforced these regulations with vigor and rigidity. Decapitation and cutting off ears were frequently the penalties for those who failed to comply with ula requirements. This of course set the entire land boiling with bitter resentment and activities which might have led to revolts. By way of appeasement Chao issued another decree in 1911 which forbade ula and introduced the hired-labor system in all places where the Tu-Sse had already been legally abolished, and magistrates appointed in their place. The Kamba and the Chinese were to be treated equally and in no case was the hiring of laborers for transport and other works to be compulsory. Any violation of this decree could be brought to the attention of the viceroy. Such reform, as it was not based on any real political force, naturally existed only on paper and was not enforced. In many cases, no doubt, some slight payment was made to ula in labor. Nevertheless there has been no essential change in the nature of ula, and ula as a system still prevails in Sikang.

There are no less than ten kinds of ula in Sikang. First there is the ula of transport animals, including horses, bullocks, and donkeys, to be furnished by those households possessing these animals. Those who do not have them substitute with their labor. Often women are required in the absence of men, but in such cases women may perform some other kind of ula, of which they are capable. Unless someone from the same village can look after the ula animals for them, the ula wa, or those who meet this

ula, have to follow the animals, sometimes for a day but often for three or four days before they return home. The ula wa have to equip the animals either for riding or for drafting purposes. They feed their own animals along the way, usually wheat and other cheap provision. A nominal fee is usually paid to the ula wa, but this is so little that it repays merely a fraction of the cost to the household. All officials (Chinese) and troops are entitled to requisition such ula. Even merchants (again Chinese), who usually have connections with the administration may obtain this forced labor of animals.

Second, there is the ula of fuel and cooking in all administrative offices, custom-houses, and inns where traveling officials and marching troops stop over. As there are no such categories of workers, as cooks or even house servants, all services which normally would be expected from them are requisitioned from all households. This form of ula is performed by women, usually of the poorest Tse-ba households. They purvey water from creeks in the canyon and fuel or cow dung from their own homes. For this kind of ula they often receive a tiny fee, so small that the O-ba who supervise the work do not even bother to "squeeze" from it.

Third, there is the ula of police and guardsman, who are also used for collecting revenues, which is met by those who have some knowledge of the Chinese language. While performing this kind of ula the ula wa receive neither pay nor food. They are of course given the chance to requisition some of their needs from the common people, and also are exempt from all other kinds of ula. They become the watchmen of the magistrate's office, the convoy of official transport and travel, and the land-tax collectors in some cases. A magistrate may have twenty to thirty such guardsmen, each of them serving one month or one year by rotation.

Fourth, there is the ula of prison guards throughout the day and night. As the guardsmen of the magistrate's office serve by rotation, other Tse-ba are required to perform the work of prison guards. Often women are drafted to meet this kind of ula. Fifth, there is the ula of baking and milling oats and of making wheat flour. Although this is not a regularly required ula and no payment whatever is attached to it, it is performed wherever and whenever a considerable number of officials or troops happen to pass by. Sixth, there is the ula of ferry service. The Tse-ba families perform this ula with their own boats. Except for the transportation of herds and large-scale commodities, this ferry service does not command a fee. The ula wa in this case do receive a little income, but more important to them is the fact that they are thereby exempt from all other forms of ula.

Seventh, there is the ula of school attendance, which is unique in character but rather common to all parts of China's western borderland. The Chinese administration has instituted compulsory school attendance where Chinese is taught to the non-Chinese population. Since this can only be enforced against the wish of the local people, each village puts up the money to secure the number of required students for regular school attendance. It therefore becomes a kind of ula which falls equally on every household. As a matter of educational promotion, the Chinese administration exempts from other forms of ula all households whose members attend schools for the learning of the Chinese language.

Eighth, there is the ula of occasional menial labor, such as road building, road repair, bridge repair, house construction, etc. as there is hardly any hired labor in Sikang. Ninth, there is the ula of working for the local chieftain, such as performing field work on his land, building his houses, managing his business activity, attending his household work, etc. This kind of ula is regular. Tenth and finally, there is the requisition in kind (fodder, fuel, timber, butter, cloth and saddle, etc.) by the local chieftain, all of which must be carried or transported by the ula wa themselves without compensation. These requisitions are the products of labor, plus the labor of transport, and therefore constitute a definite kind of ula.

The methods of enforcing ula are subject to local variations. In general, however, the 1901 ula regulations fixed by Viceroy Chao Erh-feng were disregarded. Horses and bullocks have been requisitioned without a fixed rate and on the household basis. Of all kinds of ula, the largest quota is that of horses. The new village officer, Pao Cheng, after the Chinese fashion, supervises the O-ba in all the ula administration; and through the Pao Cheng anything requisitioned is passed on to the magistrate's office. Then, by as good as customary law, the Pao Cheng, the O-ba, and even the rich Tse-ba are exempted from ula. Finally, the more corrupt the ula administration, the more crushing a burden the people have to bear. The following example of Kantze will serve for an illustration.

Whereas in 1935 the Kantze quota of ula was 621 persons, 927 riding horses and 1,652 bullocks, it increased in 1940 to 2,382 horses and 1,974 bullocks accompanied by presumably the same number of persons. Even according to the 1935 figures, they represented 9.7 percent of the total population, 71.2 percent of the bullocks, and as many as 82 percent of the horses.

In the district of Kantze the 22 villages of Kungse and Mashu tribal territories have now a central ula office. Here are stationed the O-ba of all the villages by a system of monthly rotation, the O-ba of eight villages attending at a time. The most important function is to administer the horse ula. Whenever the magistrate's office decides to call in this kind of ula, the interpreter takes an order written in Chinese to the ula office, with specifications as to the date and number of horses needed. This order is filled by the O-ba, who know how to make the village and household requisitions.

Those Tse-ba households that are notified of the horse requisition bring their horses to the courtyard of the Pao Cheng. All the ula payments are made in Pao Cheng's yard, and cow dung, fodder, dry wood fuel, hens, etc. are brought in from early dawn till noon, mostly by women. From Pao Cheng's yard, the ula objects are either despatched to the army, to the magistrate's office, to designated households, or they remain for periodic delivery.

The assistants of Pao Cheng register the deliveries in their ula book. This book provides an excellent record for the study of the subject of ula. Made of rough indigenous paper, the ula book is as large as 8 by 25 inches. Registration is classified by villages and then by households with the names of family chiefs. With the name of each house-

hold, different signs are entered to show how much and what kind of ula that household has already paid. An ula book for December 1940, for instance, has 14 different signs, of which five are letters and nine are signs. The five letters, pronounced in Tibetan, are go-ar meaning eggs, dro meaning leather bag, taba meaning rope, solo meaning scythe, and igo meaning grass beater. The nine signs stand for nine kinds of ula: 1) ㄣ for mi-the, meaning labor; 2) X for da, meaning horse; 3) 5 for zarlu, meaning sheep or goat; 4) 2 for sha, meaning chicken or hen; 5) 0 for zā-shā, meaning wild barley; 6) Q for zā-ō, meaning fresh fodder grass; 7) 6 for gābosi, meaning dry wood fuel; 8) ~~#####~~ for sin, meaning twigs or cow dung; and 9) T for su-bo, meaning cloth bag.

One of the ordinary households during a nine-month period in 1940 gave the following as ula: ten days' labor, the use of a horse 26 times, one sheep, three chickens, 18 eggs, one-time use of a leather bag, one-time use of rope, one-time use of scythe, one-time use of grass beater, one time use of a cloth bag, four loads of wild barley, 23 loads of dry wood fuel, 120 loads of twigs and cow dung, and 18 loads of fresh fodder grass.

The requisition of these kinds of ula is made by rotation with a view to equalizing the burden. Nevertheless, the total burden, and therefore the share of it, is almost unlimited. There is no fixed amount announced in advance, contrary to the regulations of Chao Erh-feng. Instead of limiting the ula service, the actual practice is to meet the unlimited demand by a fixed unit and by rotation of households. Such kinds of ula as fodder, fuel, chicken, eggs and sheep are of course consumed and never recovered. The use of horse, bags, rope, scythe and grass beater is by way of lease without compensation. As to cooking and housekeeping services, they are so common and so frequent that the Pao Cheng's office does not even bother to register them.

The real burden of ula can easily be seen, however, from the use of horses alone. If as in Kantze one ordinary household furnishes the use of a horse 26 times in nine months, it would amount to something like 35 times in a year. Thus, the eleven villages of Kungse, with 358 households subject to ula service, must have provided during 1940 12,530 horse-days. Accordingly, as there were 2,382 horses in the entire district of Kantze, in 1940, the horse ula must have totaled more than 60,000 days in that year. Yet 1940 was a peaceful year. In years of military campaigns the horse ula is bound to be very much higher and its burden far more crushing.

In nomadic areas, where there are very few settled households, if any at all, ula is requisitioned not by rotation of households but by lump sum payment by each tribe or group in money or animals or other ula in kind. It is significant that both the nomadic and agricultural population of Sikang do not give ula on the basis of land ownership or cattle ownership, but on the basis of households or tribal units. The Chinese viceroy attempted to get ula in the same way that Chinese land tax is collected, but this attempt failed utterly. In Sikang today there is a two-strata administration, therefore in actuality a two-type revenue system. In addition to the land-based land tax, the people have to give ula by rotation among all ula-serving households.

Some of the influential Tse-ba households do not pay ula at all. Of

the 509 households in the eleven villages of Kungse, as many as 119 households, representing some 23 percent of the total population, are exempt from ula. Most of these exemptions are granted to wealthy and powerful households, and not to the poor that have not the means to give at all. There is practically no Chinese household giving ula; a Chinese household either sends a member to school to learn Chinese or hires someone to attend it, and in either case is exempted from giving ula by law.

In addition to the ula which the Tse-ba are obliged to give to the Chinese administration, there is the ula which they must give to their chieftains or Tu-sse, as well as to their high lamas. Tse-ba households by rotation furnish all the household labor for the Tu-sse, and whenever the high lamas travel they automatically draft the services of the common people. The whole village pays fuel and fodder to the chieftain during the winter, and butter, beef or mutton as annual tribute. Whenever the chieftain builds, cultivates land, or engages in trade, he may freely requisition the labor of the people. In times of war or of military defense or of emergency, the people are subject to their chieftain's call, and are enlisted with their own weapons, horses and even food.

It is clear that after paying so much ula to the Chinese administration, the Tse-ba hardly have sufficient to meet the ula of their own tribe or community. Generally speaking, therefore, wherever the chieftains are not strong and powerful, then the ula to the new Chinese officers becomes predominant. Conversely, wherever the chieftains are still powerful, the ula given to the high lamas and chieftains claims the major portion. Often the tribal and feudal forces are of comparatively equal strength and this double or two-edged exploitation easily exhausts the local supply of labor and products. In such a case, either the district magistrate's office or the local chieftain will impose a requisition of money in lieu of service or goods. In the district of Tehke, for example, the requisitions levied by the chieftains of sheep, gunpowder and ink for printing holy scriptures are now paid in the form of money. In other districts, even the land tax in kind is now collected in money. In Sikang, naturally, money ula is the most oppressive burden to the people, as money is relatively scarce and difficult to obtain.

Multiple forms of corruption further intensify the burden of ula. In connection with the horse ula, for example, there are corrupt practices in requisitioning, in receiving, and finally in the use of the horses. Whatever little compensation is allowed by the government to the owners of the horses is often pocketed by the village headmen, who pretend to be holding it for larger and more urgent requisitions. But later, when such occasions arise new requisitions are made from the same Tse-ba. In many cases the headmen just pocket the major portion of the government compensation, while in the meantime they illegally increase the amount of ula or force the Tse-ba to pay in money instead of in the use of horses. There is, further, manipulation in the exchange of local Tibetan and Chinese currency.

At the end of horse ula, when the owners are ready to recover their horses and to start the homeward journey, they are often deliberately delayed by the village headmen or the Pao Cheng, who invite bribery. There are various forms of corrupt use of horses. Chinese officials requisition horses officially for government use but in reality to give service to commercial transport. The Chinese merchants bribe the bureaucrats but pay no compensation to the horse owners. They pay very cheaply for the

transport and are thus able, besides, to pass the customs stations without paying transit duty. Often Chinese officials are themselves engaged in trading and abuse the horse ula for their own personal gain.

The Kamba in Sikang have to rely on their horses and other animals for their livelihood and therefore regard them as their most valuable material possession. When they give their animals for ula, they follow and look after them, providing their own food and fodder. In the night, by the road side, they sleep alongside their animals. The life of the ula wa is one of difficulties and privation. Often during the ula service the ula wa lose their personal property, are taken ill, and more frequently are beaten and insulted. No sooner do they reach home after the first ula, than they must leave for the next one. In this way home life is completely disrupted. When there is no young able-bodied man in the house to meet the ula, girls are sent as ula wa for short journeys. In places where ula is unusually heavy, people have fled en masse. In 1939, for example, in a village called Ehr-pa, in the district of Chuan-hua, one-third of all the households migrated to a distant place in order to avoid the ula. It is significant, however, that the decrease in population only tends to increase the ula burden per household, as there is no reduction of requisition on the part of the administration.

Recently two attempts have been made to substitute the horse ula by a modern institution, but both have proved to be a failure. The Sikang provincial government once set up a government-owned and government-managed animal transport service. In this case the Kamba hired to look after the horses and bullocks did not show the same concern as for their own stock and failed to keep them in a healthy condition. Later, Chinese were hired and a transport corporation was organized. But as they had had little expert knowledge in the handling of such animals, this attempt likewise proved a failure. For the present, therefore, ula is still preserved as the only successful means of organizing transport and communication.

The consequences of ula are not limited to loss of human and animal labor to the Kamba peasants. The entire social structure has been deeply penetrated by the ula system, which has served to preserve the existing agrarian system. As the power of distributing the use of land rests with the chieftains and headmen, they alone have the power to requisition the use of labor and animal labor. There is, therefore, scarcely any hired labor to speak of. The peasants are serfs fastened to the land and dependent upon it for their very subsistence. On the other hand, the lack of hired labor has perpetuated the ula system. Needless to say, this form of cheap, even costless, labor power tends to be preserved by the local rulers. Thus it is clear that in this vicious circle, land and ula are closely interwoven and together form the base of Kamba social policy.

It is also clear that, since the use of land is regarded as a reward for ula service rendered or to be rendered, the cultivated land for each household, with the exception of a few powerful families, can be only the minimum for maintaining a bare subsistence. With the extra time and labor consumed by ula none whatever remains for enlarging the farm and increasing production in any way. Ula, then, demonstrably and concretely, prevents agricultural improvement and even reduces the productivity of the small farming economy. As a further consequence of ula, the number of people in

each household is kept at a minimum. Family members whom the household cannot afford to feed have had to become lammas or roving herdsmen. Polyandry and sometimes polygamy have resulted, and a large number of widows and widowers are to be found in almost any Kamba community. Sikang is conspicuous for its sparse population.

Hand industry, which is the home industry of the farming households in Sikang, is directly affected by the ula requisition of its products and indirectly also by the labor taken away by ula. Hard as it might be for the local hand industry to compete with industrial imports from or by way of Tibet and India, the ula system simply proclaims its death knell. Furthermore, as the Kamba have very little or no labor power, and no agricultural or handicraft goods to sell, money is scarce and a barter system prevails. Whatever trade exists is conducted by the headmen, the lamaseries and Chinese merchants. This backwardness in money economy also in its turn tends to preserve the ula system.

In many ways ula has become also a factor in social-economic change. The impoverishment of certain Tse-ba, the exemption from ula of others, and the enrichment of certain chieftains and village headmen through corrupt practices, have all worked towards deepening social stratification. The general tendency has been the shifting of the exploiting group from the Chieftains to the Chei-tsong and wealthy Tse-ba. Had these people, that is, the Chei-tsong and the wealthy Tse-ba, not had real power over the use of agricultural land, then they would have used their accumulated wealth to develop private land property and handicraft workshops and a free hired-labor market. Unfortunately, however, as they are the people who control the use of land, and derive their fortune from the ula, usury and usurious trading, all of which are based upon land, they have naturally resisted attempts to abolish the ula system.

To bring an end to the ula system it would be necessary to take political power out of the hands of the chieftains, the Chei-tsong and some of the wealthy Tse-ba. But a prerequisite to this would be the abandonment of ula by Chinese bureaucrats in Sikang. The prime move must now come from outside of Kamba society. Past history has proven, however, that Chinese rule over the province has only intensified ula and thus increased the sufferings of the Kamba. Viceroy Chao Erh-feng, in fixing ula requisition, bestowed upon the Chei-tsong and the well-to-do Tse-ba a new administrative power, on the basis of which they have enriched themselves. The vast majority of Tse-ba, the common people, have been further impoverished by this superstructure of Chinese bureaucracy.

CHAPTER VII

LABOR AND AGRICULTURE

In an early form of feudalistic social structure and agrarian system, superimposed by a Chinese exploitative policy, what is the social and economic productivity potential of Sikang? This may be answered by the following brief analysis of both labor and agricultural conditions, i.e. conditions of work and methods of farming, the two most important phases of production in this region.

A factor of prime importance in the study of labor conditions in Sikang is its sparse population. Whereas in central China the usual number of people in a household or family is four to six, in Sikang it is only two to three. As may be seen from the following table, of the 548 households in Kantze, the average number of persons per household is about three.

Nine Villages in Kantze
(1940)

	<u>Tse-ba</u>	<u>Ko-ba</u>	<u>La-da</u>	<u>Ta-du</u>	<u>Total</u>
Population	1,395	79	122	105	1,701
Households	410	38	44	56	548
Average per household	3.40	2.08	2.77	1.88	3.10

The average number of working people in each household is even less and in the nine villages of Kantze it is only about two, as described below.

	<u>Tse-ba</u>	<u>Ko-ba</u>	<u>La-da</u>	<u>Ta-du</u>	<u>Total</u>
Working people	911	64	78	87	1,140
Households	410	38	44	56	548
Average per household	2.2	1.7	1.8	1.6	2.1

Still more significant is the comparative labor strength, as shown in the following table, among the four types of peasants.

Comparative Labor Power Among Peasants
(Kantze, Nine villages, 1940)

Working people in each household	<u>Tse-ba</u>		<u>Ko-ba</u>		<u>La-da</u>		<u>Ta-du</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	No. of Households	%	No. of Households	%	No. of Households	%	No. of Households	%	No. of Households	%
0	2	0.49							2	0.37
1	50	12.20	14	36.84	16	36.36	30	53.57	110	20.07
2	246	60.00	22	57.90	22	50.00	21	37.50	311	56.75
3	87	21.22	2	5.26	6	13.64	5	8.93	100	18.25
4	18	4.39	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	3.29
5	6	1.46	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	1.09
6	1	0.24	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	0.18
Total	410	100.00	38	100.00	44	100.00	56	100.00	548	100.00

These figures reveal that 12.2 percent of Tse-ba households, 36.84 percent of Koba households, 36.36 percent of La-da households, and 53.57 percent of Ta-du households have one person in each household performing some kind of work. Here we see a definite correlation between poverty and labor power; the degree of economic status and the availability of labor go hand in hand.

Working people, in the above table, include both old men and women as well as very young boys and girls. Only the disabled, the lamas who are in distant places, and the idle members of the most wealthy households have been excluded. Yet, even including the elders and children, not more than 60 percent of the Tse-ba households, 58 percent of the Ko-ba households, and 50 percent of the La-da households have two working people each. As for the Ta-du households, nearly 54 percent have only one person working for each household. In short, as many as 77 percent of all households in the nine villages surveyed have only two or less than two people working. It is not difficult to understand, then, that the labor scarcity in Sikang hardly meets the demands of ula and is insufficient to maintain the present scale of production, let alone any prospect of agricultural improvement.

Sikang's scarce population is reflected in the large percentage of unmarried people. In the nine villages of Shun-ko, Jen-ku, Chu-mo, Chi-jui, Pu-Yu-lung, Tso-ou, Hsun-en, Se-si-ting, and Teh-la, of the total of 544 households investigated, 39.53 percent have no married couples. Of these, unmarried women comprise 80.93 percent and unmarried men 19.07 percent. Of the married women in 45.59 percent of cases, the husbands live in their wives' households, a remnant of the matriarchal system, and also because female labor is generally the dominant form in Sikang. The number of unmarried women and married women who have brought their husbands into their own households comprise 59.56 percent of the 544 households investigated.

Among the four types of peasant households, the Tse-ba and La-da are superior economically to the Ko-ba and Ta-du. This is reflected also in the matter of matrimonial relations. While 68.30 percent of the Tse-ba and 45.48 percent of the La-da households have married couples, only 34.54 percent of the Ta-du and 31.58 percent of the Ko-ba have the same status. Again, while 31.20 percent of the Tse-ba and 20.48 percent of the La-da households have sons-in-law this is true of only 15.79 percent of the Ko-ba and 14.54 percent of the Ta-du households. Since female labor is the broadest basis of all labor in Sikang including field work, and since only a well-to-do household can afford to take in a husband, it results in the fact that while only 22.36 percent of the Tse-ba households and 50 percent of the La-da have no husbands, as many as 63.64 percent of the Ta-du and 68.42 percent of the Ko-ba households have only unmarried women.

Of the total of 548 households in the same nine villages, 97 households have lamas totaling 111 persons, and of these 79.2 percent are male and 21.8 percent female. Of the total population of 1,701, male and female lamas claim 5.52. Of the 111 lamas, only 23 frequently return home to help in the household's labors, and 14 contribute an annual subsidy to their households of anywhere from 6 to 320 Tibetan dollars. Poor lamas remain poor, while the rich lamas engage in trade and make money in the lamasery. The more well-to-do the households, the larger the

number of lamas that leave the village for the lamasery. Thus while only 1.9 percent of the Ta-du and 3.8 percent of the Ko-ba have sent lamas from their households about 4 percent of the La-da and over 7 percent of the Tse-ba households have sent lamas of both sexes.

There is also a definite relation between the ula demands and the status of lamas. Wherever ula services are relatively light, poor households can afford to send members to the lamasery, from whom alms and donations may be expected. On the other hand, wherever ula demands are heavy, very few households can afford to send out a lama, and when the entire community suffers under severe requisitions, even lamas themselves are impoverished. It is clear that the Tse-ba households can usually send more people into the lamasery, because they can better spare their members from home labor. Every Tse-ba household seeks to send a member into the lamasery, the more well-to-do because it is ambitious to gain economic and political power through the lamasery system, and poor Tse-ba, because it hopes to receive a subsidy from its lama member. Under the ula system the lamasery has virtually become a reservoir of labor power. To be sure, this form of labor reservoir blocks all possibilities of free professional development.

Because of the increasing demands of ula labor, however, the number of lamas, both male and female, has been rapidly on the decline. In the early eighteenth century there had been many more lamas than there are at present.

No. of Lamas in the 18th Century (84)

Place	No. of Households	No. of Lamas
Changtu	7,635	4,500
Pai'An	6,920	2,110
Li Hwa	5,320	3,270
Mao-Ya, Cho-teng, etc. (5 tribes)	6,529	3,849
	<hr/> 26,404	<hr/> 13,729

Two hundred years ago each household sent an approximate average of two persons to the lamaseries, but today it takes five households to send one lama, male or female. Whereas in the earlier period the lamas did not have to participate at all in any of the housework or ula services, today most of the lamas have to return to their homes frequently to share the burden of labor as well as of ula.

In Sikang hired labor as a system is not yet well developed. Among the 548 households of Kantze, for example, 16.42 percent occasionally hire out their labor power; and 7.48 percent at one time or another hire in either an annual laborer or some seasonal or day laborers. Labor help outside of the family usually takes the form of labor exchange or a labor pool among several households. As may be seen from the following table, the hiring households are practically limited to the Tse-ba and La-da. The other types of peasants have no means of hiring labor, on the contrary they are sometimes obliged to hire themselves out for wages.

Labor Relations in Kantze
(9 villages, 1940)

<u>Peasant</u>	<u>Households hiring labor for field work</u>	<u>Households earning wages</u>
Tse-ba	38	44
Ko-ba		12
La-da	2	10
Ta-du	1 (85)	24
Total	41	90
% of 548 households	7.48	16.42

It may also be noted that 4.5 percent of the La-da and 9.3 percent of the Tse-ba hire laborers. But while 10.7 percent of the Tse-ba hire themselves out, as many as 22.7 percent of the La-da have to earn wages. Both the Ke-ba and the Ta-du rarely hire laborers, but 31.6 percent of the former and 42.8 percent of the latter hire themselves out. Though both have more labor power available for hiring, yet their employment is limited by the labor market which is not fully developed. In 1940, the annual wage of a yearly laborer on the farm in Kantze was 40 to 50 Tibetan dollars, plus daily food, one woolen coat, two shirts and two pairs of shoes. It is clear that the major portion of the annual wage is paid in kind. Day laborers are paid one Tibetan dollar a day in theory, but in practice it takes the form of food: either 1.7 kilograms of salt, or about 5 bowls of oat flour, or 4 bowls of coarse noodles. Very often both seasonal and annual laborers are paid nothing more than their daily food. In many instances, employment is offered as charity and relief. The purely economic labor market is very limited indeed.

Caught between the lack of a developed labor market and the constant pressure of poverty, indebtedness and ula, some of the Tse-ba, and many more of other types of peasants have had to migrate or rather flee to distant places. Within five years, 1935-40, no less than 200 households of the 1,521 households in 37 villages in Kantze, or 13.08 percent of the total number of the Tse-ba, deserted their home villages. In eleven villages of Kungse, within only two years, 1937-38, some 22.9 percent of the Tse-ba households emigrated. The total number being thus reduced from 660 to 509 households in that short period. Once they have left their villages, these Tse-ba are unable to maintain their original economic position and descend to the status of Ko-ba or Ta-du, or sometimes even roving nomads.

Just as there is a scarcity of real productive labor power so also animal labor or draft animals are lacking. In 37 villages of Kantze, 1,459 households of Tse-ba and La-da require the use of field animals, but 403 of them, or 27.6 percent have to lease them at a fee. Again, the statistics of nine villages show that 54 percent of the total of 548 households have no animal for field work and among these are 42.2 percent of Tse-ba households, 70.45 percent of La-da, 96.43 percent of Ta-du and 100 percent of the Ko-ba households. Of course, the Ta-du holds no land for cultivation and the Ko-ba may use his landlord's animals; but 44.9 percent of the Tse-ba and La-da, who must have animals for the cultivation possess no field animals at all. In other words, nearly 45 percent of the Tse-ba and La-da have to pay for the use of such animals. Yet, in Sikang, generally speaking, a self-sufficient household should have two

ploughing bullocks. A household with only one draft animal therefore has to seek the cooperation of some other household.

The primary cause of this lack of draft animals is small-scale farming. With the very limited income from their small farm the peasant household simply cannot afford to keep two, or indeed even one, draft animal. Whereas in 1935 the price of a bullock was 40 to 60 Tibetan dollars, the cost in 1940 was 120 dollars. This rapid increase in price, accelerated by the ula system and the high death rate of the stock, further hinders the peasants from owning animals.

Draft animals are not leased from the same village but from a distant nomadic community. Subject to conditions of supply and demand, and the transport facilities, animal rent varies widely with different villages. Such rent is usually paid in grain or in money, as both are needed by the herdsmen who own the animals. Animal rent is calculated in one of four ways. 1) The usual and simplest way is to pay according to the number of the animals rented. The minimum is one sack of oats for one rented animal, or the maximum of so many sacks of oats equivalent to 7 to 12 Tibetan dollars per animal. The rent for autumn cultivation is slightly higher than that for the spring. 2) A second way is to pay by the season. Two bullocks are rented for ploughing, and the rent is paid in oats equivalent to 16 to 30 Tibetan dollars. (3) A third way is to pay on the basis of time. Either two Tibetan dollars are paid for one animal for one day, or five Tibetan dollars for two animals for one day. 4) The fourth is to pay rent on the basis of cultivated or ploughed area. For one tai-chung-ti of land, ploughed twice in the year, the rent per animal would be three Tibetan dollars.

Usually one household rents the use of one animal, and cooperates with another household which also rents an animal. Each pays the rent for one animal only, but obtains the help of the other household. Often, in the same village, human labor is exchanged for animal labor. A peasant may work three, four, or even five days in someone else's field, in order to obtain the use of a draft animal on his own land for a day. This exchange of human and animal labor speaks eloquently for the dire labor situation in the entire province.

Ula as a system has apparently created a contradiction in labor relationship. On the one hand, the heavy burden of ula has taken labor power away from productive field work. On the other hand, the uncertainty of ula in respect to time, place, and type of service has crippled and even paralyzed the use of labor power, often creating idle labor. "Why have you this idle time?" you might ask a Sikang peasant. He might reply, "I have just returned from ula and don't know when I will be called to serve again!" "Why don't you cultivate some more land?" you ask him. His answer is, "We have not enough people in the household, and besides, we have no field animal." Then you might ask, "Why don't you hire your labor out?" The usual answer is that there is no employment.

On the surface it would seem that natural and geographic hardships in Sikang have held back the progress of agricultural technique, thus also limiting the employment of labor and skill. Actually, however, it is the feudalistic social structure as manifested by the ula system that

has arrested economic development and hindered the use of free labor. Here we have the primary cause of the backwardness of the agricultural system and of its low and decreasing productivity.

According to Yang Chung-hwa's Sikang in Summary, the arable land amounts to about 40 percent of the total provincial area. Forests, pastures, and barren or snow-covered mountains comprise equally about 60 percent of the land. But only one-fourth of the arable land has been brought under cultivation. Some of the cultivated fields are located along river banks; most of them are in the mountain valleys. The valleys contain the rich alluvial soil washed down from the slopes. In and between these fertile valleys are pastures and forest lands overlooking the cultivated fields. Deforestation has progressed so far that what is now called forest lands are only the remnants of virgin forests. The timber and fuel available here are actually out of reach of the Sikang peasants, who have to use cow dung for fuel. Timber and wood usually fall into the hands of lamaseries and village headmen. In theory, all pastoral and forest lands are public domains free to all. But owing to the vast distances to be traversed and the difficulties of transport, the common peasants can hardly make use of them.

The agricultural land of Sikang is situated on a high plateau. The mountain valleys in Patan are 2,260 meters above sea level, in Pa-an they reach 2,740 meters, in Yakiang, 2,850 meters, in Tao-fu, 2,914 meters and there are rice fields around the city of Yakiang. Agricultural fields in Kantze are more than 3,000 meters above sea level, and in Ning-tsin and other districts the plateaus reach as high as 4,500 meters. But what is most striking to the traveler is the fact that agriculture does not follow the favorable geographic and climatic factors. In some places in Sikang fields extend to the slopes and even into woodland areas. In other places perfectly good agricultural land is abandoned or has never been cultivated. The erstwhile prosperous Ahnganpai, immediately west of Kongting, was very populous and rich in agricultural resources during the eighteenth century. (86) Today it is almost completely deserted, with huge tracts of good land abandoned. Whether this was due to military devastation or to pestilence or to natural calamity has not been ascertained. But as the general cultural and economic levels in Sikang have remained so low, rehabilitation and reconquest of nature without external assistance were obviously difficult, if not impossible.

The most important agricultural products in Sikang are oats, peas, wheat and Yuan-ken. Oat flour mixed in tea is the staple food of Sikang. Peas are an important item in the diet of the poverty-stricken peasants as well as for livestock feed. Pea flour is used also. Wheat is costly and is considered the most luxurious food; it is produced in a limited quantity and is consumed only by high-ranking lamas and the powerful headmen. Yuan-ken, a kind of flatshaped turnip, is an auxiliary item in the poor man's diet. Only recently the variety of leguminous and other vegetables has increased. This is the result of the gardening introduced by the Chinese, who consume most of such produce.

Each farm has its four boundaries marked by stone tablets buried deep in the soil with only a small portion appearing above the ground. Each farm is ploughed in a direction different from that of its neighboring farms; thus the fields after ploughing graphically show the farm boundaries.

There is a fallow system in Sikang, usually with three crops in rotation. In the village of Shun-ko in Kantze, for example, the common practice is to have 2/6 of the farm under fallow, and of the three rotating crops oat occupies 2/6, pea and wheat each 1/6 of the farm. But the size of fallow land and areas of the various crops vary not only from village to village but even among the households of the same village, as each household has its own labor problem to solve, especially in face of the demands of ula.

Of the 36 villages in Kantze investigated in this particular regard, no less than 12 of them have no fallow land at all. (87) The village of Teh-la has 1/40 of its farm area under fallow, Ho-ku has 1/20, Tso-ou has 1/14, Hsun-en and two other villages have 1/5 of farm area under fallow. Jen-ku, like Shun-ko, has 1/3 under fallow, but the five villages of Ke-tung, Chu-mo, Ya-ou, Tsai-tu and So-ma each has half of its farm area uncultivated for one year; i.e. for one crop season. In 8 villages of Kantze a household by household investigation has revealed that of a total of 410 Tse-ba households only 55 or 13 percent of the Tse-ba cultivators have fallow lands. (88) The fallow area of these 55 families amounts to 1/4 of the total farm area. The remaining 355 Tse-ba and all the La-da, being deprived of fallow land, only practice simple rotation of crops.

As may be seen from the following table, in Kantze oats occupy 50.61 percent, peas 41.92 percent, and wheat only 7.47 percent of the cultivated area.

Crop Areas of Three main Crops
(Kantze, 1940)

Village	Crop Areas in Tai-Chung-Ti				% of Crop Areas			
	Oat	Pea	Wheat	Total	Oat	Pea	Wheat	Total
Shun-ko	146.5	119	23.5	289.0	50.70	41.27	8.03	100
Jen-ku	158.5	120.5	37.0	316.0	50.16	38.13	13.71	100
Mi-mo	28.5	—	—	28.5	100.00	—	—	100
Chi-Ehr	191.5	157.5	30.5	379.5	50.46	41.50	8.04	100
Pu Yu Lung	211.5	183.0	23.0	417.5	50.66	43.83	5.51	100
Tso-Ou	337.5	309.0	61.0	707.5	47.69	43.69	8.62	100
Hsun-En	227.0	190.0	20.5	437.5	51.89	43.43	4.68	100
Se Si Ting	88.0	62.5	20.0	170.5	51.61	36.66	11.73	100
Teh-la	84.0	78.5	2.0	164.5	51.06	47.72	1.22	100
Total	1,473.0	1,220.0	217.5	2,910.5	50.61	41.92	7.47	

The general distribution of crops in Sikang seems to be 51 percent of the cultivated area under oats, 42 percent under peas and about 7 percent under wheat. Since oats is the staple food and must be harvested every year, the norm in farming here is to have 1/3 of the land under fallow and 2/3 for crop rotation. Although there is some local variation due to climatic conditions, the usual practice in Sikang is to plant during April and to reap sometime in September. There is only one crop a year; nothing grows during the winter.

Usually the peasants do the ploughing twice a year, once just before the Spring planting (in some localities two ploughings prove to be necessary)

and the second time after the harvest. The second ploughing must be done before the hardening of the earth, for no ploughing is possible when the ground is frozen. The autumn ploughing is for the purpose of loosening the soil so that it may easily absorb the melting snow in early spring.

Towards the end of April, at a date determined by the lamas, women go to the field for the planting. Women are generally regarded as the household's chief boon. Ploughing is done by two animals, usually bullocks, followed by one or two peasant women who level the ploughed soil with a spade. After the planting, nothing is done until perhaps the end of June, when the plant, or the oat, is about six inches above the ground. If the weather proves too dry, the soil between the rows of plants is broken by the cultivators. Sometime in June or in July weeding must be done to rid the field of wild grass. Then again nothing is done until harvesting. Hoes are rarely used, and the ploughing is usually not more than two inches deep. In many places wooden ploughs are employed, iron being a scarce commodity which has to be imported from the neighboring provinces of Szechuan and Yunnan.

The high cost of iron, the scarcity of blacksmiths and consequent limited use of the iron plough and shallow ploughing, all contribute to the primitive nature of Sikang's agriculture. But the backwardness is due also to another phenomenon, namely the excess of stones in the soil. This condition hinders deep ploughing on the one hand, but as cyclones and hurricanes are frequent in Sikang, it helps on the other hand to hold down the roots of the plants. In these circumstances, therefore, the problem of fertilizer is apparently more important than that of deep ploughing.

It is not true that the Kamba peasants do not appreciate the use of fertilizer. During the winter, particularly in and near the more populous towns, they busy themselves in collecting and storing up stable manure. In some places even night-soil is applied to the field. Because of a sparse population, a poor population and the inadequate number of animals, the availability of natural fertilizer is, of course, very limited. Each household uses up its own cow dung for fuel, and goes out to collect such fertilizer as may possibly be found. The Kamba cannot in this way collect enough fertilizer and can hardly afford to introduce deep ploughing. The only way to preserve soil productivity therefore is by the system of fallow land and rotation of crops.

Small-scale farming and small-scale ownership of land on the part of the vast majority of the Kamba peasants greatly curtail the possibility of crop rotation and the fallow system. Furthermore, such an agrarian situation does not yield the common Kamba peasant-household enough wealth to build up and maintain a good irrigation system. There once were excellent canal systems for field irrigation in the districts of Tao-fu, Lo-hau, and Teh-ke, but these have deteriorated, some having fallen into utter dilapidation. In the past two decades, at least, no new effort to restore and increase irrigation systems have been known in Sikang.

As may readily be expected, the agricultural productivity here is not high. Even the best land in Sikang yields a harvest of only six times the amount sown in the field. An investigation of 37 villages in Kantze reveals that this is the maximum harvest from the first-grade land, and

that usually it yields only three times the amount sown in the case of oat or wheat, and four times in the case of peas. The medium-grade land yields usually a harvest of not more than twice the seeds sown in all crops. From the lowest-grade land, one tai-chung-ti (0.23 hectare) yields only 58.3 liters of oats, wheat, or peas.

Furthermore only about one-tenth of what is actually grown in the field is ever harvested. Some plants are grown but bear no seeds because of inadequate fertilizer. Much is lost due to hurricanes and to the deprecation of birds. A considerable quantity of grain is lost also through careless and inefficient handling of the harvest.

Agricultural Productivity in Kantze
(1940)

Village	Oats		Wheat		Peas	
	Sacks Sown	Harvest	Sacks Sown	Harvest	Sacks Sown	Harvest
Shunko	146.5	472.6	23.5	67.0	119.0	368.6
Jen-ku	158.5	339.0	37.0	82.0	120.5	269.5
Mi-mo	28.5	85.5				
Chi-Ehr	191.5	527.0	30.5	72.0	157.5	437.5
Pu Yu Lung	211.5	467.6	23.0	51.6	183.0	401.0
Tso-Ou	337.3	1,037.0	61.0	193.0	309.0	938.0
Hsun-En	227.0	506.0	20.5	59.2	190.0	424.0
Se Si Ting	88.0	272.0	20.0	63.0	62.5	186.0
Teh-la	84.0	193.5	2.0	5.5	78.5	179.2
Total	1,472.8	5,641.2	217.5	593.3	1,220.0	3,203.8

The above table is based on 548 households, and one sack weighs 58.3 liters. Compared with the seeds sown, oat harvest is only 3.8, wheat and peas both are 2.7. Such meager harvests are similar to those of the Middle Ages in Europe. Prof. W. Sombat describes primitive German agriculture in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During that period the harvest in Central Europe was only three or four times the quantity of seeds sown in the field. In France, as late as 1750, the harvest was only five times the quantity sown.

CHAPTER VIII.

OTHER ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC LIFE

Low productivity is only one aspect of the agrarian system of the early feudalistic society prevailing in Sikang. Other aspects of economic life, consumption, indebtedness, exchange, stock-raising and handicraft, clearly reflect in a similar way the nature of this agrarian system. An understanding of agrarian relations among the Kamba would not be complete without a brief examination of these phases of their daily life.

First, consumption is almost as simple as production. No more than five commodities may be said to represent the most important daily necessities of the Kamba. They are grain, tea, butter, beef and wool. The quantity of consumption varies greatly with the economic status of the household. As regards grain consumption, for instance, rich families consume more meat and dairy products and less oats or other grains, while poor families rely almost entirely on grain for subsistence.

Besides serving as a staple food, oat is used in three other ways. Oat on the stalk is burned for its fragrance, religious practice to entertain the gods. Oat, together with peas is sometimes circulated as a form of money. Then, oat in flour form, mixed with tea or boiling water, is often served to the guests of the household. Because of this multiple usage oat consumption assumes even further variations among the different households. Generally speaking, however, it may be said that the maximum per capita oat consumption among the Tse-ba is two to three sacks, each sack weighing 58.3 liters. About 28 percent of the Tse-ba households enjoy this maximum consumption, among the Ta-du 29 percent. The vast majority of the Kamba consume only one to two sacks of oats a year, and this is true also of 32 percent of the La-da and 47 percent of the Ko-ba.

In the nine villages of Kantze that were investigated household by household, the total harvest of oats, peas and wheat in 1940 amounted to some 9,440 sacks. (89) With seed and tax in grain deducted, about 4,723 sacks were left to the producers. As the total population of these villages was 1,701, the per capita grain consumption was 2.77 sacks. It is also observed that the individual Kamba uses about half a liter of oat flour per day. Thus, the annual consumption of oat or pea flour must come to 3.13 sacks per capita. Perhaps it is safe to say that the normal per capita consumption of grain is about two sacks or 116 liters.

From this investigation it is clear that there is a wide disparity between the rich and the poor. About 30 percent of the Ta-du and more than one percent of the Tse-ba are virtually beggars. On the other hand, some wealthy Tse-ba households consume as much as 20 sacks of grain during the year. Of the 547 households investigated, 9.14 percent have no store of grain at all, 69.27 percent have some grain stored but far from sufficient for annual consumption, 2.93 percent who may be regarded as the middle class, have just enough to maintain a bare subsistence, and 18.66 percent store up oats, peas and wheat over and above the quantity they consume for the year.

Generally speaking, the Ta-du as a class is the poorest and consumes the least grain. About 80 percent of them become beggars, having no grain store. This makes it clear why the Tse-ba do not want to part with their land holdings. Once they did they would be reduced to the fate of the Ta-du. But there is much variation among the Tse-ba themselves. Among the Tse-ba included in the figures given above, 1.22 percent of them must subsist on begging; 76.54 percent have not enough grain for their own consumption. Those Tse-ba households that barely manage to maintain themselves with their own grain amount to only 1.71 percent, while 20.53 percent have surplus grain, over and above their own needs.

Thus about three-fourths of the total population of Kantze, and in all probability of the entire province, have to borrow or beg, and very often they are reduced to a diet of wild grasses cooked with cow bones, and mixed with oat or pea flour. Three of the most common grasses used in this way are the Säwu or Sägëa, the Gioba, and the Nei or Bu, according to the Kamba pronunciation. It may be said that Sikang, as far as the majority of the population is concerned, exists on the border of starvation.

For centuries tea has been used to mix with oat flour and tea has been the most important, and even indispensable, import of Sikang. Tea is often cooked three times over and its residue conserved to feed the animals. The Kamba need tea much as the Chinese need salt. If they can at all afford it they prepare it every day, and for each meal. It is a staple of the meal, not just something to be enjoyed after the meal. Several decades ago the fairly well-to-do families of Sikang consumed over 100 pounds of tea each year per household. Wealthy households consumed as much as a thousand pounds and more each year.

Because of the steady impoverishment, however, and also because of the inflation of Chinese currency and the corresponding depreciation of the Tibetan dollar, and the increased cost of transport and payment for taxes, tea has come to be far beyond the means of a great many Kamba households. Tea is now definitely a luxury in this province. Among the 548 households of Kantze investigated, as many as 38.14 percent do not get tea either by purchase or by barter. Of the four types of peasant households, we find that 18.18 percent of the La-da, 32.68 percent of the Tse-ba, 62.5 percent of the Ta-du, and 84.21 percent of the Ko-ba no longer enjoy tea. Most of these households substitute wild tea for the imported tea; and the most common local plant collected for this is munō, although oro and dun-bu are also used. Some households cannot afford to obtain even this substitute; they use unflavored boiled water to prepare the oat or pea flour. At one time diluted tea was considered the sign of poverty; now it is boiled water without tea.

For the Kamba, fat is added to the diet chiefly from the locally-made butter. Theoretically, Sikang is an excellent stock-raising area and butter should be plentiful. Actually, however, the majority of the population have no milk-producing cattle. They cannot make their own butter for home consumption, nor have they the money to buy, nor grain to barter, the needed butter. In short, the majority of the peasantry cannot obtain butter or fat from the cattle-raising tribes. Of the 548 households investigated, 50.7 percent do not use butter in their daily diet. This is true of 42.44 percent of the Tse-ba, 65.91 percent

of the La-da, 76.79 percent of the Ta-du, and as many as 84.21 percent of the Ko-ba.

As for beef, consumption is even lower, as may be seen from the following table.

Households That Do Not Consume Beef
(548 households in 9 villages)
(Kantze, 1940)

<u>Categories of Peasants</u>	<u>No. of Households</u>	<u>%</u>
Tse-ba	216	52.7
Ko-ba	37	97.4
La-da	26	59.1
Ta-du	51	91.1
Total	330	Average 60.2

About 60 percent of 548 households have no beef of their own, nor have they the money to buy beef, nor the grain to barter for it. The highest percentage of beefless households is to be found among the Ta-du, being 91 percent and among the Ko-ba, as high as 97 percent. In short, practically no tenant households in Sikang are able to enjoy beef.

As a correlation to the scanty diet, there is the problem of wool consumption. The majority of Kamba peasantry do not keep sheep or goats. Usually a peasant household either buys or barter wool from the nomadic people, and then makes the yarn and weaves the woolen cloth at home. As wool is becoming increasingly more costly, and the peasantry increasingly more poverty-stricken, more than half of the households cannot afford to wear woolen clothing.

Households That Do Not Have Wool
(548 households in 9 villages, Kantze, 1940)

<u>Categories of Peasants</u>	<u>No of Households</u>	<u>%</u>
Tse-ba	248	61.5
Ko-ba	36	94.7
La-da	23	52.3
Ta-du	53	94.6
Total	360	Average 65.7

Again the highest percentage of wool-less households is to be found among the Ta-du and the Ko-ba, each constituting nearly 95 percent.

Kantze is by no means the poorest district in Sikang; in fact it is better off than most districts of the province. Yet in the investigation of nine villages covering 548 households, statistics reveal that 9 percent of the population are grainless, 69 percent short of grain supply, 38 percent without tea at all, 50 percent butterless, 60 percent beefless and 65 percent without wool or woolen cloth. The standard of living being so low, it is no wonder that money economy has been greatly retarded here in its expected development. As the results of the existing agrarian

system, all these conditions together describe a stagnant, early form of feudalistic society.

Where, as in Sikang, the peasant households feel the scarcity of money and grain, and at the same time must have seed for planting and must meet taxes in kind, grain loans naturally become a very common and extensive practice. Also, the necessity of acquiring a new animal on the death of the old, or the need to hire a lama to attend a funeral, and sundry similar expenses, inevitably lead to indebtedness in cash. Loans in both money and kind thus prove to be a controlling factor in Sikang's economic life. Of the 548 households in the nine Kantze villages investigated, 53 percent have incurred debts. As the Tse-ba and the La-da are usually better off than the Ko-ba and the Ta-du, with more means of repaying loans, the percentages of indebted households of the former are higher than those of the latter. Whereas only 5.36 percent of the Ta-du and 13.16 percent of the Ko-ba are in debt, as many as 59.09 percent of the La-da and 62.2 percent of the Tse-ba have taken loans of one form or another.

The creditors of the peasantry of Sikang are not the Chinese merchants, who rarely come in direct contact with the village households. Chinese shopkeepers in towns deal with their customers in cash, and Chinese usurers extend loans only to those Chinese who mine gold sands. Chinese merchants sometimes barter with the nomads but between them there has been very little or limited, usurious practice. Occasionally, Kamba peasant households make trade deals with the nomadic tribes, which may be partly characterized as usury, but these again are limited to a few localities and assume an unimportant position.

The important creditors or usurers among the Kambas are the lamasery or lamas and wealthy peasant families. While the lamasery and the individual creditors play an equal role in the matter of oat or grain loans, the lamasery assumes an even more important position as regards money or cash loans. In 1940, in the nine villages of Kantze the lamaseries extended loans of 710.2 sacks of oats or 49.06 percent of the total, and the families 737.4 sacks or 50.94 percent of the total. But in the same year, whereas the lamaseries loaned 64,829 Tibetan dollars, or 66.87 percent of the total, the wealthy families loaned only 32,126 Tibetan dollars, or 33.13 percent of the total. No doubt the lamasery has more money at hand because of its trading activities. In general, the lamasery has a larger total outstanding loan but to fewer debtor households, as compared with the individual wealthy creditors.

Another reason for the larger total loan extended by the lamasery is the fact that its debtors are usually the well-to-do families themselves, that sometimes pass on the loan in smaller amounts to the poorer households, with whom the lamasery would not want to deal directly. As may be seen from the following table, most of the indebted households have taken small amounts of oat loans. Of the 548 households, in nine villages, 199 households, or 36.3 percent have taken oat loans; of these 53 percent have received only five or less than five sacks each.

Indebtedness in Kantze
(9 villages, 1940)

<u>Size of Oat Loan</u>	<u>Debtor Households</u>	<u>% to Debtors</u>	<u>% to All Households</u>
Less than one sack (less than 58.3 liters)	4	2.01	0.73
1-5 sacks	102	51.25	18.61
6-10 "	59	29.65	10.76
11-20 "	27	13.57	4.93
21-45 "	7	3.52	1.28
Total	199	100.00	36.31

Of the 548 households investigated, 238 households, or 43.43 percent have taken cash loans. This percentage is larger than that of oat debtors, because more Tse-ba and more La-da take cash loans rather than grain loans. It also shows that both Tse-ba and La-da, with their land holdings, are the chief victims of usury. Thus, they are not only tied down to the land for rent and for ula, but also for usurious exploitation. Of the 238 cash indebted households, 41.17 percent, or 17.89 percent of all households in those villages, have received only 100 or less than 100 Tibetan dollars each. But it is also significant that 13 households, or 5.47 percent of the cash-indebted households and 2.36 percent of all village households, have taken a cash loan of more than 1,000 Tibetan dollars each.

Undoubtedly the lamasery far exceeds individual wealthy households in usurious power. As regards oat loans, 26.09 percent of peasant households borrow from individual creditors and 26.64 percent from the lamaseries. But for cash loans only 27.92 percent resort to individual creditors while 36.86 percent resort to the lamaseries. The total number of debtors to the lamasery is one-third larger than to individual usurers, and the total loan, extended by the lamaseries is double the amount loaned by wealthy creditors.

Quite contrary to the needs of the poor households, the larger loans demand lower interest rates whereas smaller loans exact higher interest rates. Again, interest rates on grain loans are higher than those on cash loans. Usually the monthly payment of interest is two Tibetan dollars for a loan of 160 Tibetan dollars, i.e., 15 percent per annum. Smaller cash loans are paid with interest amounting to 23, 30, and 60 percent per annum. However, the ordinary term of cash loan is eight months. Oat loans, usually taken in the planting season and returned after harvest, exact 25, 33, or 50 percent interest for the duration of five or six months. There have been many cases of grain loans returned after four years bearing an interest rate of 495 percent. In extreme cases the interest paid within two years amounts to nine times the principal.

Occasionally labor is exacted in payment for the loan, but this practice is not common simply because it is not practical. Very often a debtor household obtains loans in oats from five, eight, ten or more creditors. The creditors would like to be paid in kind, as commodities are more valuable than labor in the present circumstances. Usually, an oat loan, a cloth loan, or a salt loan will be paid back in dry wood which

can be used for fuel. In general, trade and usury practice are intermixed, as in all feudal societies. Commodities of daily use are sold on credit, to be paid later with interest in the form of agricultural or dairy products.

There is a loan society in Kantze, evidently a remnant of the early communal life. This loan society of the village of Tso-Ou has 100 Tibetan dollars and 100 sacks of oats, available to village households on loan. The interest rate is the usual 50 percent per annum. All interest paid to the society during the year is used to defray the expenses of an annual religious gathering, to which neighboring village people are invited. Lamas are engaged and all who attend join in chanting the holy scripture. Conversation is not permitted. Hence it is known as "Mute Meeting", or Ngū or Nāi in the Kamba language. The head of this meeting is called Ngu-na ni-ba. Thus this remnant of communal economy, preserved by religious practice, has in fact become more a religious rather than an economic institution.

There is practically no economic city center in the entire province of Sikang. Regular marketing places are to be found only at the seat of Chinese magistrates or in the Chinese settlements. Among the Kamba themselves, there is not even a regularly instituted market or bazaar. Commodity exchange is conducted either through the lamasery, or with the occasional visit of the nomads, or through the village headmen, or by barter among the village households. It is evident that this kind of primitive trade in Sikang tends to be monopolistic, as only the very wealthy and powerful members can afford to engage in commerce.

Most of the articles necessary for daily life are made in the peasant households. But for tea and a few other items the Kamba have to go to the lamasery, which engages both in wholesale and retail transactions. The chief factor in this lamasery commerce is the large-scale consumption by the lamas themselves. Although food or daily meals are not provided to them, the lamas on religious duty or during a religious ceremony have to have tea, butter, lamp oil, etc. Their clothing of silk or satin, the painting and decoration of the Buddhas, and the interior upkeep of the lamasery itself, must be solved by purchase and exchange. Big lamaseries, therefore, have their own money capital, their own caravan, and armed convoy.

One of the largest lamaseries in Sikang, Ta Chin Sze, is located in Kantze, with a commercial capital of 1,600,000 Tibetan dollars. It regularly imports from Tibet and India, and has long since become the trading center of the region. Chinese merchants and the Kamba village headmen obtain commodities through this lamasery and make further distributions of them. Articles of trade are piled up in the yards and rooms of the lamasery, where the lamas perform their daily religious services, without the slightest embarrassment. The lamasery is not a market place with many shops, such as are to be found in other temples. It is a warehouse, a trade monopoly, a commanding fortress of the local or regional economy. It is the powerful center of trade monopoly and usury.

Another important source of trade is the occasional visit of the nomadic tribes, usually in autumn after the harvest. Here is exemplified an excellent system of barter. The nomads exchange salt, cows, wool,

butter and other dairy products for oats, peas cloth and other manufactures. Often they trade with money with Chinese merchants and the rich lamaseries. The trade conducted by the village headman is not in the form of shopkeeping. It is rather confined to the headman's household, having no outside employee. In the home of the village headman are stored leather shoes, cotton cloth, woolen cloth, tea, etc., ready for retail sale. Usually these things are sold on credit, i.e. trade combined with usury, and thereby enormous profits are obtained over a relatively long period of time.

The small-scale bartering among the village households is a rather simple affair. The practice is to exchange oats, cow dung, wood and fodder grass for such necessities as tea and salt. Such bartering is done under the influence of money economy, because each article of exchange is valued at its current market price. Barter is conducted in terms of money values. For instance, four backloads of cow dung are bartered for one dollar's worth of tea; 1,000 pieces of dry wood for fuel are bartered for 25 dollars worth of oats. This represents the largest bulk of Sikang's retail business.

Trade monopoly in Sikang is based primarily on political power. The village headmen, the chieftains, and the high lamas in the lamaseries usually make use of public property and the public treasury for their capital. The necessary, large expenditures for transport, which for trading purposes often last half a year to one year the round trip, are always at least partially offset by ula, horse ula, etc. Similarly other miscellaneous expenses connected with trade are also saved. Usury, connected with this trade often in terms of several years, is made secure by the attendant political power. For this very reason, the total Kamba capital in commerce still far exceeds the total Chinese capital in Sikang. It is clear that insofar as political power in Sikang is really derived from land or the control of land, trade monopoly still rests with the Kamba local rulers. Because of their trade relations with India and Tibet, they also have the closest relations with Tibetan lamaseries and Tibetan nobles.

In other words, private traders among the Kamba population in Sikang are inseparable from the land-controlling chieftains and village headmen. Likewise usury is inseparable from trading capital. This trinity of land-trade-usury monopoly is the foundation of Sikang's entire economy, typical of all early stages of feudalism. The result is the lack of free independent landlords, the lack of free independent merchants, and the lack of free money exchange, or of a pawn shop. There is no marketing system, no commercial city; in short, no such economic prosperity as is to be found in Central China.

This trinity of monopolies flourishes in a wilderness of poverty and economic stagnation. How poor and how stagnant Kamba society in Sikang has come to be may be seen from the retarded development of money economy. Of the total of 548 households in the nine Kantze villages, only 8.6 percent of them use cash to buy salt, 17.9 percent use cash to buy butter, 25.9 percent buy wool with money, 28.8 percent buy beef with money, and not more than 36.3 percent obtain the daily necessity, tea, with cash. Hiring a lama to attend the religious ceremony on the death of family members or in connection with the sickness of beasts of burden, is still the well-preserved tradition all over the land of the Kamba;

yet 50 percent of the 548 households have neither money nor grain to hire a lama on such an occasion, and 5.47 percent of them pay the lama in grain.

In these nine Kantze villages, which are quite representative of the whole province, as many as 29.21 percent of the households use no money at all throughout the year. Households using twenty Tibetan dollars or less each during the year total 35.68 percent. (90) Those using 20 to 100 Tibetan dollars each, 14.06 percent and those using 100 to 1,600 Tibetan dollars each only 1.63 percent. It is significant that the first two categories, those having none or very little money, comprise 64.89 percent of the total population.

Even more significant is the fact that among the Tse-ba households 19.4 percent do not use any money in an entire year and among the La-da households 13.6 percent; whereas among the Ko-ba households as many as 76.3 percent and among the Ta-du households as many as 80.3 percent are entirely outside of the sphere of money economy. This conclusively demonstrates that the retarded development of money economy is not due to a self-sufficient household economy but rather to the general condition of utter poverty.

One more reflection of this utter impoverishment is the scarcity of livestock. Of the 410 households of the Tse-ba in the nine villages of Kantze, 33.17 percent have no horses, 42.20 percent have no ploughing bullocks, and 73.41 percent have no milch cows. Nearly 10 percent of all the households keep no animal of any kind. Of those households that have livestock, only half have one horse each, three-tenths have two bullocks each for ploughing and only one-fifth have a milch cow. (91)

Generally speaking, the La-da households have much fewer livestock than the Tse-ba. A small number of them are as poor as the Ko-ba in this respect, and on the whole they are poorer than the Tse-ba. Whereas 33.17 percent of the Tse-ba have no horses, as many as 79.6 percent of the La-da have none. Again, whereas 42.20 percent of the Tse-ba have no ploughing bullocks, as many as 70.50 percent of the La-da have none. The La-da have fewer other animals than the Tse-ba. The status of the Ko-ba and Ta-du is even worse. No Ta-du household was found to possess a milch cow or a horse. A principal reason for this scarcity of livestock is the inadequate fodder supply, coupled with the high death rate of the animals and the inability to replace them.

Finally, the general poverty of the Kamba peasantry is reflected in the death of auxiliary home industry and the lack of an independent handicraft. There are at most five types of auxiliary work for the peasants to do. First, there is stone carving and cutting holy scripture on stone tablets to be used for religious purposes. The maximum income from this per household would be 100 Tibetan dollars for the year. In some cases the work is done in exchange for salt, tea or butter. Cattle butchery is another auxiliary occupation. For each cow butchered, four to ten Tibetan dollars may be paid. Third, there is the cutting of dry wood for fuel in places near the forests; for one thousand pieces about 22 Tibetan dollars are paid. One peasant can cut at most three thousand pieces a year. Sewing leather shoes or boots is a fourth auxiliary vocation, which pays less than forty Tibetan dollars for the whole year. Lastly, one may be hired to chant the holy scripture of lamaism and at

the same time spin wool yarn. The wage for this work is so low that it amounts to 1 1/4 sacks of oats for the whole year. But as the peasants generally cannot afford to buy wool, 72.4 percent of households do not do home spinning. Those who do home spinning of course supply only their own needs, and cannot be considered as having an auxiliary vocation.

A distant Sikang or Kamba art product may be seen in the brass carving and colored paintings on the lamasery walls. The district of Pei-yu, immediately south of Teh-ke is famed for its knives and leather saddles. But the skilful workmen are scattered in different villages, and under the control of village headmen they are not permitted to sell their products freely. Like their labor power, the fruits of their work are controlled by the local administrators. In general handicraft is discouraged.

SOLUTION FOR SIKANG

Unlike the agrarian system of the Pai Yi in southernmost Yunnan, the social polity among the Kamba of Sikang bears no remnant of a village commune. Unlike the Pai Yi society, that of the Kamba, and also of the Tibetans in general, records a long period of slavery. Remnants of a slave society are still recognizable in Sikang. Almost all of the Ko-ba and La-da lack ploughing animals or agricultural implements of their own. It is also evident that the present society of Sikang is not a proto-feudal one, like that of the Pai Yi in Cheli. There is no political or administrative council of the ruling group such as is found in Cheli. Furthermore, there is already a considerable social and economic differentiation among the ruled groups. The grouping of four types of peasantry, the Tse-ba, the La-da, the Ko-ba, and the Ta-du, is not to be found among the Pai Yi.

Yet slavery is not a feature of Sikang society. With the exception of the lamas, more than 75 percent of the whole population in Sikang are Tse-ba households. Each Tse-ba household has a small landholding and in addition has its own agricultural implements and working animals. This small landholding is based on the labor power of the household and the ula that it can contribute. A portion of the land is allotted in exchange for certain degrees of ula. Land is the equivalent to fief, essentially the same as the European medieval seignior, and ula is the expression of its vassality. Whereas in the proto-feudal society of the Pai Yi there is vassality without fief, here in the feudal society of the Kamba, vassality has closely identified itself with fief. In other words, the Tse-ba, or the majority of the Kamba people are land-bonded serfs, but they are not slaves.

The Kamba society and its agrarian system certainly represents one of the earliest stages of feudalism. It closely resembles that of North China (chiefly Hopei and Shansi) during the rule of Pei Wei, in the fifth and sixth centuries. Both Tse-ba of the present-day Sikang and the Nun Nu in North China under the Pei Wei are typical serfs. The Ko-ba among the Kamba peasants have the same status as the Nu Pi of the Pei Wei period who had to labor under the Nun Nu. Under the Pei Wei rule in 485 A.D., by Imperial Order slaves were given land to cultivate and became serfs. At that time, the cultivators also had to pay heavy tribute to the rulers, and money economy was not at all developed. Even at the end of the sixth century a barter system prevailed all over North China.

It is true that the Tse-ba and other types of peasants can no longer be bought and sold as slaves, but it is also true that they are bound to agricultural labor as serfs. There is hardly an independent landlord among the ruled, certainly no independent merchant or independent craftsman. The exchange relations in this economy are simple and money economy is not well developed. Therefore the entire agrarian system of the Kamba can only be classified as early feudalism.

In this kind of economic and social system, production, and therefore life itself, is stagnant and tends to deteriorate and become decadent. Causes and factors in this process are of course multiple and interlocking.

First of all, the basis of agricultural production is too narrow and limited. Landholdings are small and the peasant households that work on the land are both economically and physically fixed to it. Like bees in their hive the Sikang peasant serfs are kept in their place, without freedom to expand their farming activities. In consequence production cannot be increased.

Ula diverts much of the labor from the peasants own production. It also requisitions handicraft products or the hands to produce them. In these circumstances there cannot be independent workshops which might lead to industrial progress. There cannot be independent merchants either, to bring supply to the market regularly. There is not even a bazaar, nor a fixed marketing day. These conditions are traced to the commercial monopoly on the part of the lamaseries and the local headmen, and the general poverty of the ordinary people.

Agricultural production being more or less confined to the mountain valley or a series of such valleys, it presents a hindrance to political unification by any stronger tribe among the Kamba. Outside political influence, as exemplified by the policy of the Chinese feudalistic administration, has fostered division rather than unity. A "divide and rule" policy has long been the tradition. External relations of Sikang therefore, have never favored the growth of a centralized feudalism. The existing decentralized social polity in turn retards economic development.

No external economic relations have ever encouraged Sikang to develop its natural resources. The imported British, Japanese, Indian and Tibetan manufactured articles can never be competed with by locally-made commodities unless there is a high tariff protection. Capital from outside Sikang can hardly be expected to come into the province for real economic or industrial development. For one thing, the establishment of modern communication and transport is too costly and not immediately profitable. Basically the economic status of the Kamba is so low that they could not afford to use the modern equipment. Then, there is no available, free, hired labor for any modern economic development. Capital without labor, not even unskilled, would not function well in this backward region.

Immigration from Central China or from the neighboring province of Szechuan would involve new land settlement and would certainly aggravate nationality conflicts. In fact, any Chinese policy, apart from the question of immigration which would tend to militate against the interests of the Kamba chieftains and headmen and the high lamas, may be opposed by these influential groups. Indeed, in Sikang, as in other parts of China's west borderland, the agrarian question is inseparably joined to the nationality question. External force or influence alone cannot bring about the changes that encourage economic progress.

Social and economic progress must be brought about essentially by internal changes within a society, though outside influences and assistance may also contribute. Theoretically speaking, there are three alternative possibilities of agrarian advance or development in Sikang. First, a substantially large number of the Tse-ba could become independent landlords freely collecting high rents and thus accumulating money capital for economic progress. This is virtually impossible at present because the existing productivity does not permit more or higher rent, and above all, no available tenants could be found because of ula.

A second possibility would be for the chieftains and headmen and the lamasery all or one of them, to become what may be called managing landlords, like the Prussian Junkers of the nineteenth century. This, however, involves a large number of hired agricultural laborers. These laborers are almost impossible to find because the ula system drains the labor power of a community. Still a third possibility of agrarian progress would be for the Tse-ba, or a considerable number of them, to cultivate increasingly more commercial crops, thereby increasing the scope of money economy. But this too would be very difficult to accomplish. Commercialized agriculture, under present conditions in Sikang, requires intensive cultivation, which again would require more labor power. The present system of ula almost certainly blocks this possibility.

The solution for Sikang, that is, a practical program for changing the present Kamba agrarian system toward progress and better productivity, is not a simple one. It should be four-fold. First and foremost the immediate and complete abandonment of ula is called for. Without doing away with this evil system, the available labor power cannot be liberated for pursuing larger productive activities. Second, land ownership by the Tse-ba must be definitely and legally fixed, so that, as private landlords or landowners, they can feel free to develop agriculture and other auxiliary production. Third, to mitigate or alleviate the disadvantages of small-scale farms, numerous labor cooperatives for agriculture should be established. Fourth and last, as none of the above three objectives can actually be achieved without a locally-elected democratic administration, it is obviously necessary that the Kamba be given autonomous political power with the right of self-determination, within the framework of which broad democratic village administration could and should be firmly installed.

Notes

- (1) Chow Cheng-peng, Chinghai, Commercial Press, Shanghai, published in Kunming, 1940, pp. 49-52. "In the 14 districts in eastern Chinghai, including Sining, Lohtu, Tatung, Kweiteh, Hualung, Hsunhua, Huangyuan, Yushu, Konho, Tulan, Tunggen, Tanyuan, Mingho, and Wotso, the total population is 205,990, all Tibetans. Around the lake of Chinghai live some 37,200 Tibetans. Twenty-five Tibetan tribes in south Chinghai have a population of 25,680. Thus the total number of Tibetans in the province is 268,870."
- (2) Sikang Provincial Government, compiler, Statistical Tables Regarding Sikang, Kongting, 1939. In the 19 districts including Kongting, Taofu, Kantze, Tehke, Tungko, Shihchu, Peiyu, Chuanhua, Kiulung, Yakiang, Lihua, Paian, Tehyin, Tinghsiang, Taocheng and Yidon, the Kamba total a population of 573,981.
- (3) Yang Chung-hwa, Sikang in Summary, Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1937, Vol. 2, pp. 249-50. The Tibetan population in the districts of Wucheng, Iantsin, Ningching, Kemei, Tsaiyu, Kung chuo, Tsaiya, Changtu, Szeta, Shihto, Chiali, Taichao, Poomie, O-loh and Seta total 321,945.
- (4) G. A. Combe, A Tibetan on Tibet, London, 1924, p. 118.
- (5) Described in "The Life of Chao Tsung-kuo", Han Shu, during the first century B.C. The Chong captured 200,000 mu of cultivated and cultivable lands in the border region of Kansu and Ninghsia, in 63 B.C.
- (6) Described in "The Life of Harakhasen", Yuan Sse. In 1307, after the ancient canals in Chinghai were repaired and reopened, the Mongolian soldiers joined the Tibetan tribes in cultivating vast tracts of grain fields.
- (7) Described in "The Life of Tukan, the Commander At Uhstang Field Headquarters," Ming Sse. In 1388 the tribes living in the present districts of Luting and Kongting in eastern Sikang had not paid for many years the annual tribute for their irrigated and dry lands.
- (8) Sikang Provincial Government, Compiler, Bird's-eye View of Sikang, Kongting, 1939, p. 207. Of the total population in the 19 districts east of the Kin-sha River, 50 percent engaged in agricultural work, 26 percent in nomadic life, etc.
- (9) According to Sse-Ma Chien, China's first great historian, Emperor Yu of the twenty-second century B.C., who was accredited with having planned a system of watersheds and consequently made irrigation possible, was born a Chong. See Sse-Ma Chien's preface to "The Table for Six Kingdoms", in his Sse Kie (Historical Records). The ancestors of the Chow Clan, who later established the Chow Dynasty in China, had been attacked by the Tsun (the Tibetans in the north) and therefore moved eastward in

the thirteenth century B.C. After their separation from the Tsun, they built their own walled cities, discarded Tsun customs and established their own moral codes. But later when the Chow people penetrated further east and attacked the rulers of the Shang Dynasty, they were joined by their neighbors, including the Tsun. The allied force was organized in 1123 B.C. near the present municipality of Sian. See Sse-Ma Chien, "Chow Peng Kie" (Origin of the Chow Dynasty), in his Sse Kie.

- (10) In southern Kansu, southern Shensi and western Honan there were many tribes of the Tsun. They were later driven to the west by the rising Chinese kingdoms, towards the end of the Chow Dynasty. See "The Accounts of Sichang" in Hou Han Shu.
- (11) Of the five tribes that invaded north China in the third and fourth centuries, three were of the Tungus and two of the Tibetans. The four kingdoms established by the latter tribes were: (1) Hou Liang (285-303) extending from Tiensui in southeast Kansu to Nancheng in southwest Shensi; (2) Kiu Chu (296-371) south of Hou Liang, also in southern Kansu and Shensi; (3) Chien Tsin (351-394) extending from Tiensui in southern Kansu to northern Shensi and southern Shensi, and further to Chengtu in the south and to north Honan in the east; and (4) Hou Tsin (384-417), further east of Chien Tsin, extending from northern Shensi through southern Shansi, eastern Honan and southern Hopei to the district of Chingho on the Shantung border and to the district of Holsien in eastern Anhwei on the Kiangsu border. See Hung Tiao-cheng, Compiler, Outline of the History and Geography of Sitsang, (Tibet), pp. 97-106.
- (12) The Turfan empire reached Kansu and Shensi in the north, south Sinkiang in the west, India in the south and the Tatu River on the Sikang-Szechuan border in the east. During a period of nearly two centuries, 634-801, the Tang Dynasty rulers and the Turfan chiefs fought a border war twenty-five times, mostly in the northwest. See "The Accounts of Turfan" in Kiu Tang Shu.
- (13) Fa Tseng, Modern Sitsang, Sino-Tibetan Academy of Religion and Philosophy, Chungking, 1937, p. 45. See also Section 3 of "Appendix to Sse Yi" in Hsin Wu Tai Sse and "The Life of Han Huang" in Kiu Tang Shu.
- (14) René Grousset, Histoire de L'Extrême -Orient-Epoque Mongole, 1929; Chinese translation by Feng Cheng-chun, Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1934, p. 67.
- (15) In 1509 a Mongolian chieftain named Yippla Atos led his tribe westward, attacked the Fans (Tibetans) in the area around the lake of Chinghai, and occupied their fertile land. The Fans fled, and those who had to remain became subordinates of the Mongols. Another Mongolian tribe from the north, led by Eta and his two sons, invaded this region and looted the Fans in

1559. Though Eta marched off to other places, his sons and their followers occupied parts of Chinghai. See "The Accounts of Sifan", Vol. 2 of Si-Yue-Li-Chuan (Biographies of the West Regions) in Ming Sse.

- (16) "Gu-gri-sog-po, Gusri, the Mongolian, in Tibet called Gu-sri-bstan-hdsin chog-rgyal, the Dsuŋgarin chief, who conquered Tibet and established the supremacy of the Dalai Lama in 1643 A.D. over all Tibet." Saarat Chandra Das, Tibetan-English Dictionary, Calcutta, 1902. "Gu-sri bstan-hdsin chos-rgyal" is the Latinization of the name in the Tibetan language. The Tibetan pronunciation is something like "Guch-tan-zin-cho-gie". In Chinese history he is referred to as Ku Sho Khan or sometimes as Kuo Shih Khan. After his conquest in Chinghai he sent a messenger and tribute to the Manchu ruler in 1637. He was officially appointed to rule over Tibet by the Manchu Emperor in 1653, and died three years later. See Section 24 of "Geography" in Vol. 292 of Ching Chao Wen Hsin Tung Kao.
- (17) In 1719 the Manchu Emperor Kanhsi ordered a Mongolian general to enter Chinghai with 25,000 soldiers to end a rebellion in Tibet. In the official proclamation it was pointed out that the system of Dalai Lama's rule had been first organized by Gusri. See Ma Ngo-tien, Field Notes from the Northwest, p. 88. Balkam, Kam of Gusri's time, not only included Sikang but also the southern parts of Chinghai. See Chow Cheng-peng, Chinghai, Shanghai, 1938 edition, p. 119. Dalai Lama was given the direct control of Wei and Tsang, accompanied by a revenue collector called Diba. Another Diba was appointed for Balkam. Gusri himself lived in Kokonor and made his sons Diba in other regions. Even at this time Kam was famed for its abundance of grain. See General Nien Keng-ya's "Memorial regarding affairs in Chinghai", 1724, quoted by Jen Nai-ngan in his Guide to Sikang, New Asia Society, Nanking, 1933, p. 3. Also Sikang Provincial Government, Compiler, Bird's-eye View of Sikang, Konting, 1939, p. 186.
- (18) There are two versions about the origin of Horsakanga. First, a certain Choschot prince lived in Kam or Sikang for about ten years. He married a Kamba and his first offspring was a girl. The Lama blessed her by saying "Mashu", which meant "as you wish". Seven sons followed, the first of whom took the name Mashu. Each of the seven was granted a Horsakanga, and by the end of Ching Dynasty, about 1910, not more than five Horsakanga were left. See Bird's-eye View of Sikang, p. 186. Second, according to the story told in 1940 by Keta Khutukhtu of the Peili lamasery, there were only five fiefs at the very beginning. In the Mongolian language "Horsakanga" means five Mongolian tribes. It was said that Gush-tanzin Cho-gie had stopped in Kantze and its vicinity on his way from Chinghai to Tibet. He had stopped long enough to build a lamasery called Duwebo, where he married a Kam woman and gave birth to a son. When he departed for Tibet he asked a lama named Laba to take care of this son, who later became a king. As king of Kam he granted fiefs to his five sons. The second version appears to be more reliable.

- (19) F. Younghusband in India and Tibet described Changtu, with 84,000 households, as governed by a big lamasery. The Kam chieftain in Tehke has had an uninterrupted rule over his region for 47 generations.
- (20) Ever since the Han Dynasty it was Chinese policy to station garrison troops in Shensi, Kansu and Sinkiang in order to separate the Mongolians in the north and the Tibetans in the south. See "The accounts of Sifan", in Vol. 2 of Si-Yue-Li-Chuan, in Ming Sse. As early as the first century, B.C. more than 10,000 infantrymen from Honan and Anhwei were sent to Kansu to organize a system of military colonization. See "The Life of Chao Tsung-kuo", Han Shu. In the Tang Dynasty, about 800 A.D., land in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia-Chinghai region was granted free to both Chinese and Tibetans. To each household the government gave one bullock and agricultural implements and grain seeds. In addition, one year's food for two people in each household was supplied by the government for the first year. All surplus from the harvest was collected by the government at a good price. Cultivators were trained to fit themselves for military defense. See "The Life of Loh Che" in Kiu Tang Shu.
- (21) There were nine wars between the Chinese and the Tibetans in the first stage; they took place successively in 1700, in eastern parts of Sikang; in 1719-20 in middle Sikang and southern Chinghai; in 1723, within Tibet; in 1728, entering Tibet from Yunnan; in 1730, subduing a rebellion; in 1745, again subduing a rebellion; in 1776, fighting on the Sikang-Szechuan border; in 1788, within Tibet; and in 1791, entering Tibet from Chinghai. There were seven wars in the second stage: 1894, 1905, 1906, 1908, 1909, 1910, and 1911. Chinese troops entered Tibet through Tehke in Sikang in 1909. In the third period, there were three wars. In 1918 Tibetan troops occupied Changtu and attacked Kantze. After the fight a Britisher named Eric Teichman brought about a truce. In 1930 Tibetan troops occupied Lihua and Lohou. In 1932 the 24th Szechuan Army re-occupied Tehke and Kantze. Only local Chinese troops were employed during the third stage.
- (22) The Opium War of 1840-42, war with England and France in 1857-60, the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, and the military intervention by eight powers in connection with the Boxer Movement, 1900. The major and better known rebellions were the Taiping 1850-64; the Miao in Kweichow, 1854-73; the Nien revolt in North China, 1865-68; and the Moslim Rebellion in Yunnan, 1865-73.
- (23) The term "Tu-sse" does not appear in Yuan history. In Ming history there are accounts of the Tu-sse of Yunnan, Kweichow, Szechuan and Kwangsi. In each of these provinces Tu-sse and district magistrates (i.e. appointed Chinese officials) have held office at the same time, either in the same district or in different districts. The system in the Ming period was a continuation of the Yuan, with additional special regulations regarding requisitions in general and corvée in particular. Whereas Yuan

laid the foundation of this system, Ming was to establish it fully and more extensively.

- (24) Summarized from Wei Tsang Tung Chu (Chronicle of west and east Tibet), a compendium of documents relating to Tibet and its administration, published in several editions in the middle nineteenth century.
- (25) In 1911 in advocating the establishment of Sikang as a province, it was said that the Tu-sse in Sikang and on borders of Szechuan and Yunnan, as well as the lamas in these areas, respected only the government of Tibet and had had no connection with the Imperial Court in Peking. (See Bird's-eye View of Sikang, Kongting, 1939, p. 134-135) In 1921 the Tibetan authorities, under British influence, presented a memorandum to the Washington Conference, making the following demands: (a) there should be no discussion concerning Tibet in the absence of a Tibetan representative; (b) the British representative in Tibet, Charles Bell, should be invited together with a Tibetan delegate; and (c) if possible any discussion on Tibet should be held in India or in Lhasa. F. Younghusband, India and Tibet, op. cit.
- (26) In the Tang Dynasty there was no regular tea trade with the Kamba and Tsangba; tea was not exported on a large scale, and both gold and silk were paid for the horses. See Loh Che's memorial to the Emperor in 792, in "The Life of Loh Che" in Kiu Tang Shu.
- (27) The horses from Chinghai were much larger and could fight much better than those from the Sikang border region. Of 100 Sikang horses only 8 were fit for fighting purposes, about 20 were good for draft purposes, the rest were poor and almost unusable. See "The Horse Administration", in the "Military Chronicle" of Soong Sse.
- (28) Throughout the twelfth century there were eight horse-trading centers on both the north and south borders. These figures were recorded in "The Horse Administration" in Soong Sse.
- (29) Ibid. In the thirteenth century the number of imported horses declined steadily.
- (30) See the section concerning tea in "Tu Shih Hou Chu" (Economic Chronicle) in Soong Sse.
- (31) See "The Horse Administration" in Soong Sse. Tea then became a government monopoly in Szechuan. The government bureau had to collect an adequate amount of tea in order to acquire a sufficient number of horses.
- (32) In 1268 the tea produced in Chengtu area was collected and transported to North China for sale by the government. Private sale of tea, just as private sale of salt, was subject to punishment. See "The Tea Revenue" in the "Shih Hou Chu" (Economic Chronicle) in Sin Yuan Sse.

- (33) See "The Life of Tukan, the Commander at Uhsteang Field Headquarters", in Ming Sse. In 1536 an Intendant of the Ming Court, Liu Liang-chin, said that the Fans (Tibetans) had dominated China's west border but had become dependent on tea for their daily life. This was why, according to Liu, private trade of tea was kept from them, and barter for horses granted them, thus securing a better national defense and "cutting off the right arm of the Huns". See "The Laws of the Tea Trade", in the "Economic Chronicle" of Ming Sse.
- (34) In the memorial of Wang Chung-ko, see "The Life of the Tartars" in Ming Sse. These designated markets for trade with Mongolians were located in northern Shensi, northern Shansi near Tating and northern Chahar.
- (35) "The Horse Administration", in the "Military Chronicle" of Ming Sse.
- (36) The "Economic Chronicle" and the "Military Chronicle" of Ming Sse. In 1403 the pasture land in the north and the reserved grassland south of the Yangtze River began to be taken away for government grant to high officials or occupation by powerful local gentry. By 1527 the budget for fodder purchase to maintain state horses became alarmingly large. The collapse of tea and horse barter was at once an index to the decline of horse administration, of tea monopoly and of national defense.
- (37) See Kin Fei, "Border Tea and Kam-Tsang" in Kong-Tao monthly, Kongting, Vol. I, No. 7, March 1939. The unit of monopoly tea is called yin. Each yin is officially specified as 59 kg. In practice this is only 50.60 kg. Thus, 100,000 yin every year would be about 5,000,000 kg. The monopoly tax was paid every quarter of the year.
- (38) See "The Memorials of Chang Yin-tang", 1907, Vol. 3, p. 52; Vol. 5, p. 8.
- (39) Ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 38-9, in Ching Chi Chiu Tsang Tsou To (Memorials and Letters written in the Ching Dynasty Regarding Tibetan Plans). Chang Yin-tang wrote to the Viceroy of Szechuan that Tibet was fertile enough for tea planting, but that the seeds brought from Szechuan had been secretly baked and thus could never have germinated. Chinese customs-houses have always prevented tea seeds from being exported. Tibetan merchants were boycotted when they attempted to engage expert tea cultivators from Szechuan or Yunnan.
- (40) David MacDonald, in Twenty Years in Tibet, told this story very vividly. The first automobile brought to Lhasa was from Mengdong Kusho in 1921. Three motor trucks were sent to Lhasa again in 1926, for postal and grain transport. Soon the bullocks and horses on the highways began to decrease rapidly, the erstwhile fodder business was suspended, peasants had no income to pay taxes. Authorities in Lhasa sent representatives to negotiate with the government of India. Consequently, the three trucks were taken out of Tibet and sold in

India, and the bullock cart was restored to use.

- (41) Wen Kai, "Graphic Sketch of Tehke", Kong-Tao (monthly), Kongting, Vol. 2, No. 6, February 1940, p. 36.
- (42) See "Tribes", Section 2, in Wei Tsang Tung Chu, Vol. 15.
- (43) Sikang Provincial government, Compiler, Bird's-eye View of Sikang, Kongting, 1939, p. 188.
- (44) It is important to understand that Tu-sse has always been a part of the imperial administrative system, and in no way can it denote a social structure even in part.
- (45) Liu Wen-hui, "My Personal Views Regarding Affairs of the Sikang-Szechuan Border", Kong-Tao, Vol. I, No. 2, August 1939, p. 6.
- (46) Chen Tung-fu, "Administrative Plans for Sikang and Tibet", Kong-Tao, Vol. I, No. 5, November 1939, p. 45.
- (47) Fan Chang-yuan "Sketch of the Tehke Chieftain", in Chuan-pien Chi-kan (quarterly) Vol. 2, No. 2, June, 1936.
- (48) Fu Cheng-yuan, "Peiyu in the Past Thirty Years", Kong-Tao, Vol. 2, No. 3, November 1940, pp. 20-21. Peiyu is an administrative district directly south of Tehke.
- (49) An appointment paper of the Tse-ba in Ling-tsung, north of Tehke, dates February 1897, now kept by the headman in Ling-tsung. The monthly stipend was six taels of silver.
- (50) An official memorial from Kantze dated August 1911, now deposited in the provincial archives of Sikang. In Tehke there were also a certain number of Pao-cheng.
- (51) Mong Yun-hsi, "Present conditions in Shih-chu", Kong-Tao, April 1940, p. 56. Shih-chu is the northernmost district of Sikang, in the central part of the province, bordering Chinghai.
- (52) Chang Tze-wei, "Livelihood in the Two Villages of Mola and Ya-sang, in the District of Lihua", Kong-Tao, Vol. I, No. 2, August 1939, p. 43.
- (53) Auyang Chu-peï, "The chieftain of Chan-hua, Past and Present" Kong-Tao, Vol. I, No. 12, June 1940, p. 21.
- (54) In Shih-chu, for instance, apart from the land tax paid to the district government, people still have to pay tribute to the local chieftain. Tribute, usually in hides, furs and dairy products, vary in quantity and kind from village to village. In Kantze, where no chieftain is to be found, the Chei-tsong exacts tribute from the people of oats, fodder, and silver dollars. In the past thirty years or so, in Kungse and Mashu, for every tu of land tax in kind the people have to pay 3/8 of a Tibetan dollar to the Pao-cheng (same as Chei-tsong). From these two areas the total tribute in cash to the Chei-tsong was 800 Tibetan dollars in 1940.

- (55) This sort of theocratic rule is prevalent in Tibet, where each administrative area is called the Tsung, administered jointly by two men called Tsung-peng. One of the two is secular and the other, who has the greater power, is a lama. See Len Liang, "Relations between politics and religion in Tibet", in The Eastern Miscellany, (a Chinese semi-monthly), Chungking, Vol. 38, No. 14, July 1941.
- (56) See Li Pai-fong, "The Lamas and Lamaseries in Sikang", Kong -Tao, May 1939, p. 54.
- (57) In the document of surrender by the chieftains of Kungse and Mashu, in 1910, which is now in the provincial archives of Sikang, it has been stated that the total population of the two places was 1,097 households, cultivating a total of 4,256 tei chung. (A tei chung of land is equal to 0.58 acre) In addition, the lamaseries have 1,352 tei chung of cultivated land. The grand total of cultivated land here therefore cannot be over 3,500 acres.
- (58) See Fa Tseng, Modern Sitsang, Chungking, 1937. The description of the Tu-sse fully applies to Sikang.
- (59) The counterpart of Ko-ba may be found in Shanghai suburbs, in the district of Pao-shan. In recent years, as a result of the increased demand for raw cotton by the cotton textile mills in Shanghai, cotton fields have been extended in Pao-shan. As a means of attracting tenants to continue cotton cultivation, some tenants in Pao-shan have been given a piece of land "free of any rent", but they have had to cultivate their landlord's cotton field and be responsible for delivering all of its harvest. In other words, for the use of this little piece of land, known in Pao-shan as Chia-Se-tien, these tenants now pay a labor rent. A Ko-ba is only a tenant who pays labor rent in Sikang, while a tenant who cultivates his Chia-Se-tien is a Ko-ba in Pao-shan.
- (60) In the Chumbi and Kam-pu valleys, and probably elsewhere in Tibet also, there is a custom of mortgaging land for a term of years in return for a loan. There are two types of mortgage. When the use of the land pays both principal and interest, it is called in Tibetan language Lo-tü. When it pays off the interest only, it is called Te-me, or sometimes mik-te. In the latter case, if the lessor cannot repay the principal, the lessee keeps the land. See Charles Bell, The People of Tibet, Oxford, 1928, p. 57-58.
- (61) This is known as "declaring the half" (Che-She). In Nepal, the fixed rent in kind, paid annually, is known as kuth. Charles Bell, *ibid.* p. 58.
- (62) G. A. Combe, A Tibetan On Tibet, New York, 1926, p. 73. Polygamy and polyandry are known as Zasumba. Dorje Zodba said, "I might mention that a custom which is common enough is for a man to allow a close personal friend to share his wife's favours; I have known such cases in Dartsendo (Kongting),

Kantze, Gyangtse, Darjoo-ling, and elsewhere." See Combe, p. 74.

- (63) Combe, p. 73.
- (64) As quoted by Combe, also p. 73.
- (65) See Huang Pei-Ch'iao, Hsi Ts'ang Tu Kao, published in 8 volumes, 1886, Peking, with maps. Much of this information was used by W. W. Rockhill in his article on Tibet, appearing in Vol. 23, new series, of Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.
- (66) Charles Bell, The People of Tibet, Oxford, 1928, p. 88.
- (67) Lho-i Cho-jung, folio 112, quoted by Charles Bell, ibid., p. 89.
- (68) Female Chieftains in Sikang may be compared with French women in the Middle Ages who received seigneurial rights by inheritance. The Yeh-ba, named Peipanima, as described here, may be compared with the manager of the seigneur, known under various names in European feudalism as Intendant, Praepositus, Provost, Major, Villicus, Meier, Schultheiss, etc. See Prof. Charles Seignobos, The Feudal Regime, tr. and ed. by Earle W. Dow, Henry Holt, New York, 1902.
- (69) Fa Tseng, Modern Sitsang, Chungking, published by the Sino-Tibetan Academy of Religion and Philosophy, 1937, pp. 58-59.
- (70) Each sack of oats in Sikang measurement equals about 58.3 liters.
- (71) In Sikang the harvest is usually 3.8 times the quantity of seeds sown.
- (72) Viceroy Chao Erh-feng's written decision at the end of an official report on agrarian conditions presented to him by the Kantze Committee. This report, bearing the date of 1910, is deposited in the Kantze District Archives.
- (73) "Regulations Relating to the Change from Tu-Sse System to the Appointed Magistrates and the New Tax Methods", dated Pa Tang, February 1907. This document is deposited in the Pa-an District Archives.
- (74) Sikang Provincial Government, Compiler, Bird's-Eye View of Sikang, Kongting, 1939, p. 213-14).
- (75) "Regulations Relating to the Change from Tu-Sse System to the Appointed Magistrates", dated Hsian-cheng (now the District of Ting Heian) October 1906.
- (76) The memoirs of the Szechuan Civil Administration Commissioner (Pu Cheng Sse), in 1903, now deposited in the archives of the Chengtu magistrate's office.
- (77) The draft regulations for colonization by Wu Hsi-cheng, now kept in the Pa-an magistrate's office.

- (78) "Regulations Relating to the Change from the Tu-Sse System to the Appointed Magistrates, and the New Tax Methods", dated Pa Tang, February 1907. Now kept in the Pa An official archives.
- (79) According to the detailed report of Patang Revenue Commissioner. Wu Hsi-cheng, in 1908.
- (80) Sikang with its present boundaries was made a province late 1938; the extreme eastern parts of the province were formerly territories in Szechuan.
- (81) Sikang Provincial Government, Compiler, Bird's-Eye View of Sikang, Kongting, 1939, p. 218-22.
- (82) A. T. Steele's dispatch of February 2, 1948, from Lobito, Angola, published in New York Herald Tribune, February 15, 1948.
- (83) See Chen Han-seng and others, Military Requisitions in China, Social Science Series No. 2, monograph in Chinese, published by Academia Sinica, Shanghai, 1932.
- (84) Wei Tsang Tung Cheh (Official gazetteer published by the order of Emperor Kang Hsi for Tibet and its border regions). 1719.
- (85) This one Ta-du household in the village of Tso-ou is an exceptional case, as it leases in land to the extent of 4 tai-chung-ti and also engages in trading. Hence it is able to hire one laborer all the year round.
- (86) Wei Tsang Tung Cheh, Vol. 4, "Cheng Tsan."
- (87) These twelve villages are Ke-ku, Tan-ka, Ko-nun, Chi-ju, Pu Yu Lung, To-ju, Ju-hsi, Se Si Ting, Long-to, Mo-hsi, Nun-pai and Mashu-Waitch.
- (88) The names of eight villages are Shun-ko, Jen-ku, Mi-mo, Chi-Ehr, Pu Yu Lung, Tso-Ou, Hsun-eh, and Se Si Ting.
- (89) These nine villages have 548 households with a total population of 1,701. Of these, 503 households, or 1,612 persons, consume their own harvests; 45 households, or 89 persons, have no harvest whatever and have to rely either on wages or, more often, on loans.
- (90) One Tibetan dollar was equivalent to 0.50 Chinese dollar in August 1939; to 1.18 Chinese national currency dollar notes in April 1940; and to 2 Chinese national currency dollar notes in September 1940.
- (91) The ploughing bullock is called dso by the Kamba peasants. A milch cow is called dso mo.

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